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In contrast to the general absence of such
discussions in the West, the Muslim majority
world has witnessed intense debates over
the meaning and consequences of (particu-
larly cultural) globalization for the relation-
ship between 'Islam' and the 'West', even as
its economic markers such as rapid growth
in trade, the use of information technologies
to reorganize production, and the integra-
tion of financial markets, have had limited
i m p a c t . There exists a multitude of Arabic,
Turkish, Persian, French, German and Italian
language literature on the subject. Exam-
ined together, they reveal great ambiva-
lence towards possibilities and dangers that
globalization implies: that is, a general fear
that globalization has brought an 'invasion'
of American culture to Muslim societies that
will 'hollow us out from the inside and do-
mesticate our […] identity'; yet at the same
time an awareness that globalization is a
'natural' process – 'neither Hell nor Heaven' –
from which the Arab/Muslim world cannot
opt out.
Muslim experiences of globalization can
be interpreted as a 'post-modern cultural-
ism', one that is intimately connected to
what is arguably the culturalization of poli-
tics and economies as a defining moment of
contemporary globalization. In this dis-
course, many Arab and Muslim writers de-
mand 'the right to be different' as the basis
for the democracy necessary to negotiate
past the Scylla and Charybdis of assimilation
into or exile from the emerging global
order. This focus on the right to cultural dif-
ference is crucial, because globalization is
understood to be premised on the develop-
ment of a forced difference that leads to the
deepening of poverty and inequalities both
inside and between countries. 
The consensus seems to be that globaliza-
tion marks a continuation of the basic dy-
namic of Western domination and hegemo-
ny dating back hundreds of years, in which
today America is utilizing globalization to
overthrow existing political, economic, and
cultural norms. In this context, globaliza-
tion's cultural/ideological foundations pro-
vide it with the 'fine power' to realize its im-
perialist aims without causing classic revo-
lutionary reactions to it, as did Western im-
perialism before it. 
Building on two centuries of Muslim cri-
tiques of capitalism and materialism (from
Al-Jabarti to Sayyid Qutb and Ali Shariati)
contemporary writers see globalization as
sabotaging the 'Islamic Personality' and 'in-
fect[ing] the people', causing a 'planned ex-
change' with true Muslims through the in-
troduction of materialist culture. As the
cover of a recent popular book on the issue
depicts it (in the fashion of an old dime-
store novel), the American cowboy is lasso-
ing the world. Culture is considered central
to the power of contemporary globalization
because globalized culture leads people to
withdraw loyalty from their 'cultural nation-
al identity', leaving only equally powerful
discourses such as Islamism able to stand
against it. 
Moreover, equally important to the per-
ceived threat to democracy and autono-
mous development posed by American-
sponsored globalization is the fear that the
consumer/materialist culture at its heart will
tear down the borders erected and main-
tained by the nation-state. Yet at the same
time the fear for the future of the nation-
state raises the question of how central the
nation-state, and the 'human nationalism'
counterposed by one writer to an 'inhuman
globalism', serves its purpose in the 'global'
era, and in a situation where tens of millions
of Muslims now live in the heart of the West,
where the dar al-harb (i.e. non-Muslim coun-
tries) is gradually becoming dar al-Islam. 
Muslims in Europe
Indeed, these ambivalent sentiments to-
ward globalization are shared not just by
Middle Eastern Muslims, but by Muslims liv-
ing in Europe as well, although the latter
generally have a more sanguine perspec-
tive. Over the course of four decades of
Muslim (im)migration to Europe a diverse
community, some 10 million strong, has be-
come 'implanted' on European soil. The
emerging European Islam is situated in a tri-
angular relation with the wider European
host societies and Muslim majority coun-
tries of origin. Together these vectors pro-
duce two opposing tendencies: a Euro-Islam
that sees itself as a permanent presence in
the space of Europe, and a 'ghetto' Islam
that mirrors the continued rejection of Islam
by the white/Christian majority cultures. 
The latter tendency is fuelled by the same
processes of economic marginalization suf-
fered by most developing countries that
have undergone structural adjustment. This
dislocation has fuelled the 'Islamization of
identity' of many younger European Mus-
lims in the same manner that globalization
has 'ideologized' Islam across the Muslim
world. Thus may Muslim leaders in Europe
remain hostile to 'Western'/European cul-
ture; indeed, if anti-IMF violence in Egypt
and Algeria heralded the arrival of global-
ization in the MENA region in the late 1980s,
in 1990 an 'intifada of the cities' in France
broke out, waged largely by poor Muslim
immigrants; while in 1993 the Union of
French Islamic Organizations issued a mani-
festo which, in a language that resonates
with the critiques hailing from the Muslim
majority world, preached the need of 'free-
ing [people] from the yoke of ungodly capi-
talism […] fac[ing] the colonialist unbeliev-
er, the eternal enemy'.
Yet on the other hand, many Muslim lead-
ers in Europe, such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi
or Tariq Ramadan, see countries such as
France assuming the status of dar al-Islam,
that is, a 'Muslim' country. Islam i n France is
becoming an Islam o f France, a transforma-
tion that was crucial to the way in which
Muslims in Europe and around the world
perceive and relate to Europe. Indeed, the
question that is raised vis-à-vis these more
extreme Islamist imaginations of European
Islam is how France can be 'expelled […]
from the minds of the colonized' when the
(former) colonized are now living i n F r a n c e .
This is the European problematic generated
by the radical political reassertion of Islam in
Algeria, and in the southern Mediterranean
more generally. 
It is clear, then, that Islamism in Western
Europe is nurtured by the same systematic
processes which are found at the global
level. In a more positive sense, this situation
reveals the power of Islam as a transnational
identity which allows, for example, net-
works to be formed by small businesses and
associations in Germany and Turkey that
allow Turkish immigrants to benefit from
being political and social actors in both
countries. One could argue that the success
of these networks is an important reason
why, in contrast to the generally negative
(or at least suspicious) appraisal of global-
ization in the Arab world, the Turkish debate
is more evenly divided between those who
support and those who criticize the domi-
nant neo-liberal, consumerist model of
globalization. 
At the same time, it reveals the impor-
tance of class/economic position in deter-
mining religious expression of European
Muslims, in fostering and supporting a Mus-
lim élite capable of acquiring legitimacy in
both Europe and their country of origin, and
more broadly, in shaping the space of Eu-
rope and the Euro-Med region into a 'terre
de mediation' between Europe and the
Muslim world. More specifically, there is a
large and growing Muslim middle class,
supported through communities such as Fe-
tulleh Gulen that have developed a 'neo-lib-
eral Islamism' that challenges the hegemon-
ic Saudi (Wahhabi) Islam that has sought to
establish the kind of religious and cultural
homogenization in the Muslim world that
many critics decry as a damaging element of
the globalization discourses emanating
from the West/America. 
Whatever their motivations, it is clear that
many Arabs and Muslims are developing
their own cultural responses to globaliza-
tion through the introduction of a politi-
cized Islam into the modern arenas of social
life. Such cultural politics is generating 'new
One of the consequences of the post-11 September
war on terrorism has been the appearance of numer-
ous attempts, both in academia and in the press, to
explain 'Muslim rage', 'why they hate us', and 'what
we can do about it'. Much of the reporting has cor-
rectly focused on Western culture as a source of an-
tagonism in the Muslim world. However, few analy-
ses have focused on the role of globalization – and
the new matrices of cultural, economic and political
interaction it has produced – in perpetuating and
even exacerbating the hostility between segments of
Muslim and Western societies. 
Muslim Responses
to Globalization
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Dutch drama: 6 May 2002 and an animal rights' activist shoots to death
the Dutch populist politician Pim Fortuyn, thus committing the first polit-
ical murder in the Netherlands since World War II (see Karacaer, p.1 1 ) .
There was no single incidence of public support for the murder, but oddly
enough many felt relief that the suspect was not a Muslim. Why?
In a fascinating one-man performance Fortuyn had shaken the founda-
tions of the Dutch political establishment. Bald-headed, proudly gay,
with a limousine as means of transportation, and often accompanied by
two Yorkshire terriers, he used television as his main medium, dissemi-
nating his views with dramatic gestures and – at times
funny – one-liners. For those who did not back his
ideas it seemed a relief that he was sort of a court
jester, too vain and witty to survive dreary Dutch polit-
ical culture. However, his horrid death may well lead
him to 'survive' longer than many anticipated. Nine
days after his death his party, established three months earlier and simply
called List Pim Fortuyn, became second to the Christian Democratic Party
that profited greatly from the moral crisis that had hit the country. The
dominant Labour Party lost nearly 50% of its seats, signalling the current
spectacular decrease of support for social democracy in Western Europe.
Not unsurprisingly, issues of immigration and (public) security, often in-
terlinked, dominated the campaigns in the Netherlands, as in neighbour-
ing countries. 
The Dutch example demonstrates that globalization is not only the
predicament of the Muslim world or Muslims migrants in the West
(Levine, p.1), but also of European societies in general. Relentless in his
critique on political correctness and bureaucratic imperative, Fortuyn
mobilized public support by questioning the ability of Muslim migrants
to integrate and by ridiculing Islam and its representatives. Fortuyn
broadcasted mixed messages; he was not xenophobic, but he clearly ab-
horred Islam and everything associated with it. Islam has received very
bad press in the Netherlands – also because of series of incidents con-
cerning imams and would-be imams expressing views which, to put it
mildly, with some regularity transgress the local contexts of both believ-
ers and unbelievers. However few in number, these extra-local (and in the
eyes of many, virtually extra-terrestrial) imams attract public attention
and strengthen the belief of many that Dutch culture has nothing to gain
from Islam. Moreover, the 11 September attacks have reinforced the idea
that Islam is strongly associated with the outright rejection of Western
lifestyles. Well before his calling to electoral politics, Fortuyn published
his views in columns and books, one of which was en-
titled Against the Islamization of the Netherlands. Dur-
ing the campaigns he defined lslam as a 'backward cul-
ture', claiming that conditions are terrible everywhere
Islam rules. He held Islam responsible for the isolation
of many migrants in the Netherlands. Moreover, he ex-
pressed fear that the increased presence of Muslims poses a danger to
the emancipation of women and of homosexuals because of their 'hypo-
critical and male chauvinistic' culture, notwithstanding his own sexist re-
marks made to female journalists. Nevertheless, he brought two formerly
left-wing issues into a basically conservative populist discourse. 
Fortuyn's uncompromising views, his camp if not eccentric behaviour,
and his veritable martyr's death explain his posthumous popularity. His
main ideas, the disciplining of immigrants into the national culture and
the refutation of cultural relativism, have been voiced in many places be-
fore. Some argue that thanks to people like Fortuyn a number of taboos
that frustrated a more pragmatic approach to the issues of immigration
and integration, in particular in the field of gender relations, including
marriage patterns, have been lifted. That may be true, yet, for the time
being, his violent death precludes a more open exploration of the issue of
migration and culture based upon the assumption that cultures are in
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D I C K  D O U W E S E d i t o r
Dear Editor,
Your ISIM Newsletter issue no. 9 is as stimulating
as ever, but I wonder whether it fully rises to the
occasion. Granted, you strike a fine and imagina-
tive editorial balance, including on the one hand,
critiques of Euro-American hegemony, and on the
other, attempts to introduce innovative ideas from
the Arab-Islamic world to an Anglophone reader-
ship. Amr Hamwazy's article on the prospects for
the 'intellectual isolation of radical Islamism' and
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi's piece on 'hate mysti-
cism' are especially striking.
But do you not skirt around an urgent issue,
which is whether or not – as recently argued in a
lecture in England by the Dutch sociologist Em-
manuel de Kadt – the undoubted tendency within
all religions (and other dogmatic ideologies) to-
wards violent extremism is particularly pro-
nounced in contemporary Islam? The case he ad-
vances is not unfamiliar – that Islam has not yet un-
dergone a Reformation and an Enlightenment,
and that its modernizing voices have not yet con-
solidated into coherent intellectual movements
comparable to Reform Judaism. I listened to De
Kadt's lecture – which also addressed the much
wider question of fundamentalism in general –
with deep resistance, fortified by my reading of
many anthropological warnings against denying
'coevality' to non-Western societies; by the knowl -
edge that a huge majority of Muslims have no in-
clination whatsoever towards extremism, let alone
violence; and by a recognition that Islam as a reli-
gion cannot bear responsibility for the repressive
character of so many political regimes in the Islam-
ic world.
However, some facts do seem to support De
Kadt's case. It is true that at the centre of Oxford
University is a memorial to Christian bishops who
were burnt at the stake as recently as four and a
half centuries ago. But it does seem odd today that
the editor of The Quest for the Historical Muham-
mad (New York: Prometheus Books, 2000) should
have had to publish his book under a pseudonym,
Ibn Warraq, presumably for fear of retribution. Yes,
he may be biased and polemical, but is not the free
exchange of ideas a prerequisite for fruitful co-
adaptation with the modern world? He has clever-
ly echoed the title of Albert Schweitzer's pioneer-
ing The Quest of the Historical Jesus, published in
1906. Surely an anthology of academic texts by
such venerable authors as Renan (d. 1892), Lam-
mens (d. 1937) and Schacht (d. 1969) deserves to
be publishable in the ordinary way.
Secondly, the extent of mind control exercised
by some of the armed Islamist groups in Algeria
over their recruits during the civil war has probably
been underestimated. I found Moi, Nadia, femme
d'un émirdu GIA [Groupe Islamiste Armé], by Baya
Gacemi (Algiers: Editions L'Epoque, 1998) such a
shocking book to read that I hoped it would turn
out to be an insidious forgery. 'Nadia' is a pseudo-
nym; the story, told to a journalist, is that of a girl
who fell in love with a young hooligan who was in-
doctrinated into becoming a ruthless killer and
petty tyrant in the GIA hierarchy. Her village, ini-
tially sympathetic to the Islamists, changed to op-
posing them, so that eventually her husband was
killed by the police and she was abandoned by all
her family and friends. During a visit to Algiers in
2000, I was assured by university sociologists
whose opinion I trust that it is an authentic ac-
count. Similar techniques of indoctrination are
commonly used by cults and similar organizations
in the West, but the extent of their use in Algeria in
the 1990s under the auspices of Islamism testifies
to a serious crisis in religious authority. This must
be a central problem today in a country whose
population is nearly 100% Muslim by birth.
If the question posed by De Kadt is indeed the
serious issue that I believe it to be, it is one for Is-
lamic theology, not merely for social and political
science – for only a minority of the world's Muslims
seem likely to suddenly give up their religious be-
liefs and become liberal humanists after the Eng-
lish or Dutch model. Special attention should be
given to such movements as Islamic feminism, as
in your conference report by Martin van Brui-
nessen; but also to the work of modernizing
sheikhs such as Zaki Badawi in London and Soheib
Bencheikh in Marseilles, whose intellectual com-
mitments, now criticized by some commentators
as élitist, may well have an immense long-term in-
fluence. And surely De Kadt's argument should be
faced straight on, so that we can assess the evi-
dence for and against. 
J O N A TH AN  B E N T H A L L
Jonathan Benthall is honorary research fellow at the
Department of Anthropology, University College London.
E-mail: jonathanbenthall@hotmail.com
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On Saturday, 8 June 2002, Prof. Dr Nasr Abu Zaid
received the Franklin D. Roosevelt Freedom of
Worship Medal. In 1941. US President Roosevelt
proclaimed that four freedoms are essential for
democracy to flourish: freedom of speech and ex-
pression, freedom of worship, freedom from want,
and freedom from fear. In order to encourage
leadership in fulfilling this vision, the Franklin and
Eleanor Roosevelt Institute honours individuals
who have demonstrated a lifelong commitment to
these ideals. Nelson Mandela was among the
other recipients. The trustees of the award stated
that Abu Zaid's career and work exemplify the im-
portance of continued commitment to freedom of
religion and conscience. In his acceptance speech
Abu Zaid expressed his great concern about the
ongoing repression and violence associated with
r e l i g i o n .
'As a Muslim and a scholar of Islamic Studies, the
first Muslim to receive such an honourable award,
I feel obliged to explicate what I think is the dou-
ble message implied in awarding me the medal of
freedom of worship. The message is to address
both the Western world and the Muslim world as
such. Islam is not static, non-dynamic, or a fixed
set of rules. It is not a violent terrorist religion by
nature. Any religion can be misused, politicized
and manipulated to serve a certain ideology. The
Qur'an, the holy book of Muslims, is silent; it does
not speak by itself, but people speak it out. As the
Word of God to man, its understanding and inter-
pretation reflect the human dimension of religion.
It is then unacceptable to ascribe to Islam what-
ever problems Muslims might have in their socio-
historical existence.'
Among his many other activities, Prof. Nasr Abu Zaid
participates in the ISIM 'Rights at Home' project. 
A p p o i n t m e n t
was supposed to be preparatory ground-
work for the Islamization of history as a disci-
pline. But, the appeal of history and histori-
ans led him to explore the cultural and reli-
gious biases that made the writing of history
possible. Using the work of Gadamer, Tayob
has tried to point out the prejudices of early
Muslim historians as both debilitating and
empowering factors in the writing of history.
Using their religious views on the compan-
ions of the Prophet, Tayob showed how the
form and production of history (t a ' r i k h) suit-
ed the interests of the early historians.
Back in South Africa in 1989, Tayob used his
knowledge of the study of religion to evalu-
ate Muslim institutions and responses to
colonialism, apartheid and the struggle
against apartheid. In addition to personal ex-
perience and academic tools, his exposure to
the study of religion prepared him well for
the task. In the next few years, he published a
number of articles and eventually two books
on Islam in South Africa. In addition to the
one already mentioned, Islam in South Africa:
Mosques, Imams and Sermon (Florida, 1999)
focused on the emergence of Islamic institu-
tions in the context of apartheid, and
analysed Islamic sermons in these institu-
tions during South Africa's transition to
apartheid. This work marked a transition
from a focus on youth and political develop-
ments, to a broader concern about the insti-
tutional framework and social-religious pat-
terns of Islamic practice. He explored, for ex-
ample, the relation between imams and
traders, Asian and African Muslims, and men
and women. Furthermore, he showed how
the sermon during the period of transition
became the locus of new interpretations on
the basis of the old.
Tayob's attention to public life in Africa has
deep roots in his personal life and academic
career. As an undergraduate student in a
racially segregated university, he was attract-
ed to Islamist politics against conservative re-
ligious scholars and apartheid. Until 1984, he
played an active role in the Muslim Students
Association and Muslim Youth Movement.
He has maintained a commitment to the de-
velopment and transformation of the latter
as a columnist for its newspaper, occasional
advisor, and honorary historian. Published in
1995, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa ( C a p e
Town: UCT Press) situates the organization in
the history of South African Islam, and the
history of Islamic revival in general. 
Even whilst reading for a degree in Arabic
and Islamic Studies, he was really interested
in a career as a mathematics teacher. After
completing an honours degree in mathe-
matics, Tayob taught the subject at the high
school level for two years. However, a short
stint in Saudi Arabia to improve his Arabic
competency lured him further into the study
of Islam. He then obtained a scholarship to
complete an M.A. and Ph.D. at Temple Uni-
versity within the framework of the Islamiza-
tion of Knowledge under the supervision of
Prof. Ismail al-Faruqi. His dissertation on the
9t h/ 1 0t h-century Muslim historian, Al-Tabari,
His interest in classical Islamic thought has
continued, and still focuses on Al-Tabari and
other individuals and aspects of classical
Islam. Tayob taught courses on the Qur'an,
Hadith, Philosophy and Sufism. These were
all taught as interrelated disciplines from a
critical perspective. Using his knowledge of
the development of t a ' r i k h, he tried to frame
other Islamic disciplines and their develop-
ment as products of particular interests. In
each case, Tayob was keen to show how the
values and symbols of Islam were created
and articulated in different historical and
cultural contexts. Islam: A Short Introduction
(Oxford: Oneworld, 1999) was the material-
ization of this intellectual trajectory. In addi-
tion, he is also working as an associate editor
for a new two-volume encyclopaedia on
Islam at Macmillan.
In the meantime, South Africa was rapidly
changing with the dawning of democracy.
Tayob's interests in South Africa expanded
to draw comparisons with religious societies
and communities in other African countries.
The focus on African experiences has devel-
oped in collaboration with colleagues in
Cape Town and abroad. In the first instance,
the meaning of religion and public life in a
democratic society has been prompted by
serious political questions in South Africa it-
self. A departmental course on Religion and
Public Life, taught with colleagues working
on comparative religions (Christianity and
African Traditional Religions) has stimulated
interesting questions. Good partnerships
based on similar concerns have been nur-
tured with colleagues in, particularly, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. So far, one co-
edited book on religion and politics has seen
the light of day, edited by Tayob and Weisse:
Religion and Politics in South Africa ( M u e n-
chen: Waxmann, 1999). On an equally pro-
ductive level, Tayob has participated in and
established a series of colloquia for sharing
and disseminating research findings with
Muslim communities.
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Re po r t  
M A RE I K E  W I N K E L M A N N
As a joint effort of the ISIM, the Felix Meritis founda-
tion in Amsterdam, and the International Institute for
Asian Studies (IIAS), a workshop on madrasas, or Is-
lamic religious seminaries, was held on 16 May 2002
in Amsterdam. Following the attacks in the United
States and the ensuing war in Afghanistan, the per-
ception of the madrasa as a training camp for jihad re-
gained strength and was linked to the debate on the
position of Islamic education in the West. The work-
shop presented a bird's-eye view of the history and
role of madrasas in Pakistan, Indonesia and Europe,
and addressed a number of related current issues.
Madrasa Workshop
In his opening speech, Khalid Masud (acade-
mic director, ISIM) gave an overview of the
history of the madrasa institution in the
Muslim world, reviewing a large portion of
the scholarly work that has been done on
the topic. Moreover, the opening address
established the link with the 11 September
attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York and the Pentagon, which marked the
advent of the New War on Terrorism and
gave rise to a new interest in the madrasas
in many parts of the world. After the 11 Sep-
tember events, madrasas were mentioned
frequently in the media, often in the form of
allegations stating that the madrasas f o r m
breeding grounds for such terrorist activi-
ties carried out in the name of Islam.
This workshop on madrasas provided an
opportunity for the four speakers to present
their ongoing work from a regional perspec-
tive. During the first session, Jamal Malik (see
Malik, p. 20–21) introduced the participants
to the Pakistani context, concluding that the
New War discourse on the 'axis of evil', a
heading under which these days the madra-
s a s are also often mentioned, ignores the far
more complex reality of this Islamic institu-
tion of learning. According to Malik, religious
schools provide a space for education and
cultural-religious survival for the deprived in
Pakistan, who suffer from social poverty,
conflict, and oppression. Hence, the basis of
the madrasa is not terrorism, in Malik's opin-
ion, though he admitted that the institution
potentially lends itself to promoting terror-
ism and violence. Nevertheless, an outright
criminalization of the madrasas is not an op-
tion in the Pakistani context either. Martin
van Bruinessen reflected on the history of
the Indonesian p e s a n t r e n, stating that, even
though they are conservative in outlook, the
religious schools stand opposite to funda-
mentalist Islam. Furthermore, Van Brui-
nessen put forward the idea that teaching
students how to think contextually forms
part of the madrasa education, which gives
rise to a rather pluralist attitude among the
students. The conclusion was that also the
Indonesian p e s a n t r e n are facing a crisis re-
garding their regeneration, even though
they are well integrated in the larger societal
c o n t e x t .
Philip Lewis shifted the focus to Europe,
presenting his findings with regard to Mus-
lims in Britain, and addressing the question
of whether through madrasas in the UK a re-
ligious leadership can be established that is
able to interact with the wider social con-
text. Lewis described three ways in which
the madrasas relate to their social context,
namely through isolation, engagement, or
resistance. Moreover, Lewis mentioned new
professional trajectories for madrasa g r a d u-
ates, such as rendering service as chaplains
in hospitals and prisons, and the new career
trajectory of the 'freelance imam'. However,
despite the innovative spirit, it turned out
that the (Deobandi) resistance model has
become paradigmatic in the British context.
Thijl Sunier spoke about madrasas in the
Netherlands, against the background of the
ongoing national debate on whether or not
such institutions hamper the integration of
migrants into Dutch society. Interestingly
enough, in the Dutch context the concern
for integration seems to prevail over the
fear of violence stemming from Qur'anic
mosque schools and vocational training fa-
cilities for imams, as they are to be found in
the Netherlands. What is perceived as prob-
lematic about the presence of such institu-
tions is that first of all funding confessional
schools is detrimental to Dutch secularism,
and moreover a complex of questions re-
garding civic incorporation and citizenship
arises. In the end, the question of whether
Islamic education should be public or pri-
vate in the Netherlands is a highly subjec-
tive one.
To round off the programme, Peter van
der Veer (co-director, ISIM) moderated the
general discussion, summarizing the main
points that were addressed in the respective
presentations. Future trajectories and em-
ployment difficulties of madrasa graduates,
the issue of women and madrasa e d u c a t i o n ,
and the question of whether and where vio-
lence comes into play against the back-
ground of the allegations made, crystallized
as the main issues for further scrutiny at the
end of the workshop. 
Abdulkader Tayob, from the University of Cape, joins
the ISIM as the ISIM Chair at the University of Nijme-
gen. His arrival brings with it his wealth of experience
in the study of Islam from the perspective of religious
studies and South African politics. Tayob is particu-
larly interested in the trends and developments in
African Islam since the end of colonial rule. How have
Muslims and Islamic institutions developed since the
1960s? Which interpretations of Islam, and which so-
cial and political forms, have dominated the public
debate among Muslims? In spite of diversity, can one
speak of an African experience of Islam? If so, what
can this experience tell us about global Muslim expe-
riences? These are the kinds of questions that Tayob
will bring to the ISIM in the coming years. 
Mareike Winkelmann is a Ph.D. candidate
a tt h eI S I M .
E-mail: mjwinkelmann@hotmail.com
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L A I L A  A L - ZW AI N I
The ISIM programme 'Rights at Home: An Approach
to the Internalization of Human Rights in Family Re-
lations in Islamic Communities' recently held its first
series of sounding board meetings in Yemen: from
4–6 May 2002 the venue was in S a nca, 9 May in Aden,
and 11 May in T aci z z. The meetings were jointly orga-
nized by the ISIM and the Forum for Civil Society
(FCS), a non-governmental organization concerned
with the development of democracy, human rights,
and civil society, based in S a nca. 
Sounding Board
Meetings in Yemen
The project team from the ISIM consisted of
Abdullahi A n - N aci m (primary consultant)
and Laila al-Zwaini (coordinator). The FCS
was represented by its director, Jamal
Adimi, and assistant, Mohammad Asham.
The team was further accompanied by two
members of the Rights at Home Advisory
Board, Ebrahim Moosa (Duke University,
USA) and Salma Maoulidi (Sahiba Sisters
Foundation, Tanzania).
The objectives of the meetings were to dis-
cuss issues and strategies regarding social
and cultural rights in local constituencies in
Yemen, especially regarding the autonomy of
women and the socialization of children. In-
vited were representatives from various sec-
tors of Yemeni society: activists, lawyers,
scholars, writers, teachers and poets, as well
as imams, female religious guides, judges and
shaykhs. With a view to the variety of local
dresses of the participants and the diversity of
their contributions, it could be established
that there was a well-balanced representa-
tion of various regions and backgrounds.
The overall outcomes were nevertheless
quite consistent: all participants agreed that
in Yemen there exists a divergence between
the s h a r ica- b a s e d laws and the Islamic s h a-
r ica, on the one hand, and normative behav-
iour which is mainly based on local and trib-
al customs, on the other. Such customs were
said to often deprive women of their Islamic
rights, for instance in matters of inheritance,
marital and divorce rights, and social free-
doms. This leads to the understanding that
women's rights – especially in the country-
side, the home of about 80% of the popula-
tion – are governed by customary norms of
honour and shame (ca y b) rather than by Is-
lamic norms of h a l a l (permissible) and
h a r a m (forbidden). Another practice that has
an immediate impact on family life and the
socialization of children is the nationwide
Yemeni custom of chewing q a t during the
afternoon and evening hours, which puts a
heavy strain on the already low household
income and often deprives children of
parental care and attention.
In such a context, norms derived from in-
ternational human rights standards could
be invoked to protect the rights of Yemenis'
own culture and religion, and at the same
time inspire a private and public debate on
how these customary and religious norms
could be redefined to play an accommodat-
ing and promoting role for all members of
this developing society.
Activating such a debate is not an easy
task, since it requires a strong political will
and the application of the agreed-upon
norms by well-functioning institutions, as
well as a change of mentality and practice
among the population as a whole. Changing
only one family or community would name-
ly not be effective or even desirous, if the
rest of society is on another track and will
treat the transformed individuals as out-
casts. 
The sounding board meetings were there-
fore also intended to identify so-called 'ad-
vocates of social change', local actors who
enjoy authority in their respective communi-
ties and have the potential and will to effec-
tuate – by themselves or by inspiring others
– widespread cultural transformation in sup-
port of human rights. There were various
candidates who easily matched these crite-
ria: for instance, a group of w aci z a t, female
religious guides who have access to the se-
cluded privacy of family homes; but also a fe-
male novelist specialized in folkoristic stories
and songs in local dialects, which in reality
have more impact on the way of thinking
and behaviour of illiterate people than a reli-
gious incantation in standard Arabic. 
There was also a member of parliament
from the Islamists' party who is at the same
time a practising lawyer, a human rights ac-
tivist and a shaykh, a tribal leader. Shaykhs
in Yemen are the 'gatekeepers' of the nu-
merous family homes located in tribal areas:
without their cooperation or consent, no
outsider – meaning virtually anyone from
outside the tribe – can gain access to this
sector of society. Although urbanized Ye-
menis, and many others alike, look upon
tribes and tribal norms as an obstacle to
progress and modernization, tribal struc-
tures have already been changing under the
influence of state formation. Is it therefore
illusory to imagine their positive participa-
tion in the context of civil society? Rights at
Home would not shun the idea of investi-
gating this possibility.
The enthusiastic young staff of the FCS
contributed a great deal to the success of
the meetings, and also gave the project
members an opportunity to experience
some 'grassroots-level' activities, in the form
of sit-on-the-floor lunches in local restau-
rants and in q a t-chewing gatherings, the
latter being the inevitable décor of the af-
ternoon sessions. 
The next Rights at Home sounding board meetings
and subsequent fieldwork will be held in Dar es
Salaam and Zanzibar (Tanzania) from 17 June
u n t i l 2 July 2002.
Wo r ksho p R ep or t
MA T T H I J S  V A N  DE N  B O S
& FA R Z I N  VA H D A T
The ISIM hosted a one-day workshop on 'Authority in
Contemporary S h ici s m' in Leiden on 1 March 2002,
convened by Matthijs van den Bos. Several observa-
tions on the current state of (Iranian) S h ici t e s t u d i e s
underlay its design. Most importantly, studies of reli-
gious discourse in contemporary Iran – particularly
that comprising reformist thought – often neglect
the disciplinary background of religious discourse.
Therefore, scientific scrutiny was due to the decisive
shifts that have taken place in the relative impor-
tance of f e q h, k a l a m, f a l s a f a, h e k m a t, e r f a n, and
t a s a v v o f as argumentative styles in debates over reli-
gious authority in contemporary S h ici s m.
Authority 
in Contemporary S hici s m
'Contemporary' was chosen roughly to indi-
cate the past century and also to locate the
workshop within the tradition set by Said
Amir Arjomand's Authority and Political Cul-
ture in S h ici s m (1988). Whereas politicized ju-
ristic debate caught the attention when the
latter book appeared, it is nowadays a
'hermeneutics' of religion that once again
brings non-juristic S h ici t e disciplines to the
fore. This particularly applies to Abdolkarim
Soroush's 'new theology', detailed by For-
ough Jahanbakhsh, and his theorizing on
the 'expansion of prophetic experience'. In
the words of Farzin Vahdat, who has been so
kind as to share his thoughts on 'this timely
conference': 'Forough Jahanbakhsh dis-
cussed the newest phase in the thought of
the prominent Islamic thinker in Iran, Ab-
dolkarim Soroush, which transcends the
"expansion of religious knowledge" and in-
corporates the idea of the expansion of reli-
gion itself, what Soroush calls, the "Expan-
sion of Prophetic Experience".'
Mahmoud Alinejad's paper 'looked at […]
two contemporary Shicitethinkers in Iran, Mo-
hammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen
Kadivar, whose thoughts are having a major
impact in the creation of a public sphere in
post-revolutionary Iran' (Vahdat). Alinejad
stated that Mohammad Mojtahed-Shabes-
tari and Mohsen Kadivar were part of 'a new
generation of clergy and lay intellectuals
[who] reclaimed the political potentials of
the faith to legitimize the expression of po-
litical and religious pluralism' in – similarly –
'reviving those aspects of the S h ici t r a d i t i o n
that had been neglected or pushed to the
margins by dominant juridical thought.'
But the women's seminaries addressed by
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut constitute an excep-
tion to this trend – f e q h remaining the dom-
inant discourse, and their target for reform.
Vahdat adds: 'Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut ad-
dressed the shifting of S h ici t e thought on
women as a result of the participation of a
large number of women in seminary educa-
tion and new interpretations of women's
position in an Islamic society. She also dis-
cussed the new attitude of some of the re-
formist clerics on the position of women in
Islam in light of their new interpretations of
the Qur'an and Islamic law.'
Another paradox, Sajjad Rizvi pointed out
that some innovative philosophers in Qom
combine a 'thoroughgoing radical approach
to traditional philosophy associated with
the school of Molla Sadra (d.1641) […] with
a most conservative defence of v e l a y a t - e
f a q i h.' Vahdat: 'Sajjad Rizvi, in his analysis of
the two prominent and influential conserva-
tive S h ici t e thinkers in Iran, Ayatollah Mes-
bah Yazdi and Javadi Amoli, amplified the
importance of these traditionalist S h ici t e
thinkers who in fact resort to new interpre-
tations of Islamic h e k m a t and e r f a n to op-
pose reformist thought and the political
movement attached to it.'
The opposite may be said of Mehdi Haeri
Yazdi (1923–1999) – addressed by Farzin
Vahdat – who was an ardent critic of the
'guardianship of the jurist' while also hold-
ing a high social position among the clerical
establishment. Vahdat's paper discussed
the ideas of Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, a
scholar of Islamic and Western philosophy
whose thought penetrates deeply into
modern Western discourses, especially that
of Immanuel Kant, as well as into Islamic
philosophy and e r f a n. It pointed to the sig-
nificant contributions of Haeri Yazdi to the
process of creating reconciliation between
Islamic thought and modern philosophy
and its significance for the establishment of
modern political and social institutions in an
Islamic context.
Said Arjomand's overview paper examined
the reform movement during the last decade
and 'its sharp break with the intellectual out-
look of the generation of the Islamic revolu-
tion.' It argued that the 'nativistic refuge in
ideology constitutes the immediate back-
ground of the current discussions of moder-
nity and advocacy of reform and pluralism.
As the Islamic ideology eroded in the 1990s, a
reform movement gathered momentum,
proposing pluralism as against totalitarian-
ism and a hermeneutic as against an ideolog-
ical reading of Islam. This reform movement
has revived the debate on tradition and
modernity with the intention of radically
modernizing the Islamic tradition, and there-
by, (re-)infusing modernity with normative
v a l u e . As Vahdat comments: '[Arjomand]
shed light on one major trend in contempo-
rary Shicite intellectual discourse in Iran
which is marked by an emphasis on pluralis-
tic and hermeneutic approaches to social
and political issues and opened a new and
crucial chapter on the decades-old debates
on tradition and modernity in Iranian social
and political thought.' 
Papers given at the workshop:
– Said Amir Arjomand (State University of New York): 'Modernity,
Tradition and the S h ici t e Reformation in Contemporary Iran'
– Farzin Vahdat (Tufts University): 'Mehdi Haeri Yazdi (1923–1999)
and His Place in the Current Debates on Modernity and Tradition
in Iran'
– Mahmoud Alinejad (IIAS): 'Scholasticism, Revolutionalism and
Reformism: New Intellectual Trends in S h ici Scholasticism and
t h e Emergence of a Public Religion in Iran'
– Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut (Université de Paris VIII): 'Women's
Seminaries and Strands of S h ici t eD i s c o u r s e '
– Sajjad Rizvi (Institute of Ismaili Studies): 'Liberal Metaphysics
versus Conservative Politics: The Paradoxical Cases of Ayatollahs
Abdollah Javadi Amoli and Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-i Yazdi'
– Forough Jahanbakhsh (Queens University): 'Expansion of
Prophetic Experience: Reflection on Abdolkarim Soroush's Views'
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S H AZ I A  MI R ZA
Stand-up comedy and Muslim woman. The two sub-
jects don't really go do they? They are not often men-
tioned together. Not till I became a stand-up comedi-
an and the media rapidly descended upon me, la-
belling me as 'the first Muslim woman in the history of
stand-up comedy'. I am a stand-up comedian who
writes all my own material, most of it from personal
experience, and most of it based on truth, because
after all the truth is funny, we don't need to make it up. 
Laughter and
t h e 11 September
Disaster 
dressed up as the Asian version of the porn
star Pamela Anderson. I went on stage, and
with the first two lines of my act I was at-
tacked by three Muslim men, who said I was a
disgrace to my religion and my culture. They
grabbed me by the neck and pushed me
against the wall. I didn't do any gigs for three
weeks after that, then I thought 'why should I
stop doing what I am doing? I'm telling the
truth and I'm only talking about myself.' 
11 September
Before 11 September I was doing very well.
People were enjoying my comedy and were
fascinated about how a 'Muslim woman
could do stand-up comedy'. Weren't Muslim
women meant to be oppressed, depressed,
repressed? Wasn't I meant to be covered
from head to toe and locked in the house?
These are just a few of the stereotypes
that the white laddy, working class men,
who visited comedy clubs, had in their
minds. Most of these men had never
known a Muslim woman in their life, they
never had an opportunity to meet one, all
they know is what they have seen on TV, and
their perceptions of Muslims were based on
that. Most of that included Salman Rushdie,
oppressed women, wars, bombing and ex-
tremism. I feel that these perceptions were
reinforced after 11 September. I started
wearing the h i j a b, because I wanted people
in comedy clubs to see the image that they
are familiar with of 'the Muslim woman' and a
lot of my jokes were funnier, because the au-
dience could visualize it, like when I say, 'the
women in my family all use the same bus
p a s s ' .
When 11 September happened I remember
watching the TV and being so deeply shocked
and distressed. A few hours later I thought to
myself, 'that's the end of my act'. I will never
be able to do my act again, no one will want
to listen to me now, not to mention laugh.
I did no gigs for weeks because I thought that
people were upset about what had happened
and it would not be right for me to tell jokes at
that point. I was also scared. There was al-
ready Islamophobia before 11 September;
afterwards there was even more. In London,
a Muslim girl wearing a hijab was beaten on
the head with a baseball bat as she walked
down the street.
Three weeks later I heard white non-Muslim
comedians in comedy clubs doing jokes
about 11 September. Most of them were not
funny. It was then that I thought, 'if anyone
should address this situation it should be me'.
Another two weeks passed and I thought I'd
try and see how people react. So I got on
stage and did exactly the same act that I had
done before 11 September. The reaction was
very poor and people were scared to laugh.
Fear was the main thing. Then I thought it was
about time I address the issue. 
I had a gig at a comedy club in Central
London and I started off with some of my
material that I had already done before 11
September then in the middle I did some of
my new material: I said, 'Hello my name is
Shazia Mirza, at least that's what it says on
my Pilot's License.' The whole room erupt-
ed. The audience which was made up of 60
white English men roared with laughter. The
tension in the room had been broken,
stereotypes had been broken. Just by stand-
ing on that stage, a Muslim woman in come-
dy, laughing at myself and allowing others
to laugh with me, I had broken barriers al-
though I didn't know it at the time. I was just
doing what I love. The British public who
come to watch me, thank me for giving
them permission to laugh at things they
normally wouldn't be able to laugh at. 
Islam has seriousness surrounding it, and
people think that all Muslims are extreme and
dangerous. Nobody associates Islam with hu-
mour. When I do my comedy, people laugh at
the things they recognize. I believe educating
people through comedy is a great way of
uniting people. When people laugh they re-
member why they laughed and the white lads
of Britain that go getting drunk then go to
comedy clubs to have a laugh, are more likely
to listen to a comedian than to a politician.
I don't know why Islam cannot be associated
with humour. Prophet Mohammed (peace be
upon Him) laughed many times in his life, and
made many jokes, as did Usama Bin Laden.
Muslims have a sense of humour too. If your
faith is that strong you should be able to
laugh at it. Now people of other faiths who
come to watch me, ask me questions at the
end of my act; they are interested in the life of
a Muslim woman and their minds and percep-
tions of Muslims after 11 September are
slowly changing, but only because
they've met and seen me perform. If these
people had carried on watching TV and
only TV their perceptions would be differ-
ent. Europe is multicultural, we live with
different coloured people and faiths, yet
know nothing about them. Most people are
affected by the media, and driven by fear.
There is also too much segregation. I went
where no Muslim has been before and I hope
generations after me will benefit. I hope that
I have inspired some Muslim women to have
courage too. As a comedian I believe laughter
is the strongest tool for communicating with
people who shut the door in my face, because
I am Muslim. One day I hope we can all laugh
together.
Upcoming gigs:
– 31 August 2002 – Mep Festival, The Hague,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
– 28 September 2002 – Brussels
Shazia Mirza is a stand-up comedian and writes
f o rt h e Birmingham Evening Mail newspaper, UK.
E-mail: VSVSM@AOL.COM 
Shazia Mirza
As I was growing up, my parents did every-
thing to prevent me from being on stage.
Whenever I suggested that I wanted to go
to drama school, or dance lessons, my par-
ents would say, 'You're Muslim, Muslim girls
aren't allowed to do that' and I could never
understand it. My whole life has been about
breaking down barriers and fighting to try
and get there. Yes, I am Muslim, that is my
religion and my relationship with God, it has
nothing to do with my time on stage. I can
separate the two, being Muslim and being a
comedian. I don't look at David Beckham
when he is playing football and think, 'he's a
quarter Jewish he is!' His football and reli-
gion are totally unrelated.
I don't suddenly stop being Muslim when I
am on the stage. It comes naturally to me to
be a performer.
I started doing stand-up in September
2000. I was a science teacher in London be-
fore then, and the school where I taught was
so rough, the only time the students lis-
tened to me was when I was funny. When I
made them laugh they would listen to me,
and although they weren't interested in
chemistry and biology, at least they had a
good lesson. Then I took that comedy to the
stage. I see no difference between making
the kids laugh in class and making people
laugh in a comedy club. I did a comedy
writing course, and my teacher suggested
that my material was so funny and original
that I should go out and perform it. So I
started doing the London Comedy Circuit.
The circuit is a series of clubs in London that
range from clubs in the basements of pubs,
to big purpose-built comedy clubs.
The first time I did stand-up, I stood in the
basement of a dingy bar in Brixton, London
with no stage, no microphone, and the bar
was filled with people on a night out, so it
was very noisy. I stood there and spoke and
people laughed. In fact they laughed so
much I got an encore. Over the period from
September 2000 to June 2002, I have done
over 500 gigs, including the London Palladi-
um, Edinburgh Playhouse, and Royal Albert
Hall. I won the London Comedy Festival in
June 2001 and this year in May 2002 I won
comedian of the year.
I did stand-up for a year without my h i j a b.
I would go to working men's clubs and do my
act and they would love it, it would interest
people, and people would laugh. There are
very few women in stand-up comedy any-
way. Even when I go abroad to do gigs, for
example, I never meet Asian women in com-
edy nor have I ever met another Muslim
woman. I do not wear the h i j a b normally in
everyday life, so I thought 'why should I wear
it on stage?' Then I slowly started doing Asian
gigs. In March 2001 I did a gig in Brick Lane,
East London. It is a heavily populated Muslim
Bengali area. I did the gig for charity, where I
was the only woman on the bill. There were
four other men, one of whom was Muslim.
The audience loved him even though he
In Afghanistan Taliban means Student, and they have a lot in
common with students: They don't shave, they both get stoned
and talk rubbish, and their mothers walk in and say: 'It looks like
a bomb, has gone off in here!'
In Afghanistan the women are not allowed to
wear high heels because the click of the heels
is meant to attract men… All goats have now
been locked up.
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D e b a t e
L A MI N  S A N N E H
A simmering issue in the Islamic world's relations
with the West concerning the tension between the
sacred and the secular took a particularly violent
turn on 11 September 2001 when Usama Bin Laden
and his A l - Q aci d a network launched a coordinated
assault on the US in the name of sacred duty. The
West reacted with stunned surprise. But given the
long history of Islamic fundamentalist grievances, is
not the West's surprise itself surprising?
Sacred 
a n d Secular 
in Islam
It is, for example, clear that Bin Laden is mo-
tivated by sacred rage against an infidel sec-
ular West, and yet the West has sought to
dismiss Bin Laden's self-proclaimed struggle
as bogus. President Bush has, notwithstand-
ing, sought to portray his military campaign
as a sacred contest with an 'axis of evil'. Bush
believes that snapping the terrorist net-
works by driving their members into the
sharp prongs of military reprisal, and com-
bining that with closing their financial oper-
ations at home and abroad, will be enough
for righteous vindication and for disposing
of the fundamentalist scourge. That view,
however, is sadly mistaken. The fundamen-
talist challenge, rooted in religious justifica-
tions, is unlikely to go away that easily.
In spite of that, the West seems reluctant to
take the fundamentalists at their own word.
The fundamentalists continue to put up a
spirited defence of Islam against an ancient
foe now ensconced in the United States. We
should inquire into what they mean by Islam
and why for them the United States has come
to be a citadel of infidels. In a videotaped
statement on 7 October, Bin Laden spoke of
the moral injury stemming from the disgrace
and humiliation Islam has suffered for almost
eighty years, a reference to the end of the
caliphate in Turkey in 1924 following the First
World War. Turkey became a secular state,
and the sultan ceased to be the political head
of the worldwide community of Muslims.
With the end of the caliphate went a potent
symbol of Islam's global spiritual identity.
Through historical ups and downs, and
sometimes only in name, the caliphate lin-
gered on as bearer of Islam's imperial im-
pulse until 1924 when it unravelled. Memo-
ries of that demise continued still to rankle
with Bin Laden, though most Westerners,
being sanguinely pragmatic and unbeholden
to tradition in their daily lives, know nothing
of that. It is tempting from Bin Laden's view-
point to dig into history for the roots of his
fundamentalist agenda of restoring Islam's
glorious past, but for Americans that would
be time wasting.
Divergent notions of religion
The West is impatient with history but also
with religion, which it reduces to individual
piety and subjective dispositions. It gives
the sacred little or no public merit. The En-
lightenment and the inter-religious wars of
Europe decided people to establish the
state on a non-religious basis. Religion sur-
vived as personal habit and subjective pref-
erence, framed by emotions, feelings, and
states of mind appropriate to the phenome-
non, as Rudolf Otto describes in his classic
work, The Idea of the Holy. This point of view
expresses well the spirit of individualism.
From the fundamentalists' point of view,
however, this notion of religion is offensive
because religion is the revealed will of God
for the public order, and for the individual
as a member of the community. This view of
religion, however, conflicts with modernity,
though, in that case, it sheds light on the na-
ture of the fundamentalist grievance.
The fundamentalists assert that the be-
liever and unbeliever alike are a subject of
state jurisdiction, because the Prophet
founded a state and a religion to go with it.
That makes the 'sacred' and 'secular' one
and the same thing, and what distinguishes
them is a matter of public will and religious
interest. H a r a m means 'sacred' when used
of the two holy sites of Mecca and Medina
(h a r a m a y n), but carries a secular meaning as
harem, the 'exclusive' women's quarter in
the household, and when used of prohibit-
ed things or conduct. H a l a l, on the other
hand, means lawful or permitted, such as
concerns dietary rules or business practice.
H a r a m carries the force of 'taboo' while
h a l a l speaks of the mundane, the unrestrict-
ed. 'Sacred' and 'secular', accordingly, touch
on both religion (d i n) and the world (d u n y a) .
Bin Laden is on firm ground here.
Pursuing A l - Q aci d a and Taliban forces in
the caves and tunnels of Spin Baldak and
the Tora Bora mountains, the West has re-
sponded to this religious challenge by tar-
geting the terrorists as a bunch of fanatics
without any standing in Islam, a noble faith
and a religion of peace, in the words of Pres-
ident Bush. Others assert that terrorism is
not jihad; is not s u n n a after the example of
Muhammad; is, in fact, not religion (d i n) .
True religion, the West believes, does not re-
cruit or conscript, does not fight or thrive in
caves and tunnels, does not compete or
commit deeds as an international actor,
does not own banks, and does not make po-
litical claims or laws, as the terrorists are
doing. Only governments may act that way.
It is difficult, though, to know what counts
here as religion, except to say that whatever
it is, religion has no public standing. The
West had hoped to avoid assuming a reli-
gious role in the conflict, and has, accord-
ingly, sought comfort in the convenient
thought that it is only a renegade break-
away group of Muslim fundamentalists who
have struck out in violence. 
Most Muslims do not share that view, and,
instead of supporting the West's anti-terror-
ism strategy, have directed their prickly
moral indignation at the threatened rights
of Taliban and A l - Q aci d a captives under US
control in Cuba. Condemnation of Bin
Laden is muted by growing Muslim calls for
his presumed innocence until convicted in a
court of law, calls that resulted, for example,
in Nelson Mandela retracting his support for
Bush. Only generous economic inducement,
backed by the amenable voices of exiled
Muslims, has prevented this moral indigna-
tion from sparking large-scale anti-Western
p r o t e s t s .
Americans and Europeans have a hard
time understanding Islam, and the funda-
mentalists are not helping. Islam, for the
radicals, calls for absolute surrender to the
rule of God. The unbeliever for them has the
rights only of a dependent client rather than
those of a conscientious dissenter. For
them, k u f r, unbelief, is not just a theological
matter of disavowing God; it calls for a poli-
cy of containment of those who refuse to
submit. Without Islam, unbelievers, like na-
tions, carry a 'secular', pejorative stigma.
Fundamentalists seek the political kingdom
first, and everything else is added to that.
The sense of divine efficacy in history, that
God reveals but also commands, what the
first Muslims called jihad fi-sabil li-llah, 'holy
war in the way of God', (Qur'an 4:76, 91f, 94f;
9:5, 29, 36, 41, 122; 47:4) is demonstrated by
the successful establishment of the early
Muslim community in Medina, and that vi-
sion has inspired the fundamentalists.
Fundamentalists dislike the secular state
for opposing the s h a r ica and for splintering
God's u m m a into petty secular jurisdictions.
They want instead to institute a divine social
order. They have appealed to fellow Mus-
lims to assume a state of h i j r a toward the
secular state, to become what the Qur'an
calls h i j r a-bound in God's cause, a l - m u h a-
jirun fi-sabil li-llah (24:22). One such move-
ment declared: 'All the Muslim people of
Turkestan have lost their patience and have
chosen the holy road to emigration for
preparing for jihad-in-the-way-of-God' (N e w
York Times, 'Qaeda Grocery Lists', 17 March
2002, p. 18). Ironically, the American per-
spective on separation of church and state
may offer a compromise by ceding the reli-
gious ground without stripping it of public
interest entirely.
That would be congruent, too, with a
strand in Muslim thought that does not want
to elide religion with politics, the sacred with
the secular, even though worldly interests
may serve the ethical purposes of religion.
As Ibn Khaldun (d. 1405/06) put it in a fit of
theological illumination, believers should re-
sist the facile view that religion and politics
belong together lest we 'patch our worldly
affairs by tearing our religion to pieces. Thus
neither our religion lasts nor [the worldly af-
fairs] we have been patching.'*
The sacred challenge
The sovereign secular state, however, will
not countenance a challenge to the sa-
cred/secular distinction. Yet the events of
11 September showed that modernity is not
impervious to challenge. For their part, Mus-
lim reformers have supported a compro-
mise solution where religion is adjusted,
even reconstructed, as a matter of con-
science and personal decision, with the
state precluded from a statutory role in the
free exercise of religion. Such a compromise
would bring Muslims closer to the West, but
would not deny a role for religion in public
life on the grounds that religion is too per-
vasive to restrict it to a few designated areas
of life. Religion is too important for the state
to ignore, and equally too important for the
state to co-opt. That implies the modifica-
tion of separation to fundamentalist ideolo-
gy, with religion qualifying the limits of
state power without the state defining the
scope of religious commitment. Under that
arrangement the state would desist from in-
terference with religion without being im-
mune to religious scrutiny. It would prompt
religious people to join political leaders to
denounce Bin Laden's excesses as political
terrorism and as religious transgression at
the same time, making him deserving of the
appropriate military response and of t a k f i r,
religious repudiation. (The argument by
some that Bin Laden is engaged, not in a
'holy war' (j i h a d), but in an unjustified war-
fare (h i r a b a) against innocent people ig-
nores the sacred/secular correspondence
for him and other Muslims.) 
The events of 11 September have breached
the walls of secular invincibility, and also the
logic of secular claims as neutral and norma-
tive. The modern religious resurgence has
revealed the dogma of secular primacy to
be vulnerable to rude surprises, making it
imperative that we recognize the role of re-
ligion in people's lives for what it is. Reli-
gious fanaticism will not disappear with mil-
itary reprisal but only with religious self-crit-
icism, if at all. The military instrument can-
not settle the issue, and governments, espe-
cially corrupt ones, are really implicated in
their own version of political fundamental-
ism in the use and means of power, and so
they have ceased to be religiously credible;
they have too long promoted secularism as
a religious alibi to be trusted. As it is, most
Muslims find few benefits in secularism
enough to win their confidence. They are
ready to turn to religious fervour instead.
For the flourishing of human life, we need to
transcend the sacred/secular cleavage and
rise to the challenge of relating our worldly
interests to our spiritual values without pre-
judice to either. In any case, we have less ex-
cuse to be surprised any more.
N o t e
* Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah, An Introduction to
H i s t o r y , vol. I, tr. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967),
4 2 7 .
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Media coverage of the current Israeli-Palestinian
confrontation has tended to emphasize its most vio-
lent and spectacular aspects. While these are hardly
to be discounted and have devastated numerous
lives, it is noteworthy that during almost two years of
conflict the cumulative death toll on both sides
stands at approximately 2,000, a figure which com-
pares rather favourably with the horrific statistics
produced in Beirut or more recently the Balkans. 
This apparent discrepancy is in large mea-
sure accounted for by the nature of the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict. The media's con-
centration on its most visible and visual as-
pects, and natural predilection for the more
belligerent and bellicose statements pro-
duced by the various parties involved, has
tended to obscure the reality that this is not
a war between Israel and Palestine. 
Formally, in fact, Palestine does not even
exist, but is rather an occupied territory.
Most of it – some 40% of the Gaza Strip and
more than 80% of the much larger West
Bank – remained under full or partial Israeli
rule on the eve of the current confrontation
in September 2000. The remaining areas,
consisting of disjointed enclaves, each of
which is fully encircled by territory con-
trolled by Israel, are administered by the
Palestinian Authority (PA), which is neither a
state nor a government and which exercises
limited jurisdiction rather than sovereignty.
Pursuant to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian
agreements which established the PA, the
latter does not control its own internal or
external borders, airspace, or subterranean
resources, and does not even possess the
right of safe passage between the fragment-
ed territories it administers – whether be-
tween the West Bank and Gaza Strip or be-
tween Ramallah and Nablus within the West
Bank. 
The only army in the putative Palestinian
state is in fact that of Israel. The Oslo agree-
ments sanctioned its continued presence
within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in
part to protect the numerous Jewish
colonies, which have continued to expand
at a furious pace since 1993 and in so doing
have served to further fragment Palestin-
ian territorial-demographic continuity. For
its part the PA was explicitly prevented
from establishing a standing army, and
possesses only a lightly-armed if oversized
police force. 
If the above helps explain the origins of
the current Palestinian uprising, it similarly
helps us understand why armed force is
only one of the instruments deployed by Is-
rael in its attempt to crush it, and perhaps
not even the most important one. Largely
hidden from the television cameras and re-
porters' notebooks, Israel has by virtue of its
continued rule over most of the occupied
territories and overwhelming military ad-
vantage imposed a prolonged and increas-
ingly strict siege upon West Bank and Gaza
Strip population centres, which has devas-
tated Palestinian society, destroyed the
economy, and paralysed normal life. 
A central characteristic of the Israeli siege
(commonly known as 'closure') is its com-
prehensive nature. Rather than subjecting
specific individuals, categories of persons,
or particular localities to the various restric-
tions involved, these are applied wholesale
to all Palestinians, their goods and vehicles
included. Exemptions may be granted on an
individual and selective basis, but this is an
increasingly rare phenomenon. 
The scope and effects of the siege can
most clearly be observed in the Gaza Strip.
Some 45 kilometres long and between 5
and 8 kilometres wide, this miniscule terri-
tory which is among the most densely pop-
ulated on earth (pop. 1,000,000) is sur-
rounded by Israel on three sides with the
sea accounting for the fourth. Effectively
hemmed in by multiple layers of razor wire
and with its flat-surfaced perimeters con-
stantly patrolled, it is impossible to exit
without first obtaining a plethora of permits
and passes from the Israeli authorities and
subsequently undergoing an array of humil-
iating security procedures in facilities which
look like they have been designed to
process cattle. Within the Gaza Strip, Israel
controls a number of 'choking points' – i.e.
key intersections – which gives it the power
to regulate or prevent altogether passage
from one region of the Gaza Strip to the
other. On several occasions, thousands of
Palestinians have been left with no alterna-
tive but to walk (and in some cases swim)
several kilometres along the beach in their
daily effort to get from one town to the
other. On others, Israeli forces have used the
power of armed persuasion to close even
this route, killing several people in the
process. 
Permanent siege
In a region which suffered from planned
neglect during the decades after 1967 and
became highly dependent upon the Israeli
labour market for economic survival as a
matter of design, the most obvious effect
has been the visible disintegration of the
local economy. Consistent Israeli preven-
tion of the export of goods from the Gaza
Strip to Israel, the West Bank, and regional
and international markets (but not of the
import of Israeli goods) have only height-
ened the crisis, to the point where the World
Bank reports that more than half of Gaza
Strip families are now surviving – or not – on
less than two dollars a day. 
The workings of 'internal closure' are by
contrast more easily observed in the West
Bank. In recent months, Israel has resorted
to a permanent siege upon each individual
Palestinian population centre, and on the
towns and cities which function as regional
hubs in particular. Travel between Ramallah
and Nablus, which during heavy traffic
could take approximately an hour, currently
consumes the better part of a day. With the
West Bank fragmented into dozens of
sealed military districts maintained through
the agency of many more permanent and
temporary military checkpoints, such a trip
would involve a passenger's repeated trans-
fer from one taxi to another, crossing – or
rather walking around – each checkpoint by
foot. At times soldiers take satisfaction in
observing Palestinians being forced to
trudge along broken paths for several kilo-
metres at a time, other times they shoot to
intimidate, or injure, or kill. 
Such practices – which have also on re-
peated occasions included the closure of
the land crossings between the West Bank
and Jordan and the Gaza Strip and Egypt –
have, needless to say, had a severe impact
not only on economic life, but also social
and family relations. With commuting ren-
dered all but impossible, some Palestinians
have lost or left their jobs, while others have
opted to move to the cities in which they
work, away from their families and despite
the raging conflict. Civil administration and
services – and not less the ability of the
Palestinian security forces to impose their
authority in more isolated areas – have also
been negatively affected. 
Sequestering basic services
It is particularly noteworthy that humani-
tarian and other services which are normally
exempt from collective punishment in times
of conflict are largely subject to the same
regulations and restrictions as the rest of
Palestinian society. Villagers, who are typi-
cally dependent upon regional hubs for
proper medical care, legal matters, and
other such services, have been particularly
hard hit. In a number of documented cases,
for example, village women were forced to
give birth at checkpoints because soldiers
would not let them pass to reach maternity
hospitals located in nearby towns. In several
cases, the woman and/or newborn infant
died as a result. 
During its recent full-scale invasions of
Palestinian cities beginning in February
2002, the Israeli military went so far as to
systematically prevent local and foreign
medical services from evacuating the
wounded and ill to hospital. While no pre-
cise statistics are available, it is beyond
doubt that not a few Palestinians died from
otherwise treatable wounds and medical
conditions as a result. 
Academic life has also been a casualty of
the Israeli siege. Throughout the occupied
territories, pupils and students, teachers,
lecturers and staff, have been unable to
travel to places of learning. University life
has been particularly hard hit, because such
a high proportion of students and staff do
not live on or within the vicinity of the cam-
pus. Research – whether conducted in li-
braries or in the field, and also that which
depends on exchange with colleagues with-
in or outside the region – has in many re-
spects and instances been paralysed as well. 
Until recently the siege operated at vari-
ous levels; with the boundaries between the
occupied territories and Israel permanently
sealed off long before the first suicide at-
tack, the 'internal closure' was at times more
strict than at others, or concentrated in spe-
cific regions while relaxed elsewhere. In May
2002, Israel announced that it would intro-
duce a new permit system whereby the in-
ternal closure would become permanent
and institutionalized as well; travel between
West Bank enclaves (i.e. from Hebron to
Bethlehem) would henceforth require a spe-
cial permit, valid for only a specified period
of time. The severity of this measure sug-
gests that Israel announced it – as opposed
to quietly proceeding to implementation –
primarily in order to observe how the world
would react to the news and to calibrate its
position accordingly. The results so far are in
this respect hardly encouraging. Coupled
with the increasingly violent and systematic
onslaught against Palestinian institutions,
this additional strangulation of Palestinians'
ability to lead normal lives is likely to precip-
itate yet another escalation in the conflict. 
Mouin Rabbani is director of the Palestinian
American Research Center in the West Bank town
o f Ramallah, Palestine.
E-mail: mrabbani@compuserve.com
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Shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the Wash-
ington Institute for Near East Policy published a
short book (137 pages) by Martin Kramer entitled
Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern
Studies in America. Kramer is the editor of the M i d d l e
East Quarterly, a journal founded by Daniel Pipes and
others who feel that the discipline of Middle Eastern
Studies, as practised in the United States, has be-
come too pro-Arab and too 'dovish'. Kramer, a former
director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East-
ern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, shares
Pipes's views, though he has generally been less stri-
dent in expressing them. Ivory Towers on Sand is pri-
marily a critique of scholars dealing with issues relat-
ed to American foreign policy in the Middle East.
Kramer is not especially troubled by current trends in
the study of Sufi poetry. 
Between Pipes
a n d E s p o s i t o
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Both Kramer and Pipes, like their intellectual
mentor Bernard Lewis, view the Muslim
world as inherently irrational, violent, and
above all, anti-Semitic. The Arabs in particu-
lar only understand force. They will behave
only if they are beaten mercilessly. The
American government should not waste
time trying to address their alleged griev-
ances, or those of Muslims in general, be-
cause these all boil down to primitive ha-
tred of the infidel and resentment that the
infidel now dominates the believer instead
of the other way around (Lewis 1990).This
view of the Islamic world underlies the poli-
cies of the Sharon government in Israel and
the policies favoured by at least some mem-
bers of the American administration. So the
issues at stake are by no means strictly aca-
demic. 
Changes in policy
It is of course natural that Kramer and
Pipes disapprove of most American scholar-
ship on contemporary Middle Eastern poli-
tics in recent decades. American scholars,
like most of their European and Israeli col-
leagues, generally reject the notion that
brutal repression is invariably the best re-
sponse to Islamic militancy, Palestinian na-
tionalism, and the terrorism often associat-
ed with both. Most Middle East specialists in
the United States would argue that to win
the 'war on terrorism', it is necessary to di-
lute the rage that fuels it. This would entail
significant changes in American and Israeli
foreign policy. (There are many Middle East
specialists who would take issue with the
very notion of a 'war on terrorism'.)
Kramer contends that the 'paradigms' of
American Middle East experts 'have been
swept away by events' (Kramer 2001: 2). One
could say the same of the Pipes-Kramer par-
adigm. Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to
eliminate Palestinian terrorism by force in
1982. He is still using the same methods for
the same purpose twenty years and thou-
sands of deaths later. Yossi Sarid, the head
of Israel's Meretz party, has noted that Is-
rael's war in southern Lebanon 'killed more
than 1,000 Israeli soldiers' and 'created
Hizbollah' (Sarid 2001). Rather than elimi-
nate anti-Israeli terrorism, Israel's occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon created an entire-
ly new form of it among the Lebanese
S h ici t e s, who initially welcomed the Israelis
in 1982. Former heads of Israel's General Se-
curity Service, Shin Bet Ami Ayalon and
Carmi Gillon, have repeatedly stressed that
Palestinian terrorism is the product of de-
spair (Gillon 1999; Eldar 2001). Yet Kramer
and Pipes advocate policies that would in-
crease that despair. 
Nevertheless, no matter how mistaken
Kramer and Pipes may be in terms of the
policies they advocate, some of their criti-
cisms of Middle Eastern Studies in the Unit-
ed States are valid. Many American special-
ists on the Middle East are so determined to
rebut popular stereotypes about Islam that
they idealize all things Islamic, especially
the militant movements commonly referred
to as 'fundamentalist' or 'Islamist'. Scholars
like John Esposito do ignore or downplay
the anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that
pervade the Islamist literature (Munson
1996). They do ignore or downplay the
threat that such movements pose to human
rights as well as to the possibility of resolv-
ing the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. Moreover, while Kramer exag-
gerates the impact of Edward Said's Orien-
talism on political science (Gause 2002), it is
true that any scholar who dares to discuss
discrimination against the Baha'is in Iran,
slavery in the Sudan, or the Islamists' perse-
cution of intellectuals in Egypt runs the risk
of being called an 'Orientalist', a 'Zionist', or
an agent of American imperialism. Con-
versely, of course, anyone who dares to crit-
icize the policies of Ariel Sharon runs the risk
of being called an anti-Semite or a self-hat-
ing Jew.
The field of Middle Eastern Studies has be-
come politicized and polarized between
two forms of moral myopia represented by
Daniel Pipes on the one hand and John Es-
posito on the other. Reading Pipes, one
could easily believe that Muslim hostility to-
ward Israel is simply a matter of anti-Semi-
tism. Reading Esposito, one would never
know that anti-Semitism is indeed a serious
problem in the Islamic world. Pipes demo-
nizes Islamic militancy without analysing
the various social, nationalistic, and reli-
gious grievances that fuel it (see Pipes
1996). Esposito idealizes Islamic militancy
while downplaying the bigotry, fanaticism,
and violence associated with it (see Esposito
1999). Students of Islamic militancy need to
avoid both Pipes's demonization and Espos-
ito's idealization. 
The rage that fuels
If we take, for example, the Palestinian Is-
lamist group Hamas, we find that its charter
borrows many of the classical shibboleths of
European anti-Semitism. It contends that
'the enemies' have 'taken control of the
world media' and were 'behind the French
revolution, the communist revolution, and
most of the revolutions we have heard
about' (presumably, Iran's Islamic revolution
was an exception to the rule). The charter
goes on to say that Zionists 'created secret
organizations like the Masons, Rotary Clubs,
Lions Clubs, and the Bnai Brith throughout
the world to destroy societies and promote
Zionist interests'. These claims are followed
by the usual assertions – usual in the Is-
lamist literature at any rate – about how
Jews caused World Wars I and II to profit
from arms-dealing and 'ordered the cre-
ation of the United Nations and the Security
Council to replace the League of Nations to
rule the world through them' (Harub 1996:
298–99). To write about Hamas without
mentioning such rhetoric would be to pre-
sent a thoroughly sanitized and distorted
picture of the movement. 
At the same time, however, Hamas's hos-
tility toward Israel is not simply the result of
anti-Semitism. Hamas is, among other
things, a nationalistic movement seeking
liberation from what it sees as colonial rule.
Hamas's charter says its supporters are Mus-
lims who 'raised the banner of jihad in the
face of the oppressors to free the country
and the worshippers of God [a l -ci b a d] from
their pollution, filth, and evil' (Ibid.: 289). In
the minds of Hamas's supporters, the tradi-
tional dichotomy of Muslim versus Jew has
now meshed with the dichotomy of 'op-
pressed' versus 'oppressor'. 
Hamas grew out of the frustration engen-
dered by the PLO's and then the Palestinian
Authority's failures, both on the political
and social fronts. The despair and rage that
fuel Islamic militancy in the Gaza Strip have
been graphically described by Amira Hass,
who writes that 'support for the Islamic
movement is closely tied to a sense of Pales-
tinian impotence' (Hass 1999: 111). Ahmad
Q u r a ic, best-known as Abu cA l a ', was one of
the principal Palestinian negotiators of the
Oslo accords. When Israeli soldiers prevent-
ed him from travelling from Gaza to his
home on the West Bank, he reportedly de-
clared: 'Soon, I too will join Hamas' (Kape-
liouk 1996: 201). Abu cA l a ' did not really
mean this. He was simply expressing the
popular view of Hamas as the voice of Pales-
tinians fed up with life in the West Bank and
Gaza. (Palestinian Christians obviously have
to find other voices.)
In addition to expressing the rage and de-
spair of Palestinians unable to leave their
towns without enduring humiliating inter-
rogations at Israeli checkpoints, Hamas has
also provided social services not adequately
provided by the Palestinian Authority (Hass
1999; Roy 2000). The documentary film
Nahnu Jund Allah (We are God's Soldiers)
shows a Hamas social worker giving an un-
employed man food to feed his family for
weeks while also trying to help him find
work. This too is part of the Hamas story. 
In short, Hamas is indeed a fanatical, anti-
Semitic terrorist organization. But it is also a
response to a specific historical context. To
understand it, one must see it in this con-
text. The available evidence suggests that to
reduce support for militant Islamic move-
ments like Hamas, one has to dilute the de-
spair and the rage that fuel them. This is not
to say that brutal repression never succeeds
or that radical educational reform is not
needed to eradicate anti-Semitic conspiracy
theories. But as a general rule, making peo-
ple's lives unliveable is not an especially ef-
fective way to convince them to embrace
life over death and moderation over militan-
cy. 
D A N I S H  I N S T I T U T E  I N  D AM A S C U S
Youth-Culture 
i n the Middle East
The Danish Institute in Damascus is cur-
rently planning a conference on 'Youth
and Youth-Culture in the Contemporary
Middle East', scheduled for 14–15 Decem-
ber 2002. The goal of the conference is to
bring together a number of scholars who
have conducted research on this issue so
as to present recent research and discuss
the results presented at the conference.
The Danish Institute in Damascus is able to
cover travel expenses and accommoda-
tion for a small number of scholars who
want to present their current research. If
you are interested in presenting a paper,
please contact the institute's director, Dr
Joergen Baek Simonsen (did@scs-net.org),
giving a short introduction to your field of
research and the contents of the paper
you intend to present. 
Papers read at the conference will be
published as Vol. IV in the Proceedings of
the Danish Institute in Damascus in 2003.
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In 1972 three members of the Japanese Red Army
carried out a notorious suicide attack on people
gathered in one of the halls of Tel Aviv airport; they
killed twenty people and wounded eighty. A few
days after 11 September, a Swiss man killed several
members of the regional parliament of Zug and then
killed himself. These two examples are given in re-
sponse to those narrow explanations of the phenom-
ena of violence, death, martyrdom and suicide that
see them in the light of the 'clash of civilizations',
bearing in mind that only a very short space of time
separates us from the American Unabomber, the
Japanese Aum sect and Timothy McVeigh, all of
whom were driven, respectively, by their anti-tech-
nology delusions, their rush to reach the millennium
and their hatred of the federal government, to short-





Since 11 September 2001 many analysts and
commentators have begun to ask questions
about what lies behind Muslims willingness
to die. The answer was soon to be 'con-
firmed' by Palestinian suicide attacks. Natu-
rally there are those who try to find the an-
swer in 'civilization' and others who look for
it in religion. No doubt there are many who
say to themselves that there is a Muslim type
who is predisposed to die and longs to en-
counter the houris in Paradise. But the ques-
tion that has only rarely been posed is: what
hatred and misunderstanding of our planet
is it that creates this love of Heaven? 
When your planet is pervaded by intoler-
able injustice and circumstances impossible
either to accept or to adapt to, you end up
gratifying the commands of a faith that be-
longs to the realm of total absolutes. A plan-
et such as this, particularly if reinforced by
those sorts of convictions, may drive people
to seek a Heaven even without houris. All re-
ligions, not only Islam, have raised the ban-
ner of martyrdom to which believers have
rallied, combining dissatisfaction with the
present with a total denial of their individu-
ality (while individualism in its modern
sense naturally could not have existed in
those times). 
It was Christianity that developed the dis-
tinctive idea of the theology of martyrdom.
Countless legends have come down to us
about the confrontations between repre-
sentatives of the Roman Empire and coura-
geous believers who bore the agonies of
their torture with laughter. In medieval
southern and western Europe the rituals of
the penitents became a widespread phe-
nomenon; until recently, self-flagellation
was still a well-known practice of devout
Catholics, just as Filipinos to this day prac-
tise live re-enactments of the crucifixion.
The word martyr itself is derived from the
Greek expression m a r t y s, meaning a witness
to a thing or event, which originally referred
to Christ's disciples, as witnesses of himself
and of his life. It subsequently came to mean
those killed, like St Peter and St Paul, under
the Roman persecution. 
Before the Christian era the early Jewish
martyrs included some of the prominent fig-
ures of the Old Testament, such as Isaac, as
well as the Jews killed at the hands of the
Romans. The Midrash mentions ten martyrs:
Akiba ben Joseph and the other rabbis tor-
tured under Hadrian as a punishment for es-
tablishing law schools. The Buddhists in
turn believed that Gautama Buddha had
been a martyr in previous lives. Some of
them, like the Mahayana Buddhists, canon-
ized Bodhisattvas (or saints) due to their sta-
tus as martyrs filled with particular zeal and
passion. In the course of their many lives it
was not enough for these people to sacrifice
life itself in their search for truth: they also
postponed their own bliss in order to help
the wretched and sufferers of this world.
The exclusive connection between Islam,
martyrdom and suicide (the latter forbidden
by Islamic law) is subject to an infinite over-
simplification. The suicide attackers of A l -
Q aci d a and Palestine are Sunni Muslims,
while self-sacrifice for the sake of a certain
goal has traditionally been associated with
S h ici t e Islam. However, in our own era, the
S h ici t e Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 did
not resort to suicide attacks, even if it has
frequently threatened its enemies with
shrouds as a form of ritual folklore and revo-
lutionary nihilism. It is true that it used
minefields during the war with Iraq in the
1980s, crossed by human waves, most of
which were made up of children, but this
criminal tendency was the result of the au-
thorities use of ideology and what is with-
out doubt a modern tactic (remember
Hitler's conscription of children in his last
year or the use of infants in the Eritrean rev-
olution). If radical S h ici t e s in Hezbollah were
involved in suicide attacks against the Is-
raelis in southern Lebanon, 'secular' groups
such as the Syrian Nationalist Party and
'atheists' such as the communists also took
part. 
Generally speaking, both religious and
temporal cultures all show this link between
death, on the one hand, and on the other a
protest against life and/or the annihilation
of the individual in a greater identity, semi-
real and semi-imaginary. This is what we see
among some of the Sri Lankan Tamils, and
especially in the practice of the Japanese
Kamikaze ('Divine Wind'), the first require-
ment for membership of which was a will-
ingness to die for the Emperor. 
I n d i v i d u a l i s m
The relationship between protesting
against life and the weakness of individual-
ism is unmistakable. Where individualism is
strong, the reaction to a bad and abom-
inable life will not take the form of suicide or
slaughter. By the same token, a weak indi-
vidualism may be incapable of benefiting
from a life that ostensibly has nothing
wrong with it. Either it will destroy it with an
act of conspiracy and sectarianism, or
through a collective struggle imbued with
demagogy from which leaders and those
equipped to ride the waves may be able to
gain; or it will set itself apart from life and re-
main in the periphery, with the possibility
that creative states of individualism may ap-
pear and find refuge in poetry or music and
art. These symptoms flourish in a context of
dead ends and crisis of modernity: either for
political reasons, such as the inability to
achieve independence and establish a na-
tion-state, as is the case in Palestine today
and was previously the case in Algeria, or for
numerous social and cultural reasons linked
to the various phases of transition. In all
cases, this relationship translates to a con-
spicuous degree into violence against the
self or against others. 
A lack of individualism combined with the
effects of modernization and urbanization
can produce a disintegrated individual, i.e. a
person with a distorted individualism lack-
ing a social dimension. Anomie, as Durk-
heim demonstrated, is the principal cause of
rising suicide rates. The connection be-
tween suicide, urbanization and isolation is
now one of the givens of post-Durkheimian
sociology, even if many of the French sociol-
ogist's other conclusions have been forgot-
ten. Just as anomie runs contrary to a per-
son's individualism, so people's old age is a
declaration that their individualism is in-
valid and that they have entered a stage dif-
ficult to reconcile with the course of life. At
this point we see suicide reappear in
wealthy, post-industrial societies, as though
it were a social responsibility or even a duty
performed by those who are no longer con-
sidered active individuals. But naturally what
is most important is still the fear of how one
is seen by society in the long transition to
individualism. It has been observed, for ex-
ample, that most suicides in modern Japan
result from individuals' feelings of 'shame'
at their failure to reach the level demanded
of them by society. 
The famous ritual suicide of the Japanese
nationalist writer Yukio Mishima in 1970
was a statement of the dramatic tension
that accompanies the transition to a moder-
nity based on individualism. The author of
Confessions of a Mask, who preferred to die
an exhibitionist death, by the sword, as he
saluted the Emperor, left us in this act a
world of evidence rich in symbols and
meanings. 
Year after year the world has produced
people that are angry for one reason or an-
other but who also suffer from a repressed
individualism, who are given golden oppor-
tunities by the media revolution to turn the
whole world into spectators of their death,
or their causing the death of others. In these
contexts 'individualism' is achieved and
'truth' is reached in death in a way that was
impossible in life. If there is a great differ-
ence, according to our moral judgement,
between martyrdom as mere masochistic
suicide and violence and terrorism directed
sadistically at others, the difference is minor
as far as the original motives are concerned.
These motives, in relation to the Arab world
under such scrutiny at present, are the
crushing of individualism by countless fac-
tors. Israeli occupation and humiliation of
Palestine is countered by neighbouring
regimes that do not respect individual
rights, and economic systems that spread
abject poverty preventing the creation of a
middle class, not to mention the failures of
modernization proven by the crises of youth
and demographics in their various forms. In
a stagnant world of blocked horizons such
as this, progress yawns while those collec-
tivist ideologies revive that call for the indi-
vidual to merge in a greater entity, such as
the nation or religion or social class, as well
as inherited blood and family ties, which
often renew themselves in one or other of
those collectivist ideologies. All these ele-
ments together help one another not only
to obstruct the advancement of modernity,
but also to make each Arab see his or her life
as something meagre and not worth pre-
serving. Whoever sees their own life in this
way will never see any more value in the
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Mid dl e Ea st
R OH AM  A L VA N D I
Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001,
Samuel Huntington's theory of a 'clash of civiliza-
tions' has been garnering greater currency. Whereas
it was roundly condemned in 1993 as a new manifes-
tation of Orientalism, in today's post-11 September
world it is hailed as having 'lasting importance'.1
Such dangerous thinking is now beginning to per-
vade presentations of Iranian-American relations,
distorting the reality that conflict between Iran and
the United States is a result of conflicting interests,
not cultures.
I r a n i a n - A m e r i c a n
Relations 
after 11 September
To test the credibility of Professor Hunting-
ton's theory based solely on one case study
– Iranian-American relations – would be un-
wise. Moreover, to view Iranian-American
relations through the lens of Huntington's
theory simply because Iran and the US are
predominantly Muslim and Christian na-
tions, respectively, is equally ill-advised. A
more accurate understanding of Iranian-
American relations after 11 September
emerges from an examination of Washing-
ton and Tehran's concurring and conflicting
interests in West Asia. 
Today, Iran and the US enjoy two signifi-
cant mutual interests in West Asia. The first
is containing Saddam Hussein's regime in
Iraq. Iran has long competed with its west-
ern neighbour for hegemony in the region.
In an effort to strike a fatal blow at a weak-
ened post-revolutionary Iran, Iraq led the
two states into a bloody eight-year war in
the 1980s. Mutual suspicion lingers be-
tween Tehran and Baghdad as both govern-
ments continue to harbour each other's op-
position groups and develop weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). 
Iran's second mutual interest with the US
is in supporting an independent Afghan-
istan, free from Pakistani and Saudi-backed
'Muslim Fascists'2 like A l - Q aci d a and the Tal-
iban. Iran's highly porous 936-kilometre
border with Afghanistan is a source of inse-
curity for Tehran because of a constant flow
of Afghan refugees (now nearly two million)
and drugs into Iran from its eastern neigh-
bour. The drug trade across this border has
transformed Iran's eastern provinces into a
lawless region where, in the year 2000
alone, 1,500 fire-fights broke out between
Iranian security forces and drug traffickers.
In the last twenty years 3,000 Iranian troops
have died on the border with Afghanistan.3
Consequently, Iran seeks a friendly govern-
ment in Kabul willing to cooperate in ensur-
ing the security of this border. Viewing the
Taliban as the long arm of its regional rivals
– Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – Iran sought to
push back Taliban forces from its strategi-
cally important border with Afghanistan. 
As competing regional players, the US
and Iran suffer from three conflicting inter-
ests in West Asia: control over Afghanistan,
the proliferation of WMD, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Afghanistan is today at
the centre of a competition between Iran
and the US for strategic dominance in Cen-
tral Asia. The view from Tehran is increas-
ingly one of a fortressed Iran, facing hostile
American forces to the west, south and
east. In all, 50,000 American military per-
sonnel surround Iran in an arc sweeping
from Incerlik in southern Turkey to Bishkek
in eastern Kyrgyzstan.4 For Washington, a
presence in Afghanistan is not desirable
but necessary in order to deny Afghan hos-
pitality to A l - Q aci d a and to ensure the sta-
bility of the Interim Government in Kabul.
CIA Director George Tenet highlighted this
clash of interests when he warned the US
Congress in February 2002 that Iran is
'countering the US presence' in Afghan-
istan because of 'deep-seated suspicions
among Tehran's clerics that the United
States is committed to encircling and over-
throwing them.'5
Today there are four nuclear actors – Is-
rael, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and
the US – and one near-nuclear actor – Iraq –
in Iran's region. Iranian security planners
would be remiss to ignore a future where
one or more of these powers could threaten
Iran with WMD. Consequently, Iran is devel-
oping its WMD capabilities to a point at
which if faced with a WMD-armed aggressor
it could brandish its own deterrent. For the
US a nuclear Iran would inhibit American
freedom of action in West Asia and limit
Washington's leverage over Tehran. 
The final conflicting interest between Iran
and the US is over the Israel-Palestine con-
flict. Just as the US has long enjoyed a 'spe-
cial relationship' with Zionism, so the Islam-
ic Republic has consistently supported the
Palestinian liberation movement. These two
relationships may have more to do with do-
mestic politics in both the US and Iran than
with external factors. Nonetheless, Iran con-
tinues to support anti-Zionist liberation
movements in Palestine and Lebanon and
the US continues to provide Israel with
diplomatic, economic and military assis-
tance. 
Resisting pressures
The concurring and conflicting interests
outlined above have driven Iranian-Ameri-
can relations since 11 September. Although
Iran did not publicly support Washington's
'War on Terror', it closed its border with
Afghanistan, denied fleeing A l - Q aci d a a n d
Taliban safe haven in Iran, promised to res-
cue any American soldiers in distress in its
territory, and allowed American humanitari-
an relief to be transported across its territo-
ry to Afghanistan. This tacit agreement be-
tween Tehran and Washington was a result
of negotiations between the two capitals on
24 and 25 September, through two interme-
diaries: the British Foreign Secretary, then
visiting Tehran, and the Swiss Ambassador
to Iran, then visiting Washington. This coop-
eration culminated in the handshake be-
tween US Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
at a UN discussion on Afghanistan on 12 No-
v e m b e r .6
Predictably, this agreement collapsed at
the beginning of 2002. As US civilian and
military personnel began to establish an
American footprint in Afghanistan, con-
cerns were raised regarding Iranian interfer-
ence with Washington's plans for post-Tal-
iban Afghanistan. Although Iran had coop-
erated with the Bonn Conference that es-
tablished Hamed Karzai's Interim Afghan
Government, President Bush demanded on
11 January that Iran refrain from interfering
in Afghanistan.7
This was followed by Bush's 29 January
State of the Union (SOTU) address in which
he identified Iran as part of an 'axis of evil'.
Despite this swipe at Iran, Iranian leaders
have persisted in trying to engage Washing-
ton without much success. On 5 February
Tehran requested American assistance in
securing its eastern border.8 Two days later,
in an attempt to demonstrate their good
will, Iranian authorities arrested non-Afghan
Taliban crossing the Iranian border.9 A g a i n
on 10 February Iran closed the offices in Iran
of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Afghan warlord
and opponent of the Karzai Government.1 0
President Bush has tried to use the politi-
cal capital gained by Washington from the
11 September tragedy to build an interna-
tional consensus against Iranian WMD pro-
liferation. Washington's public reasoning is
that Iran 'could provide these arms to terror-
ists, giving them the means to match their
h a t r e d . '1 1 Washington's demands ignore
Iran's need to defend itself against Ameri-
can, Israeli, Pakistani, Russian and, poten-
tially, Iraqi WMD threats. 
On the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict
both Iran and the US have room to manoeu-
vre. The Bush administration and the con-
gressional leadership face formidable pres-
sure from the pro-Israeli lobby in Washing-
ton and the right wing of the Republican
Party to contain and punish Iran. Similarly
Iran's elected government faces strong
pressure from the Iranian theocracy to op-
pose Israel's occupation of Palestine. It re-
mains to be seen whether either govern-
ment has the will or the power to resist such
pressure. 
Future prospects
There is, however, some hope of renewed
Iranian-American cooperation because of a
concurring interest in deposing Saddam
Hussein's regime in Iraq. As the US moves to
build support for a move against Hussein, it
will undoubtedly ask for Iranian coopera-
tion, as it did during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War. Iran will more than likely cooperate in
such an operation, as it did in 1991, but con-
flict may again arise over competing inter-
ests in a post-Hussein Iraq, as it has in
Afghanistan. 
Iran, the most populous nation in West
Asia, sitting astride the Persian Gulf and the
Caspian Sea, will play a central role in assur-
ing security in the region. Tehran cannot
abandon a role in Afghanistan as Washing-
ton requests, for to do so would be to relin-
quish control over its eastern border. Nor
can Iran ignore the proliferation of WMD in
West Asia and the threat that such weapons
pose to its national security. Progress re-
quires the American foreign policy commu-
nity to recognize these Iranian interests as
legitimate. It will also require the elected
leadership in Tehran and Washington to
overcome pressure from their domestic op-
ponents on the issue of the Israel-Palestine
conflict. Only when the two states perceive
their interests, not cultures, to be aligned
can any progress be made in Iranian-Ameri-
can relations. 
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The Nether l a nds
H A C I  K A R A C A E R
The first political murder in its democratic history
shocked the Netherlands to the core. One week be-
fore the parliamentary elections, planned for 15 May
2002, the publicist and politician Pim Fortuyn, brand-
ed by the American and British press as the maverick
of Dutch politics, was shot dead as he was leaving a
radio station in Hilversum. A dramatic end for a politi-
cian who relied on the theatrical and strong state-
ments on migrants, in particular Muslims.
Murder Victim Wins
the Dutch Elections
'The 54-year-old courted controversy with
his robust style, being blunt, outspoken and
flamboyant, an approach formerly unseen
in Dutch politics. The former Marxist, sociol-
ogy lecturer and newspaper columnist
stood out with his shaven head and bright,
colourful ties, and was also conspicuous,
travelling around in a car with a driver and
blacked-out windows. Proudly homosexual,
he spoke out against immigration and high
taxation and accused the Dutch govern-
ment of poor performance', as CNN report-
ed on 9 May. Fortuyn was not too tightly
bound by the facts. Unemployment in the
Netherlands is at its lowest in decades, the
economy is in reasonably good shape, and
the government was boring but nonethe-
less sound. Nevertheless, by way of an elec-
toral agenda, he published a book entitled
The Shambles of Eight Years of Purple. Purple
stands for the government of the former
Prime Minister Wim Kok, from the colours of
the social democrats (red), left-wing liberals
(green) and right-wing liberals (blue). For-
tuyn's agenda is inconsistent, sometimes
even self-contradictory, financially unsub-
stantiated, and unattainable in several re-
spects. And yet more than 100,000 Dutch
people bought the book (an unprecedented
occurrence for an electoral agenda in the
Netherlands, where they are normally dis-
tributed for free).
And the contradictions of Fortuyn went
further still. A Moroccan imam had declared
that homosexuals were worse than pigs. He
had every right to say so, commented For-
tuyn, since freedom of speech is a great
good. And then in his second sentence
came the punch line: 'but then, I know what
I'm talking about, because I go to bed with
Moroccan boys, and the imam probably
doesn't.' 
In November 2001 Fortuyn was elected
leader of the new populist party Leefbaar
Nederland (Liveable Netherlands). In Febru-
ary 2002 he was expelled after calling for
the abolition of article 1 of the Dutch Con-
stitution – which bans discrimination – in a
leading Dutch newspaper. On the same oc-
casion he characterized Islam as a backward
culture. Only weeks before the elections he
created a new party, called the List Pim For-
tuyn (LPF). Fortuyn denied being another
exponent of the extreme-right populist
trend in Europe, insisting, and hating to be
compared with the French Jean-Marie Le
Pen or the Austrian J ö r g Haider. 'My politics
are multi-ethnic and certainly not racist', he
once said, 'and I want to stop the influx of
new immigrants. This way, we can give
those who are already here the opportunity
to fully integrate into our society.' However,
he continued to question the ability of
(Muslim) immigrants to assimilate into a lib-
eral and sexually tolerant culture. In his
view, immigration had to be curbed in order
for the Netherlands' liberal values to sur-
vive. 
Headless party
After his death, the List Pim Fortuyn made
it into the new parliament with 26 seats (out
of 150). At first the party, which for its gov-
ernmental position relied entirely on the
one man who headed its list, had difficulty
coming to terms with its political success.
The confusion was immediately noticeable
in the first days of the cabinet discussions,
when three LPF spokesmen gave complete-
ly contradictory accounts about a possible
general pardon for resident illegal asylum-
seekers. Apparently the future cabinet
members had not quite mastered the dis-
tinctions between immigrants, asylum-
seekers and refugees. After that a news
blackout was declared to ensure that these
beginners' blunders were not given too
much media attention. The party is based
on 'Pim's' philosophy, but in light of the
contradictory conclusions which the differ-
ent members draw from Fortuyn's publica-
tions and speeches, it is not entirely clear of
what precisely his heritage consists. 'Pim
would have wanted it that way' has already
become proverbial.
But what is up with the Netherlands? Peo-
ple abroad have reacted with bewilderment
to the country's political earthquake. With
amazement, The Economist of 4 May con-
firmed that the Dutch welfare state is still
perfectly intact. The Netherlands is com-
pletely 'liveable'. It is true that there are
waiting lists, but health care is of a high
standard; education could be better, but
compares excellently on an international
scale; there are traffic jams, but it is notori-
ously difficult to control mobility. And yet,
notwithstanding the fact that the Nether-
lands is pretty well placed in the welfare
premier league, a large number of Dutch
people have chosen to vote for a party with
no agenda and no experience. Prime Minis-
ter Wim Kok, the most popular politician the
Netherlands has ever known, and his Labour
Party, which dominated politics over the
last decade, were razed to the ground in a
matter of a few months.
It seems that voting for populism is an ex-
pression of people's fear of losing their own
roots, more than an expression of xenopho-
bia. European integration and the introduc-
tion of the Euro have forced the voter out of
his v a t e r l a n d – a political term, bordering on
h e i m a t, one's own familiar environment.
The coloured man next door is the most tan-
gible and visible proof of globalization. 
And this brings us to the question of
whether the Netherlands is a multicultural
society; or whether multiculturalism has be-
come an alibi for not calling problems by
their true name. If you take the mere pres-
ence of cultural minorities in the Nether-
lands, then the country is certainly multicul-
tural, but there is no question of 'multicul-
tural equality'. A multicultural society which
is more of a 'salad bowl' than a 'melting pot'
is little more than a multi-ethnic society.
Multiculturalism demands a social cohesion
which goes further than the individual's
own group, and for which diverse groups
take responsibility. It means a society in
which newcomers are clearly called upon
for their values, behaviour and organization.
A society which asks them to contribute, but
which also takes them seriously. The latter
aspect means that their cultural capital
should no longer be viewed as a candy
store, where the others can pick and mix as
they wish ('they have such delicious food'),
but rather as a coherent, pluralist identity,
which can contribute both individually and
in a group context to the consolidation and
resilience of the society. But it does mean
that demands must be made on the new-
comers. A dominant culture reinforces its
fundamental values by absorbing new
groups. It is weakened, however, by mecha-
nisms of exclusion, and also because some
newcomers are themselves only too glad to
grasp at these mechanisms, precisely so as
n o t to be called upon as citizens. In this way
they can continue to remain in the comfort
of victimization. A society which dares to
change, dares to face its problems straight
on. Who is going to tell the Netherlands –
and Europe – that we cannot manage with-
out immigrants? Economically, socially and
culturally, we need these people to renew
ourselves. 
S o u l - s e a r c h i n g
We should stop trying to explain multicul-
tural problems merely in terms of dis-
favoured positions. It is not acceptable that
young Moroccans and Antilleans steal from
old ladies because they apparently have
such a rough life. Nor is it acceptable that
Turks get into drug-dealing because they no
longer have any prospects for the future.
For as long as the Turkish, Moroccan, Antil-
lean, Surinamese, and others do not have
the courage to raise their voices against the
ills in their own communities, things look
grim for their integration. The new Dutch
citizens must not only deal with their exter-
nal issues, but also the internal ones. The
'self-cleansing' potential of immigrant com-
munities must increase, and that is primarily
their own responsibility. Turks and Moroc-
cans were all too ready to call on two partic-
ular policy-makers to justify their state-
ments the moment they laid a finger on the
sensitive spot of immigrant criminality. But
in the meantime they have neglected to
delve into the facts behind the statements
issued by the two men. 
The progressive members of Dutch soci-
ety will have to think again about the issue
of multiculturalism, and they should take to
heart the words of William Pfaff (I n t e r n a t i o n-
al Herald Tribune, 16 May 2002): 'In terms of
the political system that a given community
has adopted for itself, and the human values
to which it is committed, it has every right to
set terms on which it is prepared to wel-
come and harbor immigrants. Whatever the
merits of other cultures, a nation has the
right to give priority to its own historical cul-
ture and to its established values and prac-
tices. One can even argue that it has a duty
to do this, since if it does not it may experi-
ence the violently obscurantist reaction
against immigrants mobilized by the far
right in France and other democracies, and
it risks undermining its own values.'
An active re-evaluation of their own iden-
tity can also help immigrants in their own
integration. For after all, identities can expe-
rience further development and renewal in
their encounters with other strong identi-
ties. Muslims must also rise to the challenge
of this confrontation. Moreover, along with
individual Muslims, we must also naturalize
Islam. Muslims must re-read the Qur'an in
the light of their new country (the Nether-
lands). Dare to call yourself a 'Dutch Mus-
lim'. For as long as we Muslims do not view
ourselves as part of Dutch society, others
will not do so either. To bring about this
change in attitude Muslims need the help of
society as a whole. Society must stop brand-
ing Islam as a heresy. Help Muslims to devel-
op a Dutch version of their faith. This means
that as well as a far-reaching social debate,
multiculturalism (and please view culture as
one of the mainsprings of society) requires,
above all, a great, great deal of practical
work. 
Haci Karacaer is director of Milli G ö r üş,
t h eN e t h e r l a n d s .
Photo in
c o m m e m o r a t i o n
of Pim Fortuyn,
Rotterdam town
hall, 6 May 2002.
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I n d i a
J AN - P E T E R  H A R T U N G
When on 27 February 2002 the Sabarmati Express at
the train station of Godhra in the Indian state of Gu-
jarat was assaulted and set on fire, and when, as a re-
sult, the whole state of Gujarat turned into the most
severe riots in India since about 10 years, an issue
was brought back to the awareness of the world
community, that had long been forgotten outside
India: the so-called 'Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi',
or Ayodhya conflict. 
The Ayodhya
Conflict and Muslim
L e a d e r s h i p
The Ayodhya conflict is a dispute over sa-
cred space between the two largest reli-
gious communities in South Asia: Hindus
and Muslims. It is, moreover, tightly bound
to colonial thinking and colonial politics in
1 9t h-century British India, and thus nowa-
days an inseparable part of what has been
named the 'post-colonial predicament'. Tak-
ing both together, the Ayodhya conflict is
the paradigmatic embodiment of a phe-
nomenon known as 'communalism': an ide-
ology that perceives society entirely as di-
vided into distinct religious communities
which have nothing in common. In India,
this ideology found its most pithy expres-
sion in the so-called 'Two Nations Theory' by
Muhammad Iqbal in 1930.
After the tragic events that accompanied
the partition of India in 1947, and the cre-
ation of Pakistan as the state of Indian Mus-
lims, the vision of the first prime minister of
the Indian Union and leader of the National
Congress Party, Jawaharlal Nehru, that India
shall become a secular democracy, seems
from the very beginning to have fallen prey
to communalist tendencies within Indian
society. Hindu communalism became a
major tendency in post-independence
India, taking up this assumption and argu-
ing that the Indian Union was to politically
safeguard the interests of the Hindu reli-
gious majority. Thus the idea of a unified,
strong and self-confident Hindu 'nation'
came into being, and turned communalism
into Hindu 'nationalism'.
The bundling of the various Hindu nation-
alist forces was achieved by the Sangh Pari-
var, an umbrella organization, under which
outfits like the Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) or the
Shiv Sena, could coordinate their activities
and work out strategies to reach different
layers of society. Out of one such strategy
today's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
emerged in 1980. The rhetoric of this new
political association included, besides a na-
tional political economy and the topos of
'justice versus corruption', more and more
religious symbols as core strategies of politi-
cal mobilization within the process of com-
munalization of the political sphere.1 M a j o r
symbols are sacred law and sacred space;
the first became manifest in the debate on
Uniform Civil Code versus Muslim Personal
Law which reached its peak so far in the so-
called Shah Bano case in 1985,2 the second,
sparked off by the mosque-temple dispute,
found its climax with the destruction of the
Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on 6 December
1992 by militant Hindu nationalist outfits.
Background to the conflict
Much has been written about the issue
since the culmination of the conflict in the
early 1990s, which centres around the ques-
tion of whether the mosque in Ayodhya,
erected in 1528 by order of the first Mughal
emperor Babur, replaced a Rama temple
which had been destroyed only for this pur-
pose.3 Nineteenth-century colonial construc-
tions of the Orient historicized religious
myths and, introducing different topoi,
helped create distinct religious communities
competing for political and social superiority.
Growing self-confidence among Hindus in
this process became evident in the utilization
of sacred space in Ayodhya when a part of the
Babri Masjid was occupied by a renowned
Hindu priest that year, setting up a raised
platform for worship in its courtyard, claiming
the place to be the historical birthplace of
Rama (ramjanmabhumi). This incident, 145
years ago, marked the beginning of the actu-
al Babri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi dispute.
Communal polarization
What followed, up to today, might be de-
scribed as flux and reflux of juridical and ac-
tivist conflict. For about one hundred years
the issue was left to the court, while the
sources prove that the British colonial ad-
ministration was more concerned with
maintaining a status quo than with taking
sides with one of the conflicting parties. But
when, on the morning of 23 December 1949,
idols of Rama and his wife Sita were found
under the middle dome of the mosque, the
Indian government took occasion of the
riots following, declared the mosque a dis-
puted area and closed it down for both con-
flicting communities. Another three decades
of juridical struggle followed, during which
Hindu nationalist thought entered almost
every strata of the Indian society. As its clear
expression, the VHP in 1961 openly called for
the demolition of the mosque. In 1984, a
'Committee to Sacrifice for the Liberation of
Rama's Birthplace' was founded and, finally
in 1986, by decision of the district court of
Faydabad, the mosque reopened for Hindus
only. From here it took only a short step to a
secret agreement between VHP and the
Union Home Minister in 1989 to erect a tem-
ple in place of the mosque and to the demo-
lition of the mosque in 1992.
The Indian Muslim intelligentsia was
aware of the danger of communal polariza-
tion of Indian society at quite an early stage.
Attempting to jointly face these develop-
ments, a number of non-governmental bod-
ies were set up, comprising otherwise even
hostile fractions within the Muslim commu-
nity. As early as 1964 the All-India Muslim
Majlis-i Mushawwarat (AIMMM) was found-
ed, followed by the All-India Muslim Person-
al Law Board (AIMPLB) in 1972. Even though
the latter refers primarily to another issue
within the communalist dispute, it cannot
be seen as separate from a joint effort of the
Muslim communities in India to unite in
view of the menace to their cultural identity
which was equally perceived as an attempt
by Hindu nationalist forces to violate the
secular basis of the Indian Constitution,
granting equality and freedom of religion.
Indira Gandhi's second legislative period as
prime minister made, for example, Sayyid
Abu l-Hasan cA l i Nadwi (d. 1999) – president
of the AIMPLB and internationally renown-
ed head of the Nadwat a l -cU l a m a – under-
stand that even the Congress Party was on
its way to discharge the main values that
have made up the foundations of Indian na-
tional identity. This latent communalism
made it possible for Hindu nationalist
movements to 'work out strategies for a cul-
tural and political genocide on Muslims, in
the result of which Muslims would no longer
persist as a culturally distinct community
within this society.'4 One of these strategies,
as Muslim leaders were quite aware of, was
the conversion of historic mosques – sym-
bols of Muslim cultural identity – into tem-
ples, which was tolerated, if not even en-
couraged, by the central and local govern-
ments. Exemplary for this was Prime Minis-
ter Rajiv Gandhi's assurance to Muslim lead-
ers during talks in February 1986 that he
would strongly vote for the Muslims in the
Babri Masjid dispute, which almost coincid-
ed with the re-opening of the mosque for
Hindus only.5
To face this particular threat, at least two
bodies were set up in 1986: the Babri Masjid
Movement Coordination Committee (B M M C C)
was founded under the auspices of the
AIMMM on the initiative of the then mem-
ber of parliament Sayyid Shahab al-Din; and
the advocate Zafar Yab Jilani from Lucknow
called in a Babri Masjid Action Committee
(BMAC) which in the meantime has become
a national platform too. Nevertheless, they
were not able to prevent political instability,
following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi
in 1990, from opening the floor to the tri-
umph of communalist politics. The BJP in-
creasingly used communalist symbols in its
electoral propaganda. From 1989 onwards
the Babri Masjid issue became crucial here-
in, and was thus transferred from a regional
controversy to a national issue; BJP rule in
Uttar Pradesh during 1991–1992 finally pro-
vided the political framework for the demo-
lition of the mosque.
Continuing dispute
The controversy over the site, officially
named 'disputed site', nevertheless contin-
ues; it has now become a court case again
which, as Zafar Yab Gilani is convinced, will
be decided this year. But although efforts of
bodies like the AIMPLB, BMMCC and BMAC
succeeded in launching effective public
campaigns, and became a major factor for
at least maintaining a legal status quo, it
cannot be denied that the Muslim commu-
nity lacks a charismatic leader who could be
accepted by all different factions, and who
could keep together a strong alliance in
order to build a front against the Hindu na-
tionalist threat. Another aspect is reflected
by the fact that the current carnage in Gu-
jarat, following the Godhra assault, did not
cause extraordinary alert among the Muslim
élites. Recently conducted interviews with
different leading Muslim personalities re-
vealed that they are quite aware of the cycli-
cal character of communalist tension con-
cerning the Ayodhya issue, and that the
sparking off of violence in Gujarat is per-
ceived as just another peak of activism. This,
together with the lack of charismatic leader-
ship, is the reason for the undermining of all
attempts of the mentioned bodies by op-
posing groups within the Muslim communi-
ty, and even today when joint action is at
highest demand, there are enough indica-
tions for the fact that the Ayodhya issue is
used by different Muslim factions only to
serve their own interests, and to consolidate
their own position within the Muslim com-
munity, as the example of the recent hear-
ing of Maulana Kalb-i Jawwad, noted S h ica
cleric from Lucknow, proves: he claimed the
land where the mosque once stood to be sa-
cred; this rather exceptional concept is very
much reminiscent of the VHP rhetoric. Not
the least because of such internal discord, a
solution for the Babri Masjid-Ramjanmab-
humi dispute seems still to be far away.
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E u r o p e
S A P H I N A Z - A M AL  N A G U I B
Take a stroll in the 'exotic' district of G r ø n l a n d i n
'east-end' Oslo, and read the signs at the entrances of
anonymous apartment buildings or old warehouses.
You are bound to discover that within their premises
several of these places accommodate mosques. What
makes these places mosques is not their actual shape,
but their interior design and decoration.1
Aesthetics of 
Islamic Spaces
i n N o r w a y
At present, there are sixty registered mosques
in Norway; thirty-six of them are in the capi-
tal, Oslo. The number of mosques reflects
the diversity of the Muslim population of
the country, the majority of which came
originally from Asia and Africa. The most
common types of mosques are those situat-
ed in flats, lofts and basements, and some-
times in detached houses with gardens.
Others are to be found in converted schools,
warehouses and old factories, or as prayer
rooms (m u s a l l a) in larger architectural units.
So far, there is only one newly purpose-built
mosque in Norway, that of the World Islam-
ic Mission in Oslo. 
The continuity of use of buildings in a city
and the discontinuity of their original func-
tion is well illustrated by the mosques of
Norway. Here, the various Muslim congrega-
tions draw upon their cultural and religious
knowledge in order to create the kind of
place, which, according to their mental
maps, constitutes a sacred space. They
transform domestic spaces like flats, houses,
factories, or schools into mosques. To do
this they select patterns and designs based
on templates from their original home
countries or other known sites and monu-
ments of the Islamic world. 
The central room of all mosques is the
prayer hall, and great care is put into its
arrangement and in correctly marking the
q i b l a. In some instances one has had to re-
orient the room in such a way that the q i b l a,
which is indicated by a prayer rug on the
floor and a picture of the K acb a on the wall,
is situated in a corner. Consequently, the
prayer lines are oblique with respect to the
walls of the room. The walls in most prayer
halls are either painted in white or in light
green and are decorated with different reli-
gious artefacts. The floors are either covered
with plain wall-to-wall carpets on which one
places the individual prayer rugs or with
multi-niched prayer rugs that are placed in
rows. In addition, most mosques have
kitchens and bathrooms with washing facil-
ities for their members. Several have a li-
brary and offer religious instruction as well
as mother-tongue and Arabic classes to the
children of their communities. A number of
mosques have a women's gallery situated
either at the back, on a mezzanine of the
main praying area, or in a separate side hall.
Barriers, like curtains or screens, dividing
the main prayer hall, may designate the al-
located space for women. From the archi-
tectural and decorative point of view, one of
the most striking features of spaces in
mosques allotted to women is their austeri-
ty and the nakedness of the rooms. In most
women's spaces the q i b l a is either marked
by a prayer rug on the floor, a k u r s i h o l d i n g
a Qur'an, or a photograph of the K acb a a n d
other holy sites. Often, a TV-set permitting
the female believers to follow the prayers
through video monitors indicates the q i b l a.
Photographs and Islamic
k i t s c h
Like other religious visual arts, Islamic vi-
sual arts are used as mediators of religious
ideologies. As agents of non-verbal commu-
nication upon which societies rely to trans-
mit religious knowledge, they contribute to
making religion apparent. Religious art pro-
vides the artists and craftsmen with an es-
tablished catalogue of forms, a sort of com-
mon fund of symbols from which they can
pick and choose in order to illustrate a given
subject. Conformity, however, does allow a
certain flexibility and innovation in the or-
ganization of details. New technologies,
new materials and even new designs and
motifs are introduced while remaining in
keeping with what is considered an accept-
ed Islamic stamp. To convey the spirit of a
coherent Islamic space, Muslim artists and
craftsmen in Norway have to find the bal-
ance between the reproduction of different
regional, traditional models and their incor-
poration into a novel, transcultural Islamic
design. What makes a building Islamic is not
so much its form as its intention and func-
tion which is expressed by the use of non-
architectural means, namely ornamenta-
tion. Visualizing religion entails the use of
visual topoi and codifying images in such
ways that they acquire symbolic and alle-
gorical attributes. The widespread use of
photographs and posters in the decorative
schemes of Norwegian mosques epitomizes
these properties. Representations of the
K acb a, the Prophet's mosque in Medina, the
Dome of the Rock, the mausoleum of
Husayn in Kerbala, and other well-known
sites worldwide adorn the walls of prayer
halls. The pictures are mass produced at low
cost, which makes their dissemination and
acquisition quite inexpensive. Photographs
and posters of holy Islamic sites may be con-
sidered timeless visual glosses where the re-
ligious message is condensed into one pic-
ture. The use of photographs and posters in
mosques appears as a contradiction to the
traditional avoidance of figurative art in Is-
lamic visual arts. But today, the omnipres-
ence and banalization of pictures in the Is-
lamic world are well exemplified by the por-
traits of chiefs of states that are found in all
public institutions including on the outer
walls of mosques, in shops, as gigantic
posters in the streets and, sometimes, even
in private homes. Photographs and posters
of sacred places indicate the religious im-
portance of their subjects and contribute
more to the transmission of religious mem-
ory than the unique chef-d'oeuvre, which is
historically and culturally bound. The famil-
iarity and monotony of photographic repro-
ductions and of posters give them the facul-
ty of inscribing and incorporating their mes-
sage deeper and deeper, mechanically and
in successive, regular waves. The framed
pictures of Islam's holy sites hanging on the
walls of a mosque aid in the creation of an
Islamic sacred space. The photographic
image or the poster encloses and freezes
the object. Time seems to stand still, and
space tends to disappear. Further, the pic-
ture's atmosphere provokes an emotional
response in the beholder for whom the de-
picted monument appears to be within
reach. The significance of pictures repro-
ducing Islamic sacred places is often given
by calligraphy captions especially on
posters whose layout regularly combines
photographs, drawings and writing. More-
over, these photographs or posters are usu-
ally subject to many forms of manipulation
in order to influence the beholder's inter-
pretation and feelings. They are retouched,
embellished and glossed. The monuments
shown are rendered in an illusive pristine
state. Signs of age, rubble and dirt are con-
spicuously absent from the scene. People
represented there are not recognizable per-
sons but crowds, and crowds negate the in-
dividual. In the context of mosques in non-
Islamic environments they bring forth in the
Muslim viewer a sense of belonging to the
larger u m m a. 
Pan-Islamic artefacts
The decoration of most mosques in Nor-
way consists largely of portable objects. In
fact, except in the one purpose-built mosque
and a converted school, there are very few
fixed features in Norwegian mosques. T h e
use of movable objects in the decoration
schemes of these mosques expresses better
than anything the flexibility and – so far –
the transient character of Islamic sacred
spaces in Norway. In addition to pho-
tographs and posters there are plates in
etched or embossed brass, copper or other
metals, wood or ceramics engraved or
painted with the names of Allah (normally
placed between the m i h r a b, indicating the
q i b l a, and the m i n b a r, the pulpit), Muham-
mad (to the left of the m i h r a b), calligrams
bearing the mirrored form of h u w a (He) or a
fuller Qur'anic quotation, and one of the
four caliphs or sometimes with those of
Husayn and Hasan as well. We see costly
printed Qur'anic verses and pious invoca-
tions set in elaborate, normally gilded
frames, richly decorated Muslim calendars,
fancy clocks showing the different local
hours of prayer and relating them to those
in Mecca, prayer rugs and carpets in shiny,
silky materials with representations of the
K acb a to hang on walls, and miniature gild-
ed mosques. One often finds a Qur'an on a
k u r s i beside the m i h r a b. Bunches of rosaries,
hanging from pegs on the walls or on pillars,
and Qur'ans placed on open shelves are
made available to those who need them.
M i h r a bs are often constructed in light, mov-
able material. M i n b a rs are either made of
wood and put on wheels, or may simply
consist of lecterns or easy chairs. Most of
these objects are machine-made consump-
tion goods that can be bought in any shop
or street stall catering to such commodities
around the world.2 They are transnational;
in fact many are labelled with 'Made in Pak-
istan', 'Made in China' or 'Made in Korea'. Al-
though they imitate renowned objects and
monuments belonging to a common fund
of Islamic 'fine arts', these artefacts are nei-
ther exact copies nor forgeries. Actually,
whether it be a gilded reconstruction of the
Dome of the Rock, a heavily retouched rep-
resentation of the Sultan Ahmad Mosque in
Istanbul on a calendar, or a glossy K acb a
woven in a silky prayer rug, all show inven-
tiveness and innovation, especially in the
treatment of details. These qualities are not
always matched with talent and accom-
plished craftsmanship. The repetitive and
conventional character of these artefacts
generates a sense of familiarity and nostal-
gia that remind us of kitsch. Like kitsch, they
give a feeling of embeddedness that is tied
to the upkeep of traditions and to authen-
ticity. At the same time, like kitsch, they also
have a pretence to universality – in this case,
one of definite pan-Islamic quality.
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H O  W AI - Y I P
Global attention was given to the macro-political
changes of Hong Kong in 1997, namely the transition
of sovereignty from British colonial rule to the rule of
the socialist regime of the People's Republic of China
(PRC). But the micro-history of ethnic minorities has
been often neglected, if not suppressed. The history
of the Muslim ethnic minorities in Hong Kong under
British colonial rule and the Chinese-dominated gov-
ernment can be revealed vividly through the design
and the spatial distribution of mosques throughout
Hong Kong's history. The history of ethnic Muslims is
intertwined with that of the mosques in which they
gathered. Mosques were – and still are – perceived as
sites of cultural and political contestation. 
Contested Mosques 
in Hong Kong 
ment proposed to demolish or convert the
Stanley Mosque into a club for government
officials.  
Mosque design in divide
Another mosque on Hong Kong Island ex-
hibits the cultural divergence between eth-
nic and local culture: the Masjid Amar and
Osman Ramju Sadick Islamic Centre (Wan
Chai Mosque), opened in 1967. This mosque,
designed by Ramju Sadick, a Chinese Mus-
lim, demonstrates a distinctive Chinese cul-
tural tradition. The Wan Chai Mosque partic-
ularly attracts Chinese Muslims, as com-
pared with, for example, the Kowloon
Mosque and Islamic Centre, which attracts
Muslims from various ethnic backgrounds.
The internal design of both mosques em-
bodies various ethnic traditions. The Wan
Chai Mosque fits more smoothly in the gen-
eral organizational structure of Hong Kong,
serving multi-faceted purposes. The eight-
floor complex is composed of a prayer hall, a
Chinese restaurant, a h a l a l bakery, medical
services, a library and seminar rooms. The Is-
lamic Union of Hong Kong and Hong Kong
Islamic Youth Association are based in the
Wan Chai Mosque Centre.
The Kowloon Mosque, constructed in
1896, remained a place of worship for over
80 years until extensive damage was caused
by the urban Mass Transit Railway project.
The mosque was reconstructed and re-
opened in 1984 in the Tsim Shau Tsui area as
a place for prayer and learning. It is primari-
ly frequented by Muslims who have their
roots in the Indian Subcontinent, many of
them living in the nearby Chung Ching
Mansion, where ethnic minorities have set-
tled. This also explains why the Kowloon
Mosque also plays a role as a cultural site for
non-Chinese Muslims, who assemble there
for their social life and support, exchange of
information, and leisure. Non-Chinese and
Chinese Muslims live in different segments
of society, with different cultural orienta-
tions and lifestyles, though they adhere to
the universal u m m a. 
The Wan Chai Mosque has a multi-pur-
pose design and clearly caters to the local
Chinese mentality. Its multi-purpose design
differs from that of the Kowloon Mosque,
where the space is mainly devoted to the
three prayer halls with luxurious white mar-
ble finishing. Moreover, the leaders of the
respective Muslim communities in these
two mosques also distinctively differ in
terms of their ethnic backgrounds: a Chi-
nese imam from China proper leads the
Muslim community at the Wan Chai Mosque,
whereas a non-Chinese imam leads the K o w-
loon Mosque. Chinese Muslims gather in the
Chinese restaurant of the Wan Chai Mosque,
where they can comfortably enjoy social
time and have a Chinese halal meal. Differ-
ent cultural practices and the institutional
design of the mosques, on one hand, reflect
the availability of a variety of spaces to ac-
commodate ethnic differences; but, on the
other hand, there has yet to be developed a
stronger solidarity, one which goes beyond
ethnic difference, amongst all Hong Kong
Muslims.   
Spatial distribution
a n d design 
The social and cultural status of non-Chi-
nese Muslims in post-colonial Hong Kong
can also be examined through the ongoing
project of the sixth mosque in Hong Kong,
the Sheung Shui Mosque and Islamic Cen-
tre. The construction of this mosque is path-
breaking as it is the first mosque to be built
in the post-colonial New Territories. Urban
reconstruction forces many Muslims to
move from Hong Kong Island to the new
satellite cities in the New Territories. Many
of these Muslims are economically less well
off and have no alternative but to comply
with government policies. In view of the ab-
sence of facilities in the New Territories,
Muslim leaders campaigned for mosques
and community facilities. Limited land sup-
ply as well as the government's policy to
promote social welfare influenced the ne-
gotiations; the latest revision of the design
aims at the development of a welfare-ori-
ented mosque, which will not only include a
prayer hall but also an English-medium sec-
ondary school and facilities for the elderly.
Permission to build the Sheung Shui
Mosque and Islamic Centre has been grant-
ed and Muslim countries including the Unit-
ed Arab Emirates and Qatar have pledged to
give full financial support, but resistance
continues. Local Chinese residents express
their discontent with the plans for the
mosque, arguing that it may upset social
order. The non-Chinese Muslim leader inter-
prets the opposition of Chinese residents to
the mosque project as being the result of ig-
norance with respect to Islam and discrimi-
nation towards non-Chinese Muslims. A dia-
logue has been initiated between ethnic
(non-Chinese) Muslim leaders and local
Hong Kong Chinese representatives. The
yearning for public acceptance of the new
mosque in the New Territories indeed sym-
bolizes the road ahead of social recognition
among non-Chinese Muslims.
One u m m a,  two fates 
Non-Chinese Muslims are a deprived pop-
ulation in the post-colonial era, and their
leaders lament the situation they deem un-
just as compared with that of the colonial
era. Resistance of Chinese residents against
the mosque in the New Territories expresses
just the tip of the iceberg of the marginality
of non-Chinese Muslims. In general, the
non-Chinese Muslim minority suffers from
the isolation and implicit racism in search-
ing for employment and in education. Many
children from South Asian countries have
difficulties being admitted to schools. They
drop out from school due to problems with
learning the native Chinese (Cantonese)
language, adapting to the curriculum and
the Chinese culture of their peers. The in-
crease in mobile groups such as Indonesian
domestic helpers find themselves in an un-
f a v o u r a b l e environment, especially after the
Asian economic crisis following the han-
dover of Hong Kong in 1997. Indonesian do-
mestic workers were the first to experience
frozen wages and layoffs. After 11 Septem-
ber, non-Chinese Muslims have become
conspicuous targets of discrimination due
to the label of 'Islam' and their skin colour. In
contrast, in the eyes of the non-Chinese
Muslim, Chinese Muslims are a silent minor-
ity that seems to be invisible in society.
Their Muslim identity is hardly noticeable in
public life. At home with the local Chinese
culture and language, Chinese Muslims
generally have no difficulty functioning in
society. Few of them outwardly express
their Muslim identity in everyday life. A non-
Chinese Muslim leader observed that many
Chinese Muslims 'forget' Islam or integrate
too comfortably in the 'westernized'
lifestyle. As Hong Kong has transitioned
from the colonial to post-colonial era,
mosques have reflected changes, especially
in terms of the social and political status of
Muslims. Only time will tell what will be-
come of the current clear divide between
Chinese and non-Chinese Muslims in Hong
Kong, and how they will come to terms with
the notion of the u m m a. 
The history of ethnic Muslims in the colonial
era is inseparable from the British colonial
policies. According to a recent government
report in 2002, there are some 80,000 Mus-
lims in Hong Kong. Approximately half of
the Muslims in Hong Kong today are of Chi-
nese origin; the others belong to various
smaller ethnic groups, including local born
non-Chinese believers from Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Middle
East and various African countries. The re-
cent increase in the Muslim population may
be attributed to mobile populations such as
the influx of Indonesian domestic helpers.
The first Muslims to settle in Hong Kong
were of Indian origin. From the mid-19t h
century onward, Muslim soldiers and busi-
nessmen from the Indian sub-continent ar-
rived in Hong Kong. As Muslims increased in
number, the colonial government allocated
land to them to build community facilities
such as mosques and cemeteries.  
The politics of space
The Jamiathe Masjid was the first mosque
in Hong Kong, built in 1890. After this
mosque was demolished, the building was
reconstructed as the Shelly Street Mosque,
dating from 1915. In terms of religious and
cultural rights, the British government's
recognition of the needs of Muslims, which
resulted in aid being given to them so that
they could build a community distinctive
from local Chinese culture, was an impor-
tant step. Nowadays, the Shelly Street
Mosque is listed as part of the historical her-
itage of the city and has been recently reno-
vated. As urban reconstruction programmes
and estate developers target the site for po-
tential redevelopment, the mosque escapes
extinction under the government policy.
The present status of the mosque is no
longer strategic when compared to the
past. Indeed, it signifies the identity crisis of
ethnic Muslims in the post-colonial era.
Many non-Chinese Muslims are no longer
well off or privileged under the new regime
in the post-colonial era as compared to the
past. They are forced to scatter in the New
Territories driven by the government's
urban renewal policy. 
Other mosques are in threat of destruc-
tion. The Stanley Mosque and the Cape
Collinson Mosque (in Chai Wan) are s i t u a t e d
in two remote places on Hong Kong Island
and are interestingly both built in isolated
prison areas (Stanley Prison and Cape
Collinson Correctional Institution). Original-
ly built in the early 20t h century to serve for
prayer and congregation purposes for the
Indian Muslim prison staff, the later tremen-
dous drop of Muslim staff in these two pris-
ons and the low access following its isolated
location from the residential area have led
to the preservation of the two mosques
being questioned. Although the prison and
the correctional institution are still in ser-
vice, there has been a significant decrease in
the number of Indian Muslim staff members
at both. In a recent initiative the govern-
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J o r d a n
A L A  H AM A R N E H
Al-Wihdat is a legendary camp in the history of the
Palestinian struggle for liberation, self-determination
and national identity. It was established in 1955 for
5,000 refugees, three kilometres to the south of
Amman's city centre and inhabited by refugees from
the villages between Jaffa and Jerusalem. Shelters and
tents dominated the camp scene until the early 1970s.
Al-Wihdat was a main centre of activity of Palestinian




After 'Black September' the Jordanian gov-
ernment and the UNRWA initiated numer-
ous projects to improve living conditions.
With the conclusion of the agreements of
Oslo and Wadi cA r a b a, the Palestinians of
Jordan, now excluded from the so-called
peace process, have opted increasingly for
Jordanian strategies.
Today Al-Wihdat constitutes an important
urban area, with more than 2,000 officially
registered shops and enterprises that offer
an impressive variety of goods and services.
Administratively, Al-Wihdat is a part of A l -
cA w d a quarter of Al-Yarmouk district. The
current estimate of 48,000 inhabitants in-
cludes about 8,000 local gypsies, Egyptian
labour migrants, Iraqi refugees and other
low-income non-Jordanian groups. In Ara-
bic A l -cA w d a means 'The Return'. It seems
ironic that the most integrated refugee
camp in Jordan carries this name. Neverthe-
less, it is a way to keep the hope of return
and a separate identity alive. The paradigms
of refugee versus citizen and Palestinian
identity versus integration have dominated
the socio-political discourse of Jordan in the
last 30 years. Although the absolute majori-
ty of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan have
Jordanian citizenship, they accepted and
understood it, until the late 1980s, to be a
'transit' solution on the way back to Pales-
tine. The Oslo and Wadi cA r a b a t r e a t i e s
caused a change in public opinion, and at
present a large majority in the refugee com-
munities has come to terms with the fact
that Jordan is their permanent place of resi-
dence. But it was not without disappoint-
ment and scepticism that they recognized
that the question of the refugees was ex-
cluded from the Oslo and Wadi cA r a b a
a g r e e m e n t s .
Al-Wihdat was one of the main centres of
the formation of the Palestinian liberation
movement in Jordan. In the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s Al-Wihdat was synonymous with
'Palestinian' in public life; protest actions,
demonstrations, petitions and even Al-Wih-
dat soccer club's matches were all indicators
of an all-Palestinian public stance and na-
tional self-identification. The takeover of Al-
Wihdat in 1970 by the Jordanian armed
forces marked the conclusion of the Sep-
tember clashes in the country. The crack-
down on the in-camp demonstrations in the
1970s put a further restraint on Palestinian
political activities. The later elections for the
executive committees in the camp's NGOs
reflected the passive political mood inside
the Palestinian community after the repres-
sion. In the first democratic elections in Jor-
dan in 1989, the inhabitants of Al-Wihdat
were reluctant to participate, demonstrat-
ing the degree of political self-identification
of the refugees. However, in the 1990s, as-
similation strategies became the dominant
trend among the Palestinian refugees. 
Political 'Jordanization'
In the wake of Arab-Israeli peace talks and
treaties, Islamic movements gained a huge
popularity with their fierce criticism, in par-
ticular concerning the negotiation tactics of
Arafat and the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty.
The Islamic Action Front – the political
branch of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan –
and numerous welfare organizations filled
the political and social gaps that existed in
the camp in the early 1990s following
Arafat's failure to continue financing his
local allies and the social networks in the
camp. The PLO now focused on the founda-
tion of the Autonomy Authority in the West
Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the PLO lost
many of its former sponsors due to Arafat's
stance during the Second Gulf War. In con-
trast, the Islamists gained a lot from their
legal status and their strong welfare net-
work. In short, an officially registered Jor-
danian political party became the represen-
tative body for Al-Wihdat. The fact that it
concerns an oppositional party with a clear-
ly Palestinian agenda does not alter its na-
tional character, orientation and loyalty.
Each Jordanian political organization puts
the Palestine issue high on its agenda, be-
cause it is the practical way to address the
'patriotic emotions' of the Jordanians of
Palestinian origin, who make up at least
50% of the potential voters.
The HAMAS crises in 1999 and the local
actions of solidarity with the Intifada al-
Aqsa in 2000–2001 show the efficacy of this
'Jordanian' domination of political life in Al-
Wihdat. While in winter 2000 a few hundred
extreme radical leftists and Islamists were
involved in street fights with the police in
the streets of Al-Wihdat, the authorized Is-
lamic actions and events were peaceful and
indeed very moderate in their expressions.
The meetings and demonstrations orga-
nized by the Islamic Movement followed the
official regulations. Even the protests
against the last Israeli military aggressions
in March–April 2002 were most disciplined;
the populous protests took place outside of
Al-Wihdat and were mainly under an effec-
tive command of the Islamic Action Front. In
contrast, in A l - B a qca, the largest refugee
camp in Jordan, various protest manifesta-
tions occurred beyond the control of the
F r o n t .
Another aspect of notice is the participa-
tion of Al-Wihdat refugees in the various na-
tional and local elections. In 1989 about
40% of the potential voters went to the
polls. In 1993 the number of voters in-
creased to 61%, but in 1997, following a call
by the Islamists to boycott the elections,
only 22% cast their votes. The votes drifted
from pro-Arafat traditional personalities,
who had good connections with the Jordan-
ian establishment (in 1989) to contra-Arafat
radical candidates with critical attitudes to-
wards the Jordanian national establishment
(in 1993) and new agitated rhetoric (in 1997)
about 'the candidate of the Jordanians of
Palestinian origin'. The integration of the
camp in Jordanian politics put an end to its
role as a 'factory of return illusions', as it was
sometimes called, and strengthened the in-
fluence of the refugee-citizens in the do-
mestic political life. The forthcoming na-
tional elections may demonstrate whether
this political integration is stable and func-
tional, especially in the context of the last Is-
raeli invasion in the Palestinian Authority
a r e a s .
Urban integration
Compared to other former refugee camps,
the changes in Al-Wihdat following the lib-
eralization of the political life in Jordan
since 1989 are impressive. The boom in the
construction and commerce sectors follow-
ing the arrival of Palestinian-Jordanian re-
turnees from the Gulf States after the Sec-
ond Gulf War has accelerated the transfor-
mation. Today Al-Wihdat is the commercial
and service centre south of Amman. More
than 2,000 enterprises are located in the
camp. While the eastern quarters of Al-Wih-
dat have been developing as low-middle
class housing areas with three- and four-sto-
ried buildings, the southern quarters have
degraded to slum-like areas. 
The practical inclusion of Al-Wihdat in the
spatial planning of the metropolis of
Amman started in 1970, with the crushing of
the Palestinian national movement there.
The first streets were built across the camp's
territory mainly for security purposes. Later,
electricity, telephone and – in the 1980s –
waste-water lines were installed. The hous-
ing reconstruction boom began in the early
1980s with the new regulations for perma-
nent-cement roofs (until that time the hous-
ing units could only have tin-plate or zinc-
plate roofs) and limited second floor per-
missions. 
The situation changed radically after the
Second Gulf War. About 300,000–350,000
Jordanians of Palestinian origin were forced
to leave the Gulf region, mainly Kuwait. The
returnees caused a boom in the commerce
and construction sectors. The geographic
location and cheap real estate prices in and
around Al-Wihdat as well as the intensive
urbanization to the south of Amman attract-
ed numerous small businesses. Between
1990 and 1993 the number of shops and en-
terprises in the camp more than doubled:
from 450 to 980, and by 1997 they num-
bered 1,700. However, it is not only the
number of enterprises that is impressive but
the type and variety as well. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, these enterprises were
mainly small, simple, family-owned busi-
nesses with a low level of technical exper-
tise. Today they include banks, jewellers,
pharmacies, travel agencies, appliance and
electronic shops, and a huge number of gro-
cers, clothing stores, vegetable shops and
fast food outlets.
The development of commerce and ser-
vices fuelled the construction boom and the
real estate market in the camp. Despite the
fact that the selling, buying and renting of
units in the camp is officially prohibited by
the UNRWA, it has become a common phe-
nomenon, which is indirectly supported by
the Jordanian authorities. Returnees and ex-
camp inhabitants are the main residents in
the extensions to the south and east. How-
ever, unlike the camp itself, these expan-
sions are formal areas, outside of UNWRA ju-
risdiction. Al-Wihdat continues to be the
centre of social, commercial and political
life for these new quarters as well. The
UNRWA schools, clinics and social networks
strengthen its dominant local position.
Palestinians have been citizens of Jordan
since 1951. Their economic and demograph-
ic weight in the country, as well as the in-
creased state of integration, is only partly re-
flected in the Jordanian political fabric. The
majority of the refugees distinguish be-
tween the right to return and the prospect of
return. The dilemma of integration versus as-
similation will remain on their agenda for
the years to come. Essential for further mod-
ernization and democratization of Jordanian
society – and for that matter for a more sta-
ble and peaceful situation in the region – is
the formulation of a new (Jordanian) nation-
al identity, that accommodates the needs
and aspirations of the Palestinians in Jordan.
A more balanced representation of the
urban areas, where the refugees live, in the
electoral laws would be a first requirement.
A commercial
street in Al-
W i h d a t .
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In September 2001, the Greater Amman Municipality
started an extensive project for the renovation of
downtown Amman, supported by a Japanese loan of
$58.8 million. One of the main goals of the project is to
bolster tourism in the kingdom which has been nega-
tively affected by Al-Aqsa Intifada and the 11 Septem-
ber attacks. Furthermore, Amman is the Cultural Capi-
tal of the Arab World 2002 and will thus become an im-
portant destination for Arab tourists. The Jordanian
economy, always looking for cash money, desperately
needs the revenues of a blossoming tourism industry.
It is therefore only logical that Jordan tries to meet the
expectations of Western and Arab visitors as a means
to improve the national balance sheet.
O r i e n t a l i z i n g
t h e O r i e n t
Renovating Downtown
A m m a n
The concerned area around the Roman Am-
phitheatre and the Citadel including the old
Circassian Al-Muhajirin quarter will undergo
a far-reaching programme of restructuring.
This area, usually simply called 'downtown'
by the Ammanites, lies in a w a d i where once
the Sail Amman (desert torrent) used to
flow. It was the nucleus of the modern town
of Amman which emerged after the founda-
tion of the Emirate of Transjordan in the
early 1920s. The development of the city in
those days was hampered by the topogra-
phy which is difficult in several respects and
which complicated the extension of the
built area. The narrow wadi is surrounded by
hills which had to be made accessible by
long staircases, one of them leading from
the street opposite the Roman Amphi-
theatre to the Citadel, thus connecting the
two main places of touristic interest.
According to the deputy mayor of Amman,
the municipality now intends to erect 'orien-
tal fountains […], kiosks and a traditional
market place' and wants 'to redecorate the
entrances of some shops in a traditional
Arabesque motif'.1 Accordingly, the flow of
tourists will be channelled through three
passageways lined with souvenir shops,
guiding the visitors from the Citadel to the
Amphitheatre or vice versa. But the refur-
bishing of downtown Amman does not only
aim at an 'orientalization' of the old city cen-
tre by means of architecture; it contains an-
other major project: the new national muse-
um, which will focus on the various aspects
of (Trans-)Jordanian history and culture.
While the exhibition will include an archaeo-
logical section, the main focus will be on the
recent Hashemite history.2
Early development of Amman
Though Amman has a long tradition,
there was no settlement continuity and the
historical caesuras had important conse-
quences for the development of the city.
Signs of human settlement in what is now
modern Amman date back at least 6,000
years. Later on, the Roman and Greek em-
perors made use of the city and in the 7t h
century, the whole region was incorporated
into the newly established Islamic domin-
ion. But after the disastrous Mongolian con-
quest in the 13t h century, Amman increas-
ingly lost its importance and was complete-
ly abandoned from the 14t h century. It was
only in 1878 that Circassian refugees were
settled in the ruins of ancient Amman by the
Ottoman administration. Remains of the
Roman and Greek rule today form the most
important tourist sites in Amman.
Typical features of a traditional Arab and
Islamic city emerged during the formative
years from 1876 to the end of the 1930s: Al-
Husseini Mosque in the centre of the city,
the surrounding markets, a cemetery some
way up from the city centre in Ras A l -cAi n,
and the palace of the ruler which was built
from 1924 onwards in Raghdan. Unlike other
cities in the Middle East, Amman never knew
a clear residential separation of Muslims and
Christians, but ethnic clusters did emerge
with regards to the Circassian immigrants
according to the date of their arrival in the
city. Al-Muhajirin quarter, which is now part
of the renovation project, is an example of
this. According to the needs of the state and
its desire for public representation, streets in
downtown Amman were widened from the
late 1920s onwards and older houses were
torn down to give way to places of public
gathering, official parades and the easy
passing of automobiles. Photographs of
Amman from the mandate period show a
very modest architecture with simple one-
or two-storied houses and hardly any repre-
sentative buildings.
The influx of the Palestinian refugees in
1948 again led to a dramatic change of the
city. Many buildings from the formative
years of the Emirate have been demolished
since then. The emergence of a politically
influential economic class during World War
II initiated also the division into East and
West Amman. From that time on, the better-
off people were found in the western part of
the town while the lower income popula-
tion settled in the eastern parts. The old city
c e n t r e has since then developed into a
cheap shopping area for the poorer inhabi-
tants of Amman. This division has become
constantly and increasingly accentuated
with each decade.
Use of public space 
Apart from its function as a market place
for low income earners and as a tourism
spot, the old city centre represents one of
the rare public spaces in Amman where so-
cial interaction takes place. Furthermore,
the city centre regularly serves as a place for
demonstrations and manifestations of pub-
lic discontent. People have flocked to the
streets after Friday prayers at Al-Husseini
Mosque on several occasions during the last
decade: to protest against the peace agree-
ment with Israel in 1994, the sanctions
against Iraq in 1998 and against the current
Israeli aggression in the course of the sec-
ond Intifada in Palestine.
Downtown Amman also contains one of
the city's biggest and most frequented
parks: the Hashimiyya Square opposite the
Roman Amphitheatre. The place, which ad-
joins Raghdan bus terminal, was originally
planned as a major tourist area with shop-
ping arcades, souvenir booths, restaurants
and cafés. Nevertheless, it developed less
into a place of consumption and more into a
place of recreation and relaxation. The large
open space, bordered by trees and de-
signed as a public garden, today attracts
s h a b a b (groups of young men), families and
couples alike. While shop owners complain
about the missing profits, the Ammanites
have different ideas about their use of the
square. They enjoy themselves strolling,
gossiping and watching people. Hashimiyya
Square thus returns to its traditional use
from the Emirate days when it often wit-
nessed small fairs and festivities during the
Ramadan and national celebrations.
Tradition or innovation?
Downtown Amman is mainly a product of
the 20t h century and never resembled the
'traditional Arab city' as constructed by West-
ern scholarship. The projected 'Arabesque
motifs' to decorate buildings from the 1940s
and 1950s, the 'oriental fountains' and the
market place all reflect the municipality's vi-
sions of how Amman could have been – but
not as it used to be. The attempts by the mu-
nicipality to restructure the heart of the city
therefore express the common imaginings of
the 'Arab-Islamic city' guided by the typical
clichés without any historical authenticity.
Besides, the national culture and local her-
itage during such a process become com-
modified, i.e. they serve as goods 'for com-
mercial consumption and excessive capital
a c c u m u l a t i o n '3 and are detached from their
original meaning. In fact, the planned reno-
vation has nothing to do with the traditional
structure of downtown Amman, the history
of which comprises no more than 120 years.
Anyway, the official interest in the relics of
the early Emirate days is rather new. For a
long time, they had been completely ne-
glected: one of the main examples of early
Transjordanian architecture, the Philadelphia
Hotel, was demolished in 1984 when the
Hashimiyya Square was remodeled,4 thus de-
stroying one of the most important places of
political, cultural and social activities during
the years of the Emirate and the early years of
i n d e p e n d e n c e .5 Another example is a large
villa on Jabal al-Luweibdeh where Frederick
Peake used to live. It was abandoned during
the 1970s and saved only by a private initia-
tive in 1993. Today it is the most inspiring art
centre in the whole of Jordan, called darat al-
f u n u n.6
Current attempts to rescue the remnants of
the past coincide with a new sense of the re-
cent Jordanian history. Since the early 1990s,
a steadily growing sense of proper historical
background has emerged, as manifested in
numerous books and articles, seminars and
conferences on local history. This demon-
strates a hitherto unknown interest in an au-
thentic 20t h-century Transjordanian history.
Moreover, the sudden increase in research
must also be seen within the context of the
ongoing discussion in Jordan about the
question of national identity. While all Arab
states have their national founding myths,
different explanations for their nationhood
and varying exclusions and inclusions of cer-
tain societal groups, the Jordanian case is
even more sensitive. In the face of the Pales-
tine conflict, the question of national identity
has yet to be sufficiently answered. The new
national museum is therefore likely to be-
come a centre point for the reinterpretation
and redefinition of the Jordanian nation-
h o o d .
The 'face-lift' of old Amman and the pro-
jected museum can thus be read in three dif-
ferent ways: as a means to satisfy tourist ex-
pectations and to strengthen the economy;
as an attempt to create tradition embodied
in material culture; and as a contribution to
the age-old discussion about national identi-
ty in Jordan.
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The establishment of monuments for commemorating
the victims of violent confrontations constitutes a
major element in the construction of modern national
c o n s c i o u s n e s s .1 The Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel,
approximately 19% of all Israeli citizens, have experi-
enced in the last five years an accelerated process of
'monumentalization' of their identity as a national mi-
nority – many monuments that commemorate their
victims in the Zionist-Palestinian conflict have been
established in Arab villages and towns inside Israel.
One event and one monument were crucial
in triggering this process: on 30 March 1976,
Israeli police shot to death six Arab citizens
during violent demonstrations against the
government's confiscation of Palestinian
land. This day, known as Land Day, and the
monument built to commemorate the trag-
ic event signify the stage in which Palestin-
ian memory began to be carved in the pub-
lic space of the Arab minority in Israel. 
R a b i n o w i t z2 describes the discursive ways
in which the state of Israel denied the Pales-
tinian national identity of its Arab citizens,
and how it tried to create a new, local Arab
identity, loyal to the state of Israel. The main
element in denying the Palestinian identity
was denying the past, notably everything
that happened before 1948. The Palestini-
ans were expected to ignore their common
destiny as victims of the war in 1948 and the
memories of their existence as a community
before 1948. The exile of the Palestinian
leadership, as well as many years of worry
about possible repressive action and the
disapproving stance of the Jewish majority,
forced demonstrations of Palestinian na-
tional identity into the private sphere.
Private memories of the 1948 war and
longings for exiled family members were
transmitted orally within families. Poets and
authors like Emil Habibi, Tawfiq Zayad and
Hana Ibrahim wrote about the Nakba (the
destruction of Palestine in 1948) in their
poems and novels, bringing this to the pub-
lic sphere. However, public rallies and
demonstrations where highly restricted and
not a single Palestinian national monument
was founded. 
The year 1976 constitutes a turning point
in the ways the Palestinians in Israel remem-
ber their past. In February of that year, the
Israeli government declared its intention to
confiscate land from its owners in the vil-
lages of Sakhnin, Arabeh and Deir-Hana in
central Galilee. The wide protest demon-
stration planned for 30 March developed
into a violent confrontation between the
demonstrators and the Border Police
troops, who entered the villages and the
houses. The Israeli police killed six people
and injured 70. 
It was not the first time that the Arab citi-
zens of Israel suffered fatal casualties from
the shooting of Israeli security forces. Twen-
ty years earlier, on 29 October 1956, a group
of peasants from Kufr-Qassem returned to
their village from the fields, not aware that
their village was under curfew. Forty-seven
of them were murdered by Israeli troops.
The event is commemorated annually and
two monuments were built in the village.3
However, it is difficult to consider those
early memorial practices as national com-
memoration since they were not articulated
by any Palestinian symbols and did not in-
voke, explicitly or implicitly, a common
Palestinian past. However, the collective
self-image of the Palestinians in Israel pro-
duced by this commemoration of Kufr-
Qassem is one of a passive victim and not of
an active political agent fighting heroically
for rights. 
In contrast, Land Day was a clear political
issue. What was at stake was the core of the
struggle between Zionism and the Palestin-
ian people: land. The Palestinian national
narrative could be summarized in one sen-
tence – 'the Palestinian peasants' land was
robbed by the Zionists'. 'Land' occupies a
central role in Palestinian experience and
mythology. After the end of military rule in
1966, the Arab citizens had reason to be-
lieve that Israel was going through a pro-
cess of democratization, progressing to-
ward civil equality. The confiscation of lands
in 1976 and the victims of the police shat-
tered this illusion. But in contrast to the
massacre in Kufr-Qassem, the absence of
military rule enabled the protest to gain
presence in the public space and to be
linked to a shared Palestinian memory.
Thus, the events of Land Day signify a his-
torical turning point where Palestinian iden-
tity began to spill from the private walls into
the public space – in building monuments
and in the annual political rallies of protest
and memory.4
The Land Day monument 
Following the Land Day events of 1976,
committees were established in the victims'
villages. These committees sought ways to
commemorate their names. The Committee
for Protecting the Arab Land5 decided to
build a central monument to commemorate
all six victims in a cemetery in Sakhnin, resi-
dence of three of the victims. The commit-
tee contacted Abed Abedi, a young artist
from Haifa who returned from his art studies
in East Germany in 1972, and worked for the
communist newspaper A l - I t t i h a d. Abedi was
concerned that his work might turn the
state's authority against him. This was one
of the reasons that he asked the Jewish
sculptor, Gershon Knispel, to join him in co-
creating the monument. 
The Arabs in Israel had indeed gained
more freedom by then but were still closely
surveilled by the authorities who restricted
their freedom of expression. When the foun-
dations for the monuments were built, the
police arrested Sakhnin's head of local au-
thority, Jamal Tarbieh, accusing him of 'ille-
gal construction'. There was no legal basis
for this accusation and he was released after
hours. This pattern of intimidation likely re-
flected the authorities' awareness of the far-
reaching significance of Land Day com-
memoration for Palestinian identity in Israel. 
Abedi and Knispel created two separate
monuments. The smaller monument is a
sculpture of a plough, with no accompany-
ing text. Beside it, the main monument
deals explicitly with the relations between
the people and the land. It is made in the
form of a sarcophagus with four bulkheads
decorated with human figures touching the
soil in various ways – a man bending over to
lift a rock, a woman taking a handful of soil.
In all the cases, this is a determined bend-
ing, not a submissive one. The eastern bulk-
head presents figures lying still, most likely
dead. These figures were developed form a
drawing of Abedi following the Arab-Israeli
war in 1973 in which he intended to express
his identification with the sufferers and vic-
tims of both sides.
The monument is located in the middle of
a Muslim cemetery, but it is characterized by
an explicit secularism. No religious expres-
sions are used, except perhaps the word
s h u h a d a (martyrs), but this term has long
been employed in secular Arab and Pales-
tinian nationalism. The names of the six vic-
tims are written on the forefront of the mon-
ument, titled by the words: 'They sacrificed
themselves [i s t a s h h a d u] for us to live…
thus, they are alive – The martyrs of the day
of defending the land, 30 March 1976'. This
is a self-aware nationalized secularized
paraphrase of a Qur'anic verse – 'And reck-
oned not those who are killed for Allah's
way as dead; nay, they are alive…'. The vic-
tims' immortality is ensured not because
they were killed for religious purposes but
for 'us' – the collective.
On the back of the monument there is a
sentence in three languages (Hebrew, Ara-
bic and English) reading: 'Created by A.
Abedi and G. Knispel for deepening the un-
derstanding between the two peoples.'
Whether this reflects a tactic to appease the
authorities or stems from the consistent ide-
ology of the then-dominant communist
party, this sentence has never appeared
again on any Palestinian monument. 
The central monument established in
Sakhnin reflects a transitional phase, a his-
torical juncture with several dimensions.
First, it signals the beginning of a long
process of 'stitching the rupture' of Palestin-
ian memory. It is the first attempt to carve in
public space a symbol of national heroism
and sacrifice, linking it to the major Palestin-
ian theme: the land. Second, it is early
enough to include a statement in Hebrew
calling for a co-existence on a Palestinian
national monument – an unimaginable sce-
nario in later days in Israel. In this sense it is
still connected to the 'decade of hope' that
followed the end of military rule in 1966.
Finally, it expresses an extroverted defiant
secularism, a moment before it became im-
possible with the rise of political Islam. 
A quarter of a century after the creation of
the Land Day monument, dozens of other
monuments have been established all over
Arab villages and towns in Israel. These mon-
uments commemorate the martyrs of the re-
bellion against the British in 1936–1939, the
Nakba in 1948, and recently, the 13 victims
who were shot and killed by the Israeli police
during the violent demonstrations of Octo-
ber 2000. Where possible, there is an effort
to a draw a direct line between all the vic-
tims, emphasizing their common destiny.
From a contemporary perspective, looking
back on 54 years of the existence of the state
of Israel, the crucial place of the Land Day
events and Land Day monument is evident.
It was the watershed of identity and memo-
ry, the moment when the Palestinian identi-
ty of the Arabs in Israel started to gain pres-
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It is largely agreed that formal Islamic leadership
centres on the ca l i m who function as experts of the
s h a r ica. It is similarly accepted that informal expres-
sions of Islamic faith are extremely common – but
there is less agreement regarding the functional
roles performed by those who lead these informal
expressions of faith. It is suggested that there are
three such (distinct but overlapping) roles, one of
which is examined here. The three roles are, broadly
speaking, the provision of healing, the oversight of
major festivals, and the storage of core religious
knowledge. Leaders of these groups collectively pro-
vide leadership that is intrinsically religious in na-
ture. As leadership is ceded to them, they in return
help those around them re-create a sense of faith-
centred corporate identity. The following briefly
looks at how healers operate as informal leaders who
help to shape Islamic faith in rural Bangladesh.
Healers as 
Informal Religious
L e a d e r s
Leadership has various facets. Local political
leaders in the village of 'R'1 were respected
less for their supposed religious expertise
than for their facility in brokering agree-
ments all could live with, such as those
reached in semi-formal localized meetings
called b i c h a rs. Conversely, piety was as-
sumed from those who oversaw religious
festivals, artistically re-created core reli-
gious knowledge, and healed various ail-
ments. In each case the practitioner was as-
sumed to be a mediator between God and
his (occasionally her) neighbour. Such medi-
ation is primarily for daily needs since ulti-
mate questions like salvation are left to God
alone to decide – although many believe
that one can become acceptable to God by
being accepted by a local p i r (since this p i r i s
acceptable to his now-deceased p i r who is
linked back through time along a chain of
intercession culminating in the Prophet).
Healing is the most urgent and wide-
spread daily need. There are several types of
healers in rural Bangladesh, including the
k a b i r a j, o j a, p i r s h a b (or p i r) and fakir (the last
two categories, in particular, often overlap-
ping in usage). The k a b i r a j is relatively well
known and written about, and is often
thought to be more reliant on learned
knowledge (of plants and herbs) than an
ability to appropriate God's blessing and
thereby God's healing.
O j as and 'snakes' breath'
Much less has been written about those
healers known as o j as. They treat snake-
bites and 'snakes' breath' (sapir batas) since
it is thought that snakes can exhale poison
which the wind can carry long distances (or
which is spilt onto the ground, evaporates,
and becomes wind-borne) and then ran-
domly afflicts people far away. Symptoms of
saper batas include nausea, dizziness, and
(occasionally) death. O j as are thus seen pri-
marily as healers of physical complaints
rather than as overtly religious figures, but
their reliance on secret mantras, their (per-
ceived) power over spirits, and their tenden-
cy to use methods similar to those used by
fakirs add a supernatural and religious as-
pect to their perceived role. 
'A' described himself as an o j a a l t h o u g h
he also occasionally heals by giving amulets
(t a b i z) and blowing air over an afflicted area
(a practice called phu d e oý a in Bengali).
Giving or selling amulets and phu d e oý a a r e
usually associated with fakirs, since the
curative effect of breath is widely held to be
one of the Prophet's powers.2
The o j a's performance given when diag-
nosing and treating sarper batas appears rit-
ualized with certain recurrent actions, but
the core of the o j a's healing process centres
on the use of a secret mantra.3 The mantra,
silently repeated, is interspersed with four
or five breaths onto the afflicted part of the
body and involves verses from the Qur'an in
addition to lists of Hindu deities. Although
mantras are also used when curing by p h u
d e oý a the wording is said to be different,
consistent with the fact that routines when
curing sarper batas and delivering p h u
d e oý a are distinct despite superficial similar-
ities. In diagnosing whether sarper batas i s
the cause of an ailment, for example, 'A'
squats by the patient's feet, recites his
mantra and slides one hand along the
ground towards the patient's feet in a mo-
tion so fluid that it resembles a snake. If the
complaint is caused by sarper batas t h e
hand is drawn towards the patient; if not,
the hand will be repelled.
Women healers
One of the features of informal healers in
'R' was the inclusion of women. 'S' is a mid-
dle-aged grandmother unremarkable in ap-
pearance as long as she keeps her head cov-
ered with her sari. Her uncovered head re-
veals hair that is very matted, in order (she
explained) to house the various types of
spirits that attend on her (she identified four
specific groups). 'S' is primarily known as a
practitioner of g a s o n t o, a term which refers
to the practice of hurting someone by bury-
ing an item of their clothing along with
plant fragments, as well as uncovering these
fragments and preparing prophylactic amu-
lets to counter any such buried threat. 
It could be argued that having women ac-
cepted as healers of this type is indicative of
their occupation of a societal niche that is
relatively unthreatening to the formal reli-
gious hierarchy. It could, however, equally
indicate the 'village realities' whereby
women are free to exercise a great deal of
closely localized leadership. Rural Bangla-
desh is organized around the b a r i, which is a
collection of homes all facing a central
courtyard, with the 'village' being a collec-
tion of dispersed b a r is. One woman in 'R'
told me: 'I do not need to wear my b u r q a
(head covering) in and around my own b a r i'
which is suggestive of the way women are
able to express themselves and exercise
their individual gifts – including healing – at
a localized level.
F a k i r s
Healing is also performed by fakirs, whose
spiritual role is generally recognized and
often relies on their association with a local
p i r s h a b (fakirs are often very active in orga-
nizing and attending feasts and festivals
such as u r us). 'H' is a locally recognized fakir
who usually diagnoses by tying a piece of
thread around a finger. This binds any of the
several types of in-dwelling spirits to answer
his questions and then obey his commands
(although there seems at times to be an ele-
ment of bargaining in this). 'H' also heals by
finger-tying or by giving amulets (using a
small stock of Arabic formulae), by p h u
d e oý a or by pani pora (administering water
that has been made sacred by having a
Qur'anic verse breathed over it).
D i s c u s s i o n
There are, of course, other healers in and
around 'R' – there is even a government hos-
pital in nearby Tangail, and the prevalence
of illness means that healers assume a posi-
tion of some leadership. The doctors in Tan-
gail are, however, perceived totally as
trained experts and there is no assumption
that their ability to heal is linked to a close-
ness (albeit perhaps via a chain of transmit-
ted piety) to God. Similarly, there are other
religious leaders in the village, which has
two mosques. But the leaders associated
with these institutions are more likely to be
consulted for set occasions such as funerals,
or the leading of Eid prayers, than for the
needs of everyday life. 
All of the people reviewed in this article
are perceived (to varying degrees) as heal-
ers who rely on religiously derived authori-
ty. This is firstly because they all are thought
to operate within the spiritual realm and
therefore need spiritual as well as practical
abilities. 'S' was adamant about the fact that
the spirits who attended on her were pow-
erful (even dangerous) and she had to be
able to control them. Similarly, 'H' said that
his expertise was primarily in secret
(g a p a n e) matters, the foremost of which
was the use of dreams. 'A' was perhaps the
most informative about his skills and train-
ing as an o j a – but significantly the 'office' of
o j a is perceived as the least spiritual of the
healing practices. 
Not only did the healers operate in a spiri-
tual realm, it was also the realm of faith – the
faith others have in their abilities and their
own faith in God. While physical materials
might be used in the healing process, it was
the assumption that the practitioner was in
a rightful position before God which was of
paramount importance. All the healers, in
other words, were seen as pious people
with the tacit assumption that an impious
healer would be unable to channel God's
healing or even survive in the 'hidden
realm'. The assumption of piety was not im-
pacted by the fact that few of the healers
(encountered in the context of this
research) were regular in keeping all the
required rituals of faith.
This leads to the third, and perhaps the
pivotal, reason for the healer's leadership.
The o j as, fakirs, p i r s h a bs et al in the village
all lived lives similar to those they attended
and had similar terms of reference. Whereas
those vying for temporal leadership and
those religious leaders more closely associ-
ated with the mosque both tend to look be-
yond the village for their power and credi-
b i l i t y , informal religious leaders retain very
localized contacts, reference points, and
power bases. Their leadership was therefore
overtly from amongst; they understood pre-
cisely the pressures all were under while
empathizing with the desire to live up to
ideals of faith many felt unable to attain.
This closeness, understanding, and accep-
tance are pivotal in the healers' leadership.
They are seen as concurrently able to access
God's power, channel God's compassion,
and accept the weakness of their neigh-
bours – which encourages their neighbours
to confer authority onto them. 
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Within the framework of the current project on the 'Dissemina-
tion of Religious Authority in 20t h-Century Indonesia', Michael
Laffan and Nico Kaptein will convene a workshop on the role of
fatwas in Indonesian society. In this workshop, to be held at Lei-
den University on 31 October 2002, project members will pre-
sent their research to date on aspects of fatwa production and
t r a n s m i s s i o n .
Participants have been invited to consider the means, author-
ity, audience and impact of fatwas in Indonesia. More broadly
they will address how fatwas are disseminated, what response
they engender, and how a relationship is established between
the fatwa requestor and the mufti. In so doing, they will inquire
into the sources of authority for the respective fatwas – textual
and/or personal.
The question of audience will of course be crucial, and the ef-
fect of a fatwa in a given society is naturally related to the social
context, whether local, national or international. The presenta-
tions will also address such issues, by looking at the competing
fatwas of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, or
the recent moves to harmonize the fatwas of Indonesia's Coun-
cil of Ulama and those of Egypt's Al-Azhar.
Presentations will be given by Kees van Dijk (Leiden Universi-
ty), Nico Kaptein (Leiden University), Jajat Burhanuddin (IIAS),
and Michael Laffan (IIAS), among others. Two leading scholars
will also present papers with the aim of providing an overview
of the situation in Indonesia – Atho Mudzhar (IAIN Jakarta) – and
comparative comment – Muhammad Khalid Masud (ISIM).
Both the presence of and comments from scholars working on fields outside
Indonesia are very welcome. Those wishing to attend the workshop are invited
to contact Michael Laffan at the IIAS in the first instance.
E-mail: m.laffan@let.leidenuniv.nl
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The Literacy Corps (sepah-e danesh) was implement-
ed in Iran in the framework of the White Revolution
(1963–1979) during the reign of Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi (1941–1979). Suggested by the Kennedy ad-
ministration as an alternative to red revolutions and
as a condition to US aid, the White Revolution aimed
at propelling Iran onto the level of the most modern-
ized countries. However, since about 40% of the
labour force was illiterate and, thus, could not foster
productivity, the government realized that action
had to be taken in the field of education.
The Literacy Corps 
in Pahlavi Iran,
19 6 3–19 7 9
According to two government decrees is-
sued on 26 October and 3 December 1962,
and approved by the Majles on 26 January
1963, young men holding a secondary edu-
cation diploma – mainly urban middle-class
youth – were given the option of serving in
the Literacy Corps instead of serving in the
army. Dispatched to rural areas, 166,949
corpsmen and 33,642 corpswomen (since
1969) taught over 2.2 million children be-
tween the ages of six and twelve who had
not yet attended school up to the second
grade, plus a million adults. The Literacy
Corps absorbed high school graduates who
could not be drafted in the army and had no
labour skills; used military facilities and the
army's experience in literacy training; saved
funds, especially as compared to the previ-
ous teachers training programme; and – ac-
cording to an American observer – the pro-
gramme was peculiarly suited to the Persian
temperament because nothing could 'get
Iranians to help their fellow man
or participate in any sort of Peace
Corps activity except force or the
threat of force.'1
With the Literacy Corps 'the
state combined the stick of con-
scription with the carrot of mon-
etary advantage and opportunity
for service'.2 Corpsmen were paid
$16 per month during the train-
ing period3 and then 300–400
tomans ($50) per month, accord-
ing to their military rank. Women
received 450 tomans per month
(perhaps because women were
not obliged to serve in the army
and a decent salary could help in
finding volunteers). The cost of
educating a student in a school
run by the Literacy Corps was
considered minimal (100 tomans,
equivalent to $13.33), that is,
one-third of the costs for a stu-
dent at a conventional school.
Furthermore, the villagers paid
for the construction of facilities.4
With the Literacy Corps, edu-
cation to some extent escaped
the control of the ulema, who
used to shape the younger gen-
eration along traditional lines.
This programme actually aimed
at helping the regime in establishing a mod-
ern nation-state on a basis other than reli-
gion. Persian as a common language was
the major tool used to inculcate the spirit of
national unity: 'I viewed central control of
public education as one means of ensuring
national unity. Teaching the Persian lan-
guage throughout our country fostered a
common bond among all', wrote the Shah
whilst in exile.5
Teaching the history of the Persian Em-
pire was a means to make people feel part
of Iran. In the textbook for the third year of
high school, for instance, the interference
of the Zoroastrian clergy in politics caused
the defeat of the Sasanian Empire by the
Muslim armies. Therefore, religious interfer-
ence in political affairs was extremely dan-
gerous. 
Involvement in politics
In 1966 some corpsmen were involved in
political activity within the Islamic Nations
Party. Arrested in the autumn of 1965, fifty-
five members of this organization were sen-
tenced in March 1966. Three of them were
literacy corpsmen and their leader had just
ended a tour with the corps a few months
before his arrest. In addition, 'there are also
indications that the Government, con-
cerned over reports that corpsmen wittingly
and unwittingly have spread anti-regime
propaganda in the villages (often as a result
of communist radio broadcasts), is moving
to counter this situation. In an operation as
large as the Literacy Corps and in a country
like Iran, some activity of this sort is to be ex-
p e c t e d . '6
Two decades of White Revolution im-
proved standards of living. At the same
time, however, 'deprivations deepened, dif-
ferences widened, and disparities became
even more transparent'. The combination of
these factors can answer 'the apparent para-
dox of sustained accumulation and growing
absolute prosperity with outbursts of mass
agitation and discontent'.7
Some of the consequences were un-
leashed by the gap in living conditions be-
tween rural and urban areas and the large
amount of money the regime was spending,
for instance, on celebrations. Despite at-
tempts to keep up the corpsmen's morale,
the Literacy Corps led to some extent to the
further radicalization of already discontent-
ed men. Corpsmen were reported as taking
part in 'dissident political activity' though,
'in view of the size of the Corps, the inci-
dence did not seem overly significant'.8
The historian Mohamad Tavakoli told the
story of his brother who was drafted into
the Literacy Corps in the early 1970s: '[h]is
understanding of the problems of village
life politicised his consciousness and
spurred the formation of a new revolution-
ary identity in him and many others. His
subsequent involvement with leftist groups
was the direct and unintended conse-
quence of the state's programs of develop-
m e n t . '9 In contrast, some corpsmen de-
clared that their experience in the country-
side had strengthened their support for the
r e g i m e .1 0
Oppositional activities
In addition, many of the corpsmen's par-
ents were influenced by their 'children's
new-found radicalism' and the political im-
pact of the Literacy Crusade was thus larger
than generally thought. According to a sur-
vey, 82.3% of literacy corpsmen declared
that this experience had made them more
aware of the actual situation in rural Iran
and they had realized that no
prompt solution was available. Eight
per cent declared they had become
'more aware of the inefficiency and
inertia of the government bureau-
c r a c y ' .1 1
According to Ali Rezavi, in the
1960s the widespread opinion
among leftist corpsmen was that
the White Revolution had been im-
plemented because the Shah had
been instructed to do so by imperi-
alist countries wishing to have
cheap labour and to rule over peo-
ple. With the White Revolution im-
perialist countries supposedly want-
ed the villagers to migrate to towns,
increase the unemployment rate
and thus decrease wages to the
benefit of the imperialists them-
selves. At the end of the day, the
only real change brought by the
White Revolution was that 'the land-
lord's power had been weakened
and he and his sons could not enjoy
the jus primae noctis any longer'.
This advantage for the villagers was
pointed out to my interviewee by
Darvish Mahmud, who spent his
time travelling, reciting poetry and
collecting money: 'Sarkar, up to four
years ago any bride in the village
would have had to spend her first night with
the landlord or his sons. Therefore, 50% of
the children of our village are illegitimate.
Everything changed when the White Revo-
lution was launched and the villagers dared
to set the landlord's car on fire. Can't you
see the difference between now and the
p a s t ? '1 2
It is, however, difficult to distinguish be-
tween the political implications motivated
by the experience in the Literacy Corps and
those generated by the turbulent atmos-
phere of those years. My interviewee, Ismail
Bayani, stated that after having watched the
television programme on Golsorkhi's trial,
his perception of the regime was so nega-
tive that he decided to join the street
protest and throw stones at the windows of
the university. Some of his anger was surely
motivated by Golsorkhi's death sentence,
but it was also the result of his personal ex-
perience. In fact, at the beginning of the
1970s Bayani was directly involved in the
Feda'in-e Khalq, which he joined after a pe-
riod spent attending lectures by the influen-
tial reformer Ali Shariati at the Hoseyniyyeh-
ye Ershad college and leading a group of
pro-Islamist students. Before entering uni-
versity, Bayani had served as a literacy
corpsman in a village in Mazandaran and
this experience helped to shape his political
thought. As a corpsman he had tried his
best in order to implement the White Revo-
lution, had written to many ministries com-
plaining about the lack of resources, but
was disappointed by the fact that in reply he
only received threats for being too active.
Though it is not possible to give an exact di-
mension to one experience compared to an-
other, Bayani declared that serving in the
Literacy Corps surely had an impact on his
political activism.1 3
Two members
o f the Literacy
C o r p s .
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South As i a
J AM A L  M AL I K
Considerable criticism has been directed towards
traditional Islamic educational institutions, the ma-
drasas, as breeding grounds of militant Islam and
training camps for jihad. The powerful perception of
the supposedly unilateral inter-relatedness between
these religious schools and jihad, between mullahs
and violence, produced and perpetuated fear in the
public mind in the West. As a result, the relationship
between state power and civil rights has been sub-
jected to very severe restrictions in countries like
Pakistan – and without major reactions from the pub-
lic. This has enabled governments to push through
restrictive policies in an unprecedented way. 
Efforts in Pakistan and other Muslim coun-
tries to streamline madrasas into the nation-
al educational systems are not new, but
they are now seen as a part of the global war
on terrorism. Also in secular India, the ap-
proximately 100,000 madrasas have be-
come subject to scrutiny and suspicion. It is
evident that the majority of Muslims do not
regard the madrasa as a terrorist institution.
They believe it fulfils the needs of religious
education. It is therefore unsatisfactory and
indeed too simplistic to equate madrasas
with terrorism, as becomes evident in Gen-
eral Musharraf's historic speech of 12 Janu-
ary 2002 in which he indulges in a rather
sweeping 'othering' of the ulama, reminis-
cent of the 19t h-century topos of the mad
mullah. Even if the General appreciates reli-
gious schools as excellent welfare and edu-
cational organizations, better even than ser-
vices offered by NGOs, he clearly revealed
that he is influenced by the notion that reli-
gious scholars are narrow-minded and
propagate hatred. The country's future, he
postulated, was to be not a theocratic state
but an Islamic welfare state, not marginal-
ization but modernization, not traditional-
ism but reform. 
In the 19t h century – in the wake of colo-
nial penetration – with the introduction of
new systems of education, the madrasa lost
its function as a general training institute
and turned into an institution exclusively for
religious learning. While some groups made
use of Islamic symbolism to mobilize
against colonial power, other Indian Mus-
lims tried to change, reform or conserve it,
as a means to counter colonialism. Various
Sunnite schools of thought emerged, such
as the Deobandis, the Barelwis, and the Ahl-
e Hadith. They appealed to specific social
groups and were tied to particular regions,
and thereby added to the religious and soci-
etal complexity of South Asia. Yet another
movement, the modernist Aligarh school,
tried to Anglicize the Muslim educational
system, but this was contested by the Coun-
cil of Religious Scholars (Nadwa al-Ulama),
which aimed at an integration of religious
and secular education. 
These various reforms, however different
they may have been, were thought to be
achievable only through 'modernization'. It
was in this context, that modernity came to
be regarded as the opposite of tradition and
thus determined the fate of Muslim educa-
tion. Religious institutions that did not sub-
scribe to this development were marginal-
ized politically and culturally but continued
to provide knowledge to the majority of
Muslims. This led to a dramatic societal split.
It was only the recent wave of Islamization
that has given the madrasa new life. While
after 1947, in India, these schools were left
more or less untouched by the secular state,
in Pakistan, as in many other Muslim coun-
tries, the situation was quite different: polit-
ical leaders have always been interested in
bringing the madrasas into the mainstream
national system of education in order to try
to curb autonomy. 
State encroachments in Pakistan became
prominent fairly early, with Ayyub Khan's
nationalization of religious endowments
and schools during the 1960s. A first survey
of religious schools was undertaken, dis-
cussing their histories, affiliations and loca-
tions and the numbers of religious students
and teachers in what was then West Pak-
istan. Their institutional affiliation to state
machinery was to be paralleled by curricular
reforms which, however, aroused opposi-
tion among the representatives of religion.
They therefore established umbrella organi-
zations for religious schools – just prior to
the proclamation of the 'West Pakistan Waqf
Property Ordinance 1961'. The main tasks of
these umbrella organizations were to re-
form and to standardize their educational
system, and of course, to counter state
power collectively. 
During Z.A. Bhutto's time Islamic scholars
were able to negotiate some concessions,
but it was with the advent of so-called Is-
lamization in the late 1970s, that state activ-
ities touching on traditional institutions in
general and centres of Islamic learning in
particular took increasing effect, although
most of them had been pushed to the mar-
gins of the political process before the ad-
vent of Zia al-Haqq's Islamization policy,
when they regained significance partly as
an alternative educational system. 
The Islamization policy in Pakistan has re-
sulted in a new dimension of curricular re-
form and has ushered in a new phase of in-
stitutionalization. For the first time the de-
grees of religious schools were put on a par
with those of the formal education system
and recognized by the University Grants
Commission. This recognition was based on
certain conditions: the students were now
supposed to be taught a modernized syl-
labus lasting sixteen years, which meant
that the religious scholars would have to
follow the suggestions of the National Com-
mittee on Religious Schools established in
1 9 7 9 .1 The report of the Committee sug-
gested making
concrete and feasible measures for
improving and developing Deeni-
Madrassahs along sound lines, in terms
of physical facilities, curricula and syllabi,
staff and equipment […] so as to bring
education and training at such
Madrashahs in consonance with the
requirements of modern age and the
basic tenets of Islam […] to expand
higher education and employment
opportunities for the students of the
Madrassahs […] integrating them with
the overall educational system in the
c o u n t r y . (my emphasis)
The idea of this reformed Islam stood in
contrast to the concepts of most of the
ulama, however. These suggestions pro-
voked considerable reaction, but with the in-
sistent pressure of the government and its
support – i.a. through zakat money, as we
shall see – and with the equating of their de-
grees with those of national universities in
1981/82, the ulama became more and more
convinced of the potentially positive conse-
quences of this policy for them. They did
adapt the curriculum by merely adding sub-
jects from the formal primary education sys-
tem to their own syllabus, and Arabic in-
stead of English was used on the certificates.
The ulama showed their ability to gain offi-
cial recognition by effecting minor changes,
and they were gradually able to exercise
more influence on the government. Theoret-
ically, these degrees, once recognized, were
to open up economic mobility and possibili-
ties of promotion for the graduates. Howev-
er, there was no consideration of how and
where the now officially examined armies of
mullahs would be integrated into the job
market. This short-sighted planning soon re-
sulted in considerable problems.
Stemming the tide 
Parallel to these administrative and curric-
ular reform measures, the economic situa-
tion of religious schools was changed and,
indeed, improved by means of money dis-
bursed through the central and provincial
zakat funds set up by the government in
1980: ten per cent of the alms collected
from current accounts through zakat-de-
ducting agencies go to religious education
if curricular reform and political loyalty are
observed. These additional financial re-
sources enhanced the budgets of religious
schools considerably, comprising up to one-
third of their annual income, and were ex-
clusively at the disposal of the rectors of the
schools, e.g. the ulama. This certainly creat-
ed new expectations and new patterns of
c o n s u m p t i o n .
As a result of these changes, a new dimen-
sion of mobility of these scholars and their
centres of learning can be discerned. One is
tempted to speak of an expanding indige-
nous infrastructure which in the early 1990s
already had far-reaching consequences:
firstly, the prospect of zakat grants resulted
in a mushrooming of madrasas, mostly in
rural areas. In response, the government has
introduced various measures to try to stem
the tide, but this has only resulted in new
problems. Secondly, the number of the
graduates of higher religious schools – not
to speak of students in religious schools in
general – is constantly on the rise, as these
institutions now also offer formal primary
education with officially recognized de-
grees. Thirdly, the Islamization policy
brought in a new phase of institutionaliza-
tion among umbrella organizations, so that
the number of affiliated schools has in-
creased tremendously. Fourthly, the data
available on religious schools also shed light
on their spatial distribution and the social
and regional background of their students:
Deobandis in the North Western Frontier
Province and Baluchistan, where tribal soci-
ety prevails, as well as parts of Punjab and
Sindh; Barelwis in rural areas of Sindh and
Punjab, where the cult of holy men is most
popular; S h ici t e s in Northern Areas and in
some districts of the Punjab dominated by
folk religion; Ahl-e Hadith in commercial
centres and important internal markets; and
J a m aca t - e Islami primarily in urban and po-
litically sensitive areas that seemed to have
attracted a number of radical groups from
various regions outside Pakistan. Thus, each
school of thought has its own reserved area,
be it tribal, rural, urban, trade oriented or
even strategic. 
In the wake of the formalization and re-
form of religious schools, an increasing
trans-provincial north-south migration from
rural to urban areas can be observed, a sign
of the degree of spatial mobility of the
young religious scholars. Students from
specific regions then look for schools and
teachers that comply with their cultural per-
ceptions and ethnic affiliations and the
search for corresponding institutions that
create identity-giving sub-structures in an
urban environment which may otherwise
be perceived as alien and even hostile. The
migrant scholars-to-be gather in the me-
tropolis and potentially contribute to con-
flicts that are often religiously and ethnical-
ly motivated. The fact that the number of re-
ligious schools and their students has
grown spectacularly in urban, and even
more in rural areas also suggests that not
only cities have become locations of in-
creasing conflict: the hinterland has also
been increasingly drawn into the sphere of
religiously legitimized battles. Thus, the Is-
lamization policy has promoted the institu-
tionalization of different groups, but has
fostered their politicization and even radi-
calization. And since contemporary regimes
are not able or willing to integrate ulama in
a productive way, their increasing marginal-
ization is the result. 
The increasing number of young theolo-
gians, with degrees equivalent to an M.A. in
Arabic/Islam Studies, are faced with govern-
ment reform measures that lack plans for
dealing with the labour market. The
promised Islamization and improved litera-
cy of the country has not translated into
jobs for the ulama; on the contrary, the lack
of proper measures comprises a potential
source of conflict. The American advisor on
religious education made the following crit-
icism: 'Reservations were voiced by various
officials of the provincial Departments of
Education about recruiting "Maulanas" for
the schools on the suspicion that they
would divide the students on the basis of
their own preferences for a particular "Mak-
tab-i-Fikr".' He hastened to add that 'these
suspicions, however, were proved in the
field to be ill-founded. Such suspicions
should never be allowed to affect the mak-
ing of educational policy at any level.'2 
It is only as teachers of Arabic, having
been promoted since 1979, that some
young scholars have found jobs. These
courses, however, targeted Pakistanis going
to work in the Middle East, and so were mo-
tivated primarily by pragmatic financial con-
siderations. On a different front, the military,
against the background of the cold war, has
been encouraging the recruitment of reli-
gious scholars since 1983 – with foreign aid.
In the medium term, this has led to new val-
ues and structures in the army, especially at
junior levels of command. 
Danger of expectations
With the official support of religious
scholars in the 1980s and even in the 1990s,
the political strength of representatives of
this section of Islamic traditionalism has in-
creased unmistakably. Thus, the Islamiza-
tion policy – or better the politics of de-tra-
ditionalization – has ultimately forced the
politically dominant sector to rethink its
own position. The centre may be pushed
onto the political defensive, a position from
which it could extricate itself only by vio-
lence, and with increasing alienation from
the rest of the society. This danger exists
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especially when indigenous social and edu-
cational structures, such as endowments,
alms and religious schools, still existent and
mostly functioning, cannot be adequately
replaced and thousands of unemployed
mullahs who have access to the masses are
not successfully integrated. 
The raised expectations have pushed
many graduates of religious schools into the
hands of different players: their role in the
cold war in Afghanistan, when they were ex-
ploited by certain groups and governments;
their role in post cold-war Afghanistan,
when once again, they were caught up in
power politics supported by different secret
services; and now in the post-Taliban era,
when some of them have taken sides with
terrorist groups. 
The rhetoric of Islamic symbolism and
jihad has shown that it can be effectively
used as a means of self-defence against for-
eign encroachments, and there has been
constantly increasing pressure on the state
by religious elements. The Council of Islam-
ic Ideology set up in the 1960s, and the Pak-
istani Federal Ministry of Religious Affairs,
should not therefore be blamed for issuing
outrageous Islamic proposals. Similarly, the
failure to reform either the Blasphemy Law
in 1994 and 2001, or the madrasas in 1995 is
simply a reflection of the aggressive mood
of the clergy and Islamists, based on what
has been called 'paranoid Islam'. In May
2000, Islamic parties were powerful enough
to demand several Islamic provisions, some
of them met instantly by the government.
But in order to increase control over the
clergy, the current regime came up with yet
another madrasa reform proposal in August
2 0 0 1 .
General Musharraf called for a peaceful
'Sunnatization' of life-worlds, referring to Is-
lamic mysticism and prohibiting madrasa
students from going for divine force. The re-
construction of tradition ought to serve to
raise the madrasa and bring it to a level with
the mainstream. The major task seems to be
to open up the job market for the graduates.
Similarily, mosques should be reformed in
order to guarantee a secular and modern-
ized society, otherwise Pakistan will be mar-
ginalized – and radicalized. This policy clear-
ly aims at controlling some 20,000 madrasas
with approximately 3 million students, and
more than 50,000 mosques – a solid power-
structure. 
The control of the clergy seems to be even
more important since there has traditionally
been a movement across the borders of
Pakistan with Afghanistan, India and Kash-
mir. This is especially true of ethnic groups
such as Pashtuns in Pakistan, who outnum-
ber their fellow Pashtuns in Afghanistan,
and are linked by family networks, commer-
cial connections, and religio-political soli-
darity. Hence, despite the Pakistan govern-
ment's recent strict policy against foreign
students, Afghan students of religious
schools have vowed to continue their edu-
cation in Pakistan. 
Effects of the reforms
The reforms envisaged by the state have
produced an imbalance that has resulted in a
variety of problems, some of which were
temporarily alleviated through jihad in
Afghanistan. In the wake of these develop-
ments, several different branches of Islamic
learning and madrasas have emerged. We
need to distinguish: firstly, students of reli-
gious schools in general; secondly, mujahidin
or freedom fighters; thirdly, Taliban; and
fourthly, j i h a d i groups. 
As far as the first category is concerned,
they have been subjected to several reforms
from within and from without, but have
played a quietist role. Because of traditional
ties with Afghanistan and other neighbour-
ing countries and as a result of the use of
jihad rhetoric, some of them were used as
foot-soldiers in the cold war. This is the sec-
ond group – the mujahidin. In order to keep
this group under control and to maintain a
grip on the region for economic and political
purposes, another version was established
by interested parties: these were the Taliban.
Both the mujahidin and the Taliban are
known for their forced recruitment of young
children in madrasas and refugee camps. As
for the fourth category, the j i h a d is, some of
them can be traced back to groups returning
to Pakistan from other battlefields such as
Kashmir and Afghanistan, their leaders being
middle-class and secular educated men,
rather than madrasa students, though
madrasa students also joined the militant
and radical groups. There is little doubt that
some of these organizations run private
armies, collect compulsory donations, and in-
dulge in militant and terrorist activities.
Some of them, such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba and
Jaish-e Muhammad, have made a regional
conflict, the Kashmir cause, their raison
d'être. But what is the reason behind their
radicalization? Mere hatred, violence and the
obsession for jihad? 
It is true that the struggle for victory over a
super-power and their alleged connections
to some international network enhances
their feeling of Islamicity, no matter how
blurred and intangible that may be. But it is
the objective material conditions plus the
symbolic power of regional conflicts, such as
Palestine and Kashmir, that make up for the
explosive mixture because these conflicts
represent the suppression of whole nations.
However international these organizations
may be, they have arisen primarily as a result
of an internal problem caused by political
mismanagement, and they have subse-
quently been exploited by external powers.
The dramatic flaunting and celebration of
military power on national occasions such as
P a k i s t a n i
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Pakistan Day and the propagation of jihad in
textbooks even in formal schools3 and daily
on television for the cause of Kashmir are
cases in point. 
This state-promoted violence and hatred
from childhood onwards might be part of the
painful nation-building process and search
for ideology, but it certainly fails to instil tol-
erance and acceptance of plurality in the stu-
dents. The alarming increase in kidnapping
for ransom in the cities as well as in rural
areas, the killing of whole families by senior
family members because of lack of material
resources are causes of major concern. 
Concluding remarks
In this scenario religious schools provide at
least space for some kind of education and
survival, and what is more important, they
use the variety of religious repertories to
make sense of the predicaments people are
facing in a highly fragmented society. The
growing presence and visibility of religious
power in the public sphere shows this strug-
gle between neo-colonial élites – mostly the
military that has been ruling in Muslim coun-
tries – and religious scholars who have been
exploited in different quarters but have con-
stantly been denied their share, very dramat-
ically. In the face of these developments the
making of an epitomizing prophet is easy:
the 'ladinist' saviour, who would lead the
campaign against suppression. It should be
noted that the basis of this Islamically tuned
radicalism still has a very secular basis: social
conflict, poverty, suppression. The basis is
not the Qur'an, but social reality, which is put
into an Islamic symbolism. Formerly, violence
and terror were legitimized in nationalistic
terms; today use is made of the Islamic reper-
tory, not because this violence is or has be-
come Islamic or religious, but because the
political discourse has shifted. 
The latest crack-down policy can hardly di-
minish the significance and power of these
groups, because they reflect systemic prob-
lems. Unless these problems (e.g. material
conditions of the common people and re-
gional conflicts) are tackled, these groups
will start operating under different names,
change their modus operandi or move their
operations elsewhere, making use of trans-Is-
lamic networks. As a popular diviner has
opined, a reaction was brewing: 'This govern-
ment is paving the way for Islamic revolution
by creating hurdles for the Islamic parties.'
He hastened to add that '[t]here may not be
instant reaction but they will respond once
the dust is settled […]. We are just watching
the situation but the silence will not last for
long. […] The timing of this announcement
by the president [e.g. crack-down, J.M.] has
raised suspicion in the minds of religious
people. It is being done under U.S. pressure.'
And he asked: 'If they were terrorist groups,
then why were they allowed to operate for
such a long time?'4
The criminalization of the ulama therefore
seems not to be an option. In a country that is
heavily under their socio-cultural and reli-
gious influence, a dialogue of bullets is a dead
end. Instead, it is more important to integrate
these sections of society properly in order to
prevent a cold war before it gets too hot and
becomes a war that no one can handle. 
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AS H K  D A H L É N
Contemporary Islam is witnessing the advent of new
critical discourses from within its own modes of artic-
ulation. It confronts a new epistemic and interpreta-
tive situation, which is generally felt as something of
an emergency. This emergency in epistemology and
hermeneutics is largely the result of a radical shift of
the categories of modern philosophy, science, cul-
ture and geography. Given the fact that the ex-
ploratory elaboration of law for centuries has been
the dominant mode of self-expression in Islam, one
of the key themes of contemporary S h ici thought is
the search for a legal identity. The current debate on
the s h a r ica (divine law) in Iran underscores the con-
tinued significance of this exploration. In the debate,
the radical post-modernist cA b d al-Karim Surush con-
tests the epistemic certainty of eternal knowledge,
so common among modernists.
T o w a r d s an Islamic
Discourse of
U n c e r t a i n t y
a n d D o u b t
In the study of the dissemination of modern
thought in Iran, one experiences special dif-
ficulties due to the fact that the existing
constellations on the intellectual scene are
characterized by institutional discontinu-
ities, transmutation in the use of language
and complex notions of loyalty in society
and politics. This entanglement has pro-
duced a multiplicity in the various intellec-
tual patterns, where components of one
stance are even employed by other dis-
courses in their experience of modernity.
Among the pivotal figures who are consid-
ered in this respect are primarily cA b d u l l a h
Jawadi-Amuli, Muhammad Mujtahid-Sha-
bistari and cA b d al-Karim Surush, but other
individuals who belong to the Islamic intel-
lectual élite of Iran are also included. In the
main, the discourse of Surush is highlighted,
since his post-1988 writings on the nature of
Islamic law, legal epistemology and herme-
neutics accommodate Islam to modernity to
an extent unsurpassed in the Iranian con-
text. 
Since the 1979 revolution, the problem of
the reform and renewal of the traditional Is-
lamic law has acquired great urgency, as
the new theocratic order confronts a politi-
cal reality that is not addressed by definite
formulations in the traditional f i q h c o r p u s .
Since there do not exist any clear unam-
biguous norms under the s h a r ica in many
areas of law, such as substantive laws, the
S h ici f u q a h a (jurists) are divided among
themselves as to the best legal solutions to
many problems facing contemporary soci-
ety. This situation and the ensuing contro-
versy have forced traditional as well as
modern educated scholars into different in-
tellectual camps. As some observers have
noticed, the intellectual debates and para-
doxes that are taking place in contempo-
rary Iran defy any monolithic characteriza-
tion of S h ici Islam. Partly due to the at-
tempts to apply traditional Islamic jurispru-
dence in the political sphere of the modern
state, Islam, being an a priori source of reli-
gious normativity, is increasingly 'crystal-
lized' into a contested myriad or body of
competing intellectual discourses, where
the access to interpretation of the revealed
legal texts has become more plural. At the
present, a number of lay Islamic intellectu-
als participate in developing various dis-
courses on religious epistemology and
hermeneutics side by side with the ulama,
and the key figures in the criticism against
traditional jurisprudence are lay intellectu-
als. 
Suggesting that the present overall situa-
tion in Islam is characterized by the dual
phenomenon of tradition vis-à-vis moderni-
ty, which has generated the possibility of
competing paradigms struggling for mas-
tery, makes contemporary Islamic thought a
paradigmatic phenomenon. From this per-
spective, Islamic intellectual production
comprises a paradigmatic field, which epito-
mizes a discursive dialogue between revela-
tion and reason, unity and diversity, ideal-
ism and realism and tradition and moderni-
ty. The exchange of European ideas has in-
cited the development of a complex set of
competing normative discourses to the ex-
tent that the use of terms like polycentrism
seems appropriate to characterize modern
Islam. A significant factor in the formation of
a multiple paradigm phenomenon is the
very existence of a paradigmatic field, in
which different paradigms coexist and
knowledge of different paradigms becomes
possible and accessible to others. By high-
lighting the variety of stances found in the
debate, it establishes a taxonomy that pro-
vides a scheme for the characterization of Is-
lamic thought in terms of three distinct cat-
egories, namely traditionalism ('pre-criti-
cal'), modernism ('critical') and post-mod-
ernism ('post-critical'). 
Transitional paradigms
The traditionalist position (represented by
Jawadi-Amuli) in general terms adheres to
the paradigm of pre-modern Islamic tradi-
tion by identifying legal epistemology
(woven into methodology) with Aristotelian
syllogism. In philosophical terms, it is pre-
critical and considers cognitive matters in
the light of a basic sacred cosmology. In
contrast, the genuine effort of Islamic mod-
ernism (represented by Mujtahid-Shabis-
tari), in the sense of representing the ap-
pearance of an autonomous critical con-
sciousness, is to break with the entrenched
pre-modern paradigm in the realm of epis-
temology. It signifies a genuine effort to ac-
commodate religion to the scientific (albeit
not always ethical) structures of modernity,
emancipated from the traditional theologi-
cal and legal philosophy. While the result of
the reflection of the critical consciousness is
the secularization of the world, the recent
hermeneutical turn of certain modernists'
discourses does not accept the full implica-
tions of a retreat before critical thinking and
instead rework interpretative methods in
the light of the methods of modern science.
Islamic post-modernism (represented by
Surush) constitutes a further paradigm shift
in S h ici speculation on revealed law, in the
sense that it contests the modernists' belief
in epistemic certainty by considering all
human knowledge, religious as well as 'sec-
ular', as hypothetical and conjectural at
best. In contrast to the typical modernists'
submission for rational criticism in the name
of truth, post-modernism accepts no un-
shakable foundations on which to adjudi-
cate claims of justified true knowledge and
hence also of meaning. Representing the
most innovative 'avant-garde' thought in
contemporary S h ici Islam, it argues that the
temporality of understanding that merges
with its contextuality points out both the
finitude and reflexivity of human under-
s t a n d i n g .
M o d e r n i t y
Due to the relationship between global
modernity and the religion of Islam, the
question of s h a r ica has indisputably come to
occupy a wider perspective than its tradi-
tional formulations and this raises the ques-
tion as to whether modernity is categorical-
ly conceptualized as an external phenome-
non among Iranian religious intellectuals, or
if there is instead an effort on their part to
develop indigenous forms and expressions
of modernity. While the dilemma of moder-
nity is more momentous considering the
fact that the universal reason of European
Enlightenment denies the equality of all cul-
tural traditions, it is important to take into
account the existence of different and plur-
al varieties of modernity, where the term
modernity itself refers to those features that
allow us to speak of a modern age in the first
place. In philosophical terms, modernity has
as central to its reality the category of expe-
rience itself and might justifiably be thought
of as the sovereignty of experience. In so far
as there is no higher authority for the mod-
ern world than experience, the universality
of reason and the autonomy of the subject
(notions rooted in the Enlightenment
thought) equally serve as constitutive com-
ponents of the philosophical but also social
vision of modernity. In the realm of episte-
mology, the growth of epistemological
'subjectivism' is considered to be the under-
lying ontological foundation of modernity,
which gives paramountcy to a moment of
self-awareness in the adjunction of knowl-
edge. The turning away from things, the ob-
ject of thinking, to the subject, having
thoughts, is considered to be the mark of
modern Western philosophy.
Islamic post-modernism
As far as the primary cognitive and inter-
pretative questions for many contemporary
Islamic intellectuals are essentially similar to
those of contemporary Western philosophy,
their understanding of Islamic epistemolo-
gy, hermeneutics and conflicting interpreta-
tions is engendered by the cognitive struc-
tures of modernity. By considering Islamic
tradition not as a closed entity but as a para-
digmatic epistemic field, and by focusing on
processes of reception and communication
between cultures, it is possible to speak of
internal S h ici expressions of modernity. One
of the unique results of the in-depth en-
counter between Islam and modernity is the
ability of Iranian Islamic intellectuals to ex-
amine the very foundations of modernity
and thereby give internal synthetic answers
within their own religious and cultural con-
text. Surush's affinities with post-modern
thought are, for instance, closest in the
sphere of hermeneutics, where he initiates a
systematic critique of meaning. By turning
to the hermeneutics of suspicion, Surush
considers religious knowledge as, overall,
tentative and conjectural: it is ultimately
bold guesswork. Since human understand-
ing, in his view, always is blocked and em-
powered by the concrete and changing
context of a specific hermeneutical situa-
tion, the scientific endeavour constantly
preys on other interpretations in an endless
process. A moment of philosophical doubt
clings to all human knowledge claims. 
It is tempting to think of Surush as a con-
structive or revisionary post-modernist who
seeks to overcome the modern worldview
by means of constructing a new worldview
through a revision of modern premises and
traditional concepts. Unlike deconstruction-
ism, which overcomes modernism through
an anti-worldview, he has not abandoned
modern philosophy's goal of formulating ra-
tionality and universality, and he does not
altogether reject or eliminate the ingredi-
ents necessary for a worldview (God, self,
purpose, meaning, real world, truth as cor-
respondence, etc.). By considering the con-
tribution of post-modernism to pluralism,
tolerance and its criticism of the superiority
of reason as beneficial, he is essentially in-
volved with the question of what to do next,
given that in central ways modern philoso-
phy has reached a state of exhaustion. By
adopting deconstruction at the level of
methodology in his lectures on i j t i h a d, it is
evident that his ideas comprise a revision of
the epistemic premises of Enlightenment
modernism. Surush's thought constitutes
the flowering of the deepest impulse in the
modern project and represents in many re-
spects a loss of faith in Enlightenment mod-
ernism, a spirit of subjectivism, a pluralism, a
scepticism and a relativist rejection of final
answers. His religious discourse is hence sit-
uated in opposition to the 'settled hegemo-
ny' and 'objective certitude' of the meta-
narrative of Islamic tradition. 
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A S E F  B A Y A T
Understandably, the 11 September terrorist attacks
in the USA have reinforced more than ever Western
anxieties over the 'threat' of 'Islamic fundamental-
ism'. The perpetrators' Islamic identity and the sub-
sequent mass street protests in the Muslim world
during the US bombings of Afghanistan left little
doubt that political Islam in the Middle East is here to
stay. However, the picture conceals some significant
changes that Islamism in the Middle East has been
undergoing in recent years. There is a clear shift from
the earlier emphasis on Islamist polity to one on per-
sonal piety and ethics; from constituencies centred
around impoverished middle classes to more frag-
mented adherents including the privileged groups.
Specificity of individual Muslim countries
notwithstanding, there seems to be a
change from Islamism as a political project
with a contentious agenda into an active
piety concerned with personal salvation
and culture. The causes of the change are
complex, but broadly include the crisis of Is-
lamic rule wherever it was put into practice
(as in Iran and Sudan), the failure of violent
strategies (e.g. in Egypt and Algeria), more
hostile Israeli policies which overshadow
domestic conflicts in Muslim countries, and
thus the emergence of new visions about
the Islamic project.
The following concentrates on one aspect
of change in Egyptian religious activism –
the popularity of a new genre of lay Muslim
preachers. In particular, the focus is on what
is currently described in Egypt as the 'Amr
Khalid phenomenon'. As the most popular
preacher since Sheikh S h acr a w i, Amr Khalid
exemplifies a transformation of Islamism
into a post-Islamist piety – an active piety
which is thick in rituals and scriptures and
thin in politics. It is marked and framed by
the taste and style of the rich, in particular,
affluent youth and women; and sociologi-
cally underlies a Simmelian 'fashion'. Thus,
the convergence of youth sub-culture,
élitism, and a pietistic Islam together pro-
duce this new genre of d acw a and its appeal.
It has grown against a backdrop of a crisis of
political Islam, and a profound stagnation in
Egypt's intellectual and political landscape.
Since 1999, Amr Khalid, an accountant-
turned-preacher, has become a household
name in wealthy Cairo. Khalid followed the
leads of fellow lay preachers cUmarAbdel-Kafi
and Khalid el-Guindy, but surpassed them in
popularity amongst the well-to-do youth and
women. A gifted orator – televangelist style –
he began by lecturing in private homes and
exclusive social clubs, but soon rose to star-
dom at the pulpit of El-Hossari Mosque in the
trendy Muhandesin, before he was forced by
the authorities to move to 6th October City, a
new posh community in the outskirts of Cairo.
His weekly lessons have become a spiritual
staple for thousands of young people who
flock from throughout the city's affluent dis-
tricts to hear him. Crowds arrive hours in ad-
vance of the sermons to get a spot, filling the
lecture halls, the surrounding streets and
sidewalks, often causing heavy traffic conges-
tion. In 1999, Amr Khalid delivered up to 21
lessons a week in socially prominent house-
holds, peaking at 99 during the Ramadan. The
tapes of Amr Khalid's sermons were the un-
paralleled best sellers in Cairo's massive Book
Fair in 2002, and have travelled as far as the
back-street markets of East Jerusalem, Beirut
and the Persian Gulf cities. 
Faith and fun
The new preachers deliberately target
youth and women of the élite classes, 'the
people with influence', because 'they have
the power to change things', according to
Khalid el-Guindy. Since the élite families
generally kept away from the traditional
mosques located in the lower class areas,
the young preachers brought their message
to their doorsteps, to the comfort of their
private homes, social clubs and the stylish
mosques of their posh neighbourhoods.
More importantly, in addition to face-to-
face sermons, Amr Khalid utilizes a full
range of media to disseminate his message,
including satellite television channels such
as Dream T.V., Iqra'a and Orbit, the internet
with his state of the art website, and audio
and videotapes – media which particularly
reach the middle and more affluent classes.
For some time a popular state-sponsored
magazine, Al-Ahram al-Arabi, distributed his
tapes as gifts to readers. Khalid el-Guindy
established a paid 'Islamic Hotline' (hatif al-
I s l a m i) to be used by the public to seek ad-
vice from the sheikh. Within the period of
one year daily calls increased from 250 to
1,000. For his part, Amr Khalid travelled with
his message to the stylish Agami and other
upper middle class north coast resorts, and
has more recently gone on speaking tours
to Arab Gulf states where his fame had al-
ready spread. The colourful décor and a talk-
show-like aura of his lecture halls, in con-
trast to the austere Azherite pulpits, reflect
the taste of his main audience – males and
females from 15 to 35 years of age, never
before exposed to religious ideas in such an
appealing and direct manner. 
Amr Khalid's style resembles that of his
young, affluent audience; he appears clean-
ly shaven in blue jeans and polo shirts or in
suit and necktie. Khalid simultaneously em-
bodies the hip-ness (r e w i s h) of Amr Diab
(Egypt's most revered pop-star), the persua-
sion power of evangelist Billy Graham, and
unsubtle therapy of Dr Phil, American popu-
lar talk-show host. For the young, Khalid, in
the words of a female fan, is 'the only
preacher that embraces and tackles o u r s p i r-
itual needs', someone who 'makes us psy-
chologically comfortable', 'who treats us like
adults, not children'. Unlike more orthodox
preachers known for their joyless moralizing
and austere methods, Khalid articulates a
marriage of faith and fun. Speaking in a
sympathetic tone, compassionate manner,
and in colloquial Arabic, Khalid and his col-
leagues convey simple ethical messages
about the moralities of everyday life, dis-
cussing issues that range from relationships,
appearance, and adultery, to posh restau-
rants, drunk driving, the h i j a b, and the sins
of summer vacations in Marina. In a sense,
the new preachers function as 'public thera-
pists' in a troubled society which shows lit-
tle appreciation for professional psy-
chotherapy. Emotional intensity, peace, and
release (crying) often symbolize Khalid's ser-
mons. 
From the likes of Khalid, the young hear
the message that they can be religious and
still live a normal life – work, study, have fun
and look like anyone else in society. More
importantly his words assure the audience
that they can be pious while maintaining
their power and prestige. Khalid's message
operates within the consumer culture of
Egypt's nouveau riche where piety and priv-
ilege are made to cohabit as enduring part-
ners. Analogous to the Methodist church of
the well-to-do in the American Bible belt
where faith and fortune are happily con-
joined, Khalid's style makes the Egyptian
rich feel good about their fortunes.
Of course, adherence to religious ethics
and the search for spirituality are not new
among Egyptian Muslims, including the
wealthy youth. But theirs was a p a s s i v e r e l i-
gious attachment. That is, as believers, they
unquestioningly carried out their religious
obligations. However, what seems to be
novel (since the late 1990s) is that affluent
families, the youth and women in particular,
have begun to exhibit an a c t i v e search for
religious devotion, exhibiting an extraordi-
nary quest for religious ideas and identity.
Not only do they practise their faith, they
also preach it, wanting others to believe and
behave like them. 
Scriptural cosmopolitanism
Khalid is not a scholar or interpreter of the
Qur'an, and does not issue fatwas. Rather he
is devoted to correcting individuals' ethical
values and everyday behaviour, fostering
such values as humility, generosity, trust,
loyalty, and repentance. However, he is not
a liberal Muslim thinker. Some of his ideas
remain highly conservative, and his meth-
ods manipulative. Khalid advances a reli-
gious discourse which contains passion,
clarity, relevance, and humour, but lacks
novelty, nuance and vigour. While his style
is highly imaginative, his theology remains
deeply scriptural, with little perspective to
historicize, to bring critical reason into inter-
pretations. On the h i j a b, for instance, Khalid
begins by basing the 'integrity of society
[…] on the integrity of women' and the lat-
ter on 'her h i j a b', because 'one women can
easily entice one hundred men, but one
hundred men cannot entice a single
woman'. Since, according to this logic, un-
veiled women are promoters of sin, a 'com-
plete, head-to-toe h i j a b is an obligation in
Islam'. The unconvinced Muslim women are
not really Muslim, he claims, because Islam,
in the literal terms, means simply 'submis-
sion' to the words of God. 
In fact, Khalid's doctrinal views hardly differ
from those of orthodox Azharite sheikhs who
dismiss him despite, and perhaps because of,
his popularity. Rather, in the current juncture
in Egypt where religious thought in general
possesses little sign of innovation (and this is
testified by Islamic thinkers from Yusef al-
Qaradawi to Salim el-Awa, to the activist
Essam el-Erian), Khalid appears as an innova-
tor, if only in style. The mass appeal of the
likes of Khalid is a by-product of Egypt's mass
education, one that valorizes memorization,
fragmenting knowledge, revering printed
words, and nurturing authoritarian mentors.
Compared to the patronizing manner of a
typical Azhari sheikh, the amiable and com-
passionate Khalid appears as a true democ-
rat. For those who have learnt to take short-
cuts in seeking knowledge, or are trained to
be docile learners, Khalid emerges as a supe-
rior source of wisdom. 'He is easy to under-
stand' echoes what the young admirers of
Khalid invariably express.
Yet this new genre of d acw a is as much the
initiative of the sermonizers as a response to
the appeal of the increasingly globalizing
youth. In a sense, Egyptian cosmopolitan
youth fostered a new religious sub-culture –
one which is expressed in a distinctly novel
style, taste, language and message. It is res-
onant of their aversion to patronizing peda-
gogy and moral authority. This globalizing
youth display many seemingly contradicto-
ry orientations. They are religious believers,
but distrust political Islam if they know any-
thing about it; they swing back and forth
from Amr Diab to Amr Khalid, from partying
to prayers, and yet they feel the burden of
the strong social control of their elders,
teachers, and neighbours. As the Egyptian
youth are socialized in a cultural condition
and educational tradition which often re-
strain individuality and novelty, they are
compelled to assert them in a 'social way',
through 'fashion'. 
Thus, from the prism of youth, this reli-
gious sub-culture (ideas, emotions, and
identities) galvanized around the 'Amr
Khalid phenomenon' is partly an expression
of 'fashion' in the Simmelian sense, in the
sense of an outlet that facilitates a simulta-
neous fulfilment of contradictory human
tendencies: change and adaptation, differ-
ence and similarity, individuality and social
norms. Adherence to active piety permits
the Egyptian youth to assert their individu-
ality, undertake change, and yet remain
committed to collective norms and social
equalization. In the social juncture in Egypt
characterized by the decline of organized Is-
lamism, intellectual stagnation and political
closure, Khalid ingeniously took his d acw a
literally to the sitting rooms of his audience.
By doing so, Khalid and his colleagues be-
came catalysts for a gradual shift in Egypt-
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In Damascus there are a number of different places
where women are active, when they jointly occupy
part of their normal day, where they communicate in-
tensely with one another, and where they attempt to
cope together with their problems. Temporary exclu-
sive women's domains exist within the women's pub-
lic domain and form one element of women's culture
in Syria. Access to these social areas is permitted ex-
clusively to women. Only female staff are employed
in such establishments.
'Women's World'
i n Damascus 
The construction of a female public space
and male public space serves as a basic
model to understand the necessity of
women's domains. The strict spatial separa-
tion of female and male spheres and spaces
characterizes the segregated and segmen-
tary social order of the Middle East. Western
academics, both female and male, associate
the living domain of Muslims today directly
with privacy and isolation. This description
has proved to be Eurocentrist and obstructs
the view of the differences in social and cul-
tural reality.
The construction of social reality, as un-
dertaken by women in Damascus, indicates
two publics: a female one and a male one.
Inside the female public sphere women's
spaces arise as an integral part of society.
This definition differs from Western culture,
and deviates from the common definition of
the public domain as being accessible to
everybody on an unrestricted basis.
The so-called public domains in Damascus
cannot be chosen freely or exchanged by
both genders. They co-exist. I am therefore
turning away from the previous concept
that private sphere = women's domain and
public sphere = men's domain, since it puts
the men's domain at the forefront and high-
lights women's domains only under the as-
pect of exclusiveness. Clear instructions on
roles and tasks exist for both public do-
mains. Male claims to power and space,
which are displayed in the repressive mech-
anisms against women from the male public
domain, allow the emergence of a likewise
isolated female public domain.
In the women's world, the opportunity ex-
ists for women to free themselves for a lim-
ited period of time from imposed social
obligations, and to rid themselves from pa-
triarchical mechanisms. A common positive
feeling of self-confidence can be developed
here. Women act according to their own
ideas and express their needs without any
hindrances. Differences can be made be-
tween domestic informal women's do-
mains, formal out-of-house women's do-
mains and formal out-of-house charitable
organization forms. 
Domestic domains
Domestic informal women's domains exist
temporarily in the apartments and houses of
those involved. The groups which are close
to the family are formed out of the necessity
at certain times to do something only for
oneself. According to their life cycle, women
of similar ages come together to talk to one
another, to support each other, to give
themselves strength and to improve their
own economic situation. The mobile interior
of Arabian apartments can be adapted for
various purposes without any problems: a
living room becomes a meeting room, a re-
ception room becomes a dance floor.
The s a b h i y a, the daily morning meeting,
indicates the regular coming together of fe-
male inhabitants of a traditional house, or of
a block of houses, or of women from the im-
mediate neighbourhood. The drinking of
coffee at about 10 o'clock is essentially a part
of the every day routine. The content of the
conversations covers the normal day of the
women – basically just gossip! I s t i q b a l,
women's receptions in the afternoon, are a
kind of small party with friends and acquain-
tances, organized by female family mem-
bers. Larger women's receptions are only
held by prosperous women. The parties are
held at alternating locations, generally at
larger homes or at restaurants, which are
agreed upon beforehand. The hostesses and
the guests are always the same women.
Good food and relaxed celebrating are main
aspects of such gatherings. The entire after-
noon and evening is taken up by heated dis-
cussions, jokes, dancing, games and singing.
The gamaiya niswan, the women's savings
and credit association, also takes place in the
afternoon. The basic idea behind the infor-
mal associations is the coming together of
several individuals, in order to tie up a rare
factor of production, e.g. capital, and with a
rotation process to always make available
one member of the group. All members
should profit within a fixed time frame. The
money is used to create accruals to secure
the family in the case of financial crisis. The
sum of money saved is also partially used as
up-front financing for small companies and
in particular to realize the wishes of the con-
sumers: for buying items such as a television
set, new furniture, etc.
Health, beauty and fitness
Formal out-of-house women's domains
are formed in areas which are conceived for
specific purposes, such as hairdressing,
bathing, fitness training, etc. Architectural-
ly, the buildings are designed in line with
the women's needs and activities. The ham-
mam, a public bath, was – together with
holy graves and the cemeteries – once the
only permitted place for women outside of
their homes. Due to the fact that today al-
most every home has its own bath, this es-
tablishment is increasingly diminishing and
almost completely losing its importance for
the cities' inhabitants. Out of a total of 12
hammams, today only seven have opening
hours for women. The women's hairdressing
salon is an important establishment, where
women can keep up with the demands on
their looks because they (usually) are appre-
ciated less for their intellectual capabilities
than for their beauty and capacities as
housewives. As well as beauty care, they use
the visit to the hairdresser as a social event
and look for contact with female staff and
customers. The women's open-air swim-
ming pools are a relatively new phenome-
non within the city of Damascus. The first
opened at the beginning of the 1970s. The
current ten existing women's swimming
pools are social places for women of all so-
cial/economic backgrounds, religions and
ages. The level of admission fees, the type of
building and the accessibility using public
transport are the decisive factors as regards
the customers in the pools. Nadi riyada, fit-
ness clubs for women, of which 26 exist
today, have formed part of the infrastruc-
ture in many parts of the city since the
1990s. Going to aerobics classes is currently
very popular amongst women between the
ages of 18 and 40, and amongst all social
classes. The main motivation of the partici-
pants attending aerobics classes is mainly
weight reduction. They want to lose as
much weight as possible in a short period of
time, while overcoming their dislike for
sports. Contact with other women is also
important. 
Charity organizations
Through the honorary work in state-
owned, private or church charity organiza-
tion forms, formal out-of-house women's
domains have appeared in which women
find the place and time for social together-
ness and communication, in addition of
course to their activities which express their
social commitment. During group activities
there is sufficient time for social conversa-
tion. Group excursions, journeys and cele-
brations are also extremely popular. At such
events there is a strengthening of the com-
munity spirit and motivation to carry out
charitable work.
Concluding remarks
The use of and participation in informal
and formal women's domains creates set
points in the daily, weekly and yearly sched-
ule of the women. In domestic informal
women's domains the women are welfare
workers, therapeutics, advisers and aid
workers to each other. Handed down pat-
terns are reproduced and opportunities are
created to make a contribution towards
helping the family to survive. Women's do-
mains provide social security. The commu-
nicative and personal aspect of gatherings
in informal women's domains creates a
power potential which could regulate or
guide the social togetherness. Formal out-
of-house women's domains help women,
on one hand, to keep up with social norms
and demands on their looks and, on the
other hand, to establish their presence in
more extensive communication systems.
Women create this female public to corre-
spond to their demands for modern-ness or
conservatism. 
The dynamic expansion of formal women's
domains in the centre of Damascus at the
end of the 1990s allows one to focus on four
aspects regarding the women's motives: ob-
taining better health and greater attractive-
ness, social care, keeping tradition in the
sense of 'back to the roots', and adapting
American/European norms in their use of
leisure time. 
Observing and maintaining emotional
satisfaction of all concerned is the main ob-
jective of coming together. In this way, in-
formal and formal women's domains con-
tribute to gender separation and help to
stabilize the existing social order. As the pa-
triarchal supremacy is not being ques-
tioned, and the women's increased overall
satisfaction has a positive effect on men;
most household leaders approve of the ex-
pansion of different women's domains. For
this reason as well, the number of institu-
tionalized women's domains is currently on
the rise.
The description of the living situation of
women in Damascus society which is por-
trayed as un-free and repressed from a Euro-
pean point of view, often neglects the posi-
tive qualities of women's domains. A lived
out women's community offers security and
certainty to its members. If the lack of orien-
tation or the loneliness of the individual is
being denounced in Western European so-
ciety, the female public space of the Damas-
cus women offers assistance and support in
coping with everyday life.
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commentary by students but later became
notorious for ridiculing women and politicians.
2 . Levina was a 1s t-year student who rejected the
advances of some male students. They in turn
harassed her. She sought help but the authorities
were unresponsive, resulting in her committing
suicide. 
3 . See Hamza Njozi, The Mwembechai Uprising,
available at www.islamorg.tz.
4 . Usman Bugaje, 'Do Muslim Women Need
Empowerment' (paper presented at a conference
on 'Islam and Contemporary Issues' organized by
the Movement for Islamic Culture and Awareness,
26 October 1997).
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Ea st Af r i ca
S A L M A  M AO U L I D I
Muslims take considerable pride in Islam's eloquence
on the rights and obligations of women. Scholars and
laypersons do not hesitate to point out how Islam
emancipated women over 1400 years ago – some-
thing the global community only began working to-
wards in the last three decades. But despite religious
and legal assurances, very few Muslim women can
claim personal autonomy; guarantees in marital, per-
sonal or political matters; or recognition of their re-
productive role. In view of this gap many Muslim
women are becoming disillusioned with the popular
rhetoric on rights few of them enjoy. 
The Predicament of 
Muslim Women
i n T a n z a n i a
Faced with numerous challenges – oppres-
sive social, political, economic and philo-
sophical systems, a hostile political climate
and world economic imbalance – Muslim
women are exploring diverse means and
forms of exerting themselves. In Tanzania
the struggle is about governance, at an indi-
vidual and institutional level, a struggle
touching the heart of fundamental rights
and freedoms. Unfortunately religious and
political undercurrents blur the real issues
at stake. Where does this leave the Muslim
women's movement in Tanzania?
As is the case elsewhere, the development
of Muslim women has largely been a con-
cern not of Muslim women, but of other
people: of Muslim men who claim divine au-
thority over their womenfolk; of Western
feminists who (patronizingly) see them-
selves as trailblazers of gender equality; of
the Western media which thrives on ridicul-
ing the image of the cloaked and sup-
pressed non-attractive woman. Even so,
Muslim women are responding to these
challenges while appreciating that they are
both internal and external. 
Globalization is bringing new perspec-
tives and challenges to the population.
Amidst a dominant global culture, individ-
ual identity is now more pronounced with
increased symbolism around the image of
the Muslim woman. By and large her image
signifies Muslims' aspirations to build an Is-
lamic model of governance. Inevitably, the
discussion revolves around placing greater
restrictions on women. 
Muslim women's movements and Muslim
activists paint an image of Muslim women
far divorced from local realities. While
earnestly trying to distance what is Arab
from what is Islam, in effect they engage in
the Arabization of local customs. In Tanza-
nia some Muslim factions promote the black
chador or ca b a y a, common in parts of the
Middle East, over the local k h a n g a a n d
k i t e n g e, a multi-purpose cotton print. Gen-
der activists on the other hand advocate
ideals of women's liberation using models
that are alien to the local situation. Failing
to appreciate that the basis for human inter-
actions and relations should inform the con-
tent and context of their paradigms, the two
groups remain at loggerheads, confusing
the less enlightened populace.
In defiance of external assault, the local
situation rigidifies its system to preserve its
essence singling out those who fail to con-
form. Communities miss the opportunity to
reflect on lessons and instead are left react-
ing to external factors/challenges. In such a
scenario, how do we not only recognize but
also value the individual state of being?
The struggle for Muslim women in Tanza-
nia is at two main fronts: internal and exter-
nal. Internally, Muslim women try to exert
themselves against unresponsive structures
and systems. Women have little access to
major Islamic institutions, hardly any of
which have women in decision-making
bodies. Where space is provided to women,
it is symbolic and leaves them with little au-
tonomy to organize or make decisions. Ex-
ternally, they struggle against a global sys-
tem that increasingly is intolerant of non-
Western philosophies or ideologies. The
spillover of these dynamics can be appreci-
ated in the treatment Muslim women have
attracted in Tanzania, a reality that reflects
the gap which civil society organizations are
yet to bridge in promoting good gover-
nance, equality and justice. 
The issue of religion
From 1992–1993 Tanzania witnessed its
first openly religious conflict over pork
butchers. Enraged by an incident where a
'faithful' had purposefully sold pork, Mus-
lims set about destroying pork butchers in
Dar es Salaam. In justifying their actions
they asserted that the operations of pork
butchers violated city regulations. The inci-
dent was trigged by perceived oppression
of Muslims by the state. In particular they in-
terpreted the opening of pork butcheries in
residential areas as a deliberate affront to Is-
lamic values and freedoms. Muslim women
suffered most from the ensuing communal
tension. As female Muslim students at the
University of Dar es Salaam (the Hill) at this
time, we became easy targets for those who
wanted to put Muslims in their right place.
We were threatened verbally and physically.
A few had their headscarves ripped off from
their heads. The famous 'Hill' grapevine1
purported that should the situation get out
of hand Muslim women would be raped to
assert secular/Christian authority over the
Muslim population. 
During this period, the Hill was just recov-
ering from the Levina2 scandal that for the
first time exposed the issue of sexual harass-
ment of female students. In response, uni-
versity authorities formed a gender task
force to investigate cases of harassment and
to support the harassed. While the media
was instrumental in exposing Levina's fate,
the harassment of female Muslim students
went unnoticed by the media and the gen-
der task force. Male students escorted us
from classes to our dormitories and vice
v e r s a .
Again in 1998 Dar es Salaam witnessed the
Mwembechai uprising instigated by a lead-
ership dispute at the local mosque.3 This was
the first time police openly fired live bullets
at protestors. Caught in the mêlée and some
in their homes, Muslim women were arrest-
ed, strip-searched and penetrated with ob-
jects in the vaginal and anal areas. Perhaps
because it concerned a group detached
from social and gender movements, few
human rights or gender organizations spoke
up against these atrocities. Some felt Mus-
lims deserved this treatment, as they were
w a k o r o f i, or troublemakers.
During the 2000 elections the military and
police violated Muslim women. In Muslim
majority areas like Pemba, media reports
surfaced of rampant raping of women by
the military to quell fierce political opposi-
tion. This time, key human rights organiza-
tions spoke about the human rights viola-
tions on principle. Most comments were,
however, directed at the suppression of po-
litical rights and not at the violation of
women's bodily integrity. 
So is there room to apply human rights
norms/principles to Muslim women?
The human rights perspective
The Tanzanian Constitution is founded
upon democratic principles and social jus-
tice and guarantees various rights and free-
doms. Article 29 provides for equal treat-
ment before the law. State organs are the
constitutional custodians, guided by inter-
national human rights conventions and
principles of non-discrimination on the
basis of sex, colour, ethnicity, religion or
personal status. 
Yet, judging from the experiences of Mus-
lim women this has not always been the
case. The state and activists single-handedly
blame religion and customs for women's
predicament. Such assertions trivialize the
real issues at hand and thus fail to offer sus-
tainable options in realizing gender equali-
ty/equity. As a class Muslim women are de-
nied the right to free association, to partici-
pation, to an education, freedom of expres-
sion and exercise of their religion, enjoy-
ment of personal security and proprietary
rights. The h i j a b, for instance, has systemat-
ically been used to deny Muslim women ed-
ucation and work opportunities. Following
intense activism, a ministerial circular was
issued in August 1995 to allow female stu-
dents to wear the h i j a b. However, this pro-
tection is revocable and does not extend to
women in employment.
Excessive state interference in Muslim or-
ganizations also impacts women's ability to
advance. The Tanzania Muslim Council
(BAKWATA) is heavily regulated by the state.
Muslim women's efforts to organize are offi-
cially not recognized if not sanctioned by
this body. Likewise it dictates their attempts
to exert their autonomy and directs their
fate in personal matters. For instance, under
the Law of Marriage Act, before dissolving a
marriage, the matter has to go before a mar-
riage conciliation board. In the case of Mus-
lims, such matters are directed to BAKWA-
TA, which has a proven record of inaction
and insensitivity to women's concerns and
interests. Yet, the government refuses to
see beyond the political and resists enter-
taining any challenges to BAKWATA's exis-
tence and powers.
Inheritance is another sore issue with
women in Tanzania. However, there are two
fundamental departures in approaching
the issue of property with others in the
women's movement. The first rests with the
reality that Muslim women are guaranteed
property rights as mothers, wives daugh-
ters or sisters. Secondly it concerns the con-
cept of inheritance in Islamic jurisprudence
as opposed to Western views, a contrast be-
tween distributive justice and self-interest.
This in no way undermines the real hurdle
Muslim women like other women face in as-
serting their property rights in inheritance
matters. However, the solution is not just
about giving women those rights but guar-
anteeing them access and enjoyment of
those rights by putting appropriate and re-
sponsive mechanisms in place to that ef-
f e c t .
Inspiration from within
Usman Bugaje notes, 'the prevailing intel-
lectual decadence of the Muslim communi-
ty has over several decades forged a timid
mind, which conformed and feared creativi-
ty […] lost its analytical capacity and be-
came mechanical in its thinking […] [I]t is
easier to evade questions/issues rather than
face them, particularly when they relate to
women or the private sphere.'4 This asser-
tion is a true description of the predicament
in which we find ourselves. This struggle is
about reclaiming what is ours and defining
our development. 
Sound activism demands a people-cen-
tred approach compatible with prevailing
concepts of social justice. We can revisit
what is empowering in our traditions. For
instance, while gender activists clamour for
the recognition of women's reproductive
role, Islam bestowed this unique status to
women. Alternatively, we can draw parallels
from indigenous people's movements to as-
sert their rights to land, representation, sur-
vival and dignity. Invoking the powers with-
in becomes a means of facilitating transfor-
mation supported, not dictated, by the
state. 
It is evident that if not empowered and
not allowed to assert their voice, assume
their position, exert their authority and
obligations in the family and society, the de-
velopment of Muslim women in Tanzania
will remain a hypothetical, desired state of
being rather than a genuine sense of being.
In essence, our struggle has been about the
dignity of womanhood. For us in the Sahiba
*Sisters Foundation, this is a struggle at the
heart of our very being.
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The immense importance of the complex interaction
between Iran and the outside world has long been
recognized, but scholars traditionally have been se-
lective in the attention they have paid to its manifes-
tations and individual aspects. From the wars against
classical Greece to the Iranian Revolution, their focus
has typically been Iran's relations with Europe, and
later the United States, revolving around commercial
traffic, imperialism and the reaction to it, particularly
reform attempts. Especially with regard to the period
since 1500, this emphasis has come at the expense of
studying relations with countries adjacent to Iran – a
situation that is no doubt reinforced by a tendency
among Iranians themselves to overlook and ignore
the region around them in their eagerness to adopt –
or resist – things Western. A different approach, one
that looks also at neighbours and at culture and cul-
tural politics, should offer us much new information.
Iran and the
Surrounding World
Iran has been a crossroads of civilizations
since time immemorial. Its location and
physical geography have always made it a
favoured and often inevitable corridor for
land-based military expeditions and com-
mercial traffic between West and South
Asia, between China, inner Asia and the
Mediterranean basin. Alexander the Great
travelled through Iran on his way to Central
Asia. Islam arrived in India through Iran. The
Mongols used Iran as their springboard to
invade the Middle East. Napoleon planned
to use Iran as a passageway for his assault
on India, while the British regarded the
country as a vital buffer against Russian en-
croachment on the shores of the Indian
Ocean. 
The fluidity and mobility of an environ-
ment with a large tribal, nomadic popula-
tion not just energized movement, but also
facilitated borrowing and adaptation.
The fruits of this synergy lasted well be-
yond 1500, the time when three kindred
empires, that of the Ottomans, the Safavids
and the Mughals, coalesced into political
units that, given the remarkable way in
which they each reconstituted a common
legacy of combined Perso-Islamic and
Turko-Mongolian religious and political ele-
ments, must be seen as an interactive con-
tinuum. Long fascinated by the maritime
discoveries and the ensuing new level of in-
tensity reached in the interaction between
Europe and Southwest and South Asia,
scholars only recently have begun to direct
their attention to specific aspects of histori-
cal ties between Iran with the world directly
surrounding it in the period after 1500. The
immensely important relationship between
Iran and India is a case in point. In the area
of economic relations it is only now being
recognized that India in early modern times
was by far Iran's most important trading
partner. Something similar is true for cultur-
al relations. A steady migration of Iranians
to the subcontinent, driven by instability at
home and beckoning economic and politi-
cal opportunities in India, created a large
and very influential class of Persian-speak-
ing scribes and literati at its various Muslim
courts – to the point where in the Mughal
period many more speakers of Persian lived
in India than in Iran. The same migratory
movement influenced the formation and
development of S h ici - r u l e d p r i n c i p a l i t i e s
and kingdoms, in the Deccan and, following
the fall of the Mughals in the 18t h century, in
the north as well. Most importantly, the in-
flux of Iranians elevated the Persian lan-
guage and its literature to the pre-eminent
status that it would maintain well into the
1 9t h c e n t u r y .
Iran's place in the world
Relations between Iran and its neighbour
to the west present a comparable situation.
The rich and richly documented military,
diplomatic, and cultural relations between
various Iranian dynasties and the Ottomans
await thorough investigation. Until the 19t h
century, the two fought many wars but also
engaged in the frequent exchange of gift-
carrying embassies, and the status of Per-
sian in the Eastern Muslim world ensured
steady cultural borrowing. Mutual percep-
tions were coloured by the variant forms of
Islam professed by the two states – the Ot-
tomans were staunchly Sunni while Iran has
been the only officially S h ici country in the
world since 1501 – as much as by their
shared cultural affinity. In the 19t h c e n t u r y ,
finally, the Ottoman Empire (and later
Turkey) provided Iranian rulers and élites
with models of political and administrative
modernization. 
Iran's relationship with its northern neigh-
bour is another field in need of further ex-
ploration. Good studies exist on the military
and political aspects of contacts between
Iran and Russia, the country that posed a
threat to its northern borders as of the late
Safavid period and that as of the reign of
Peter the Great loomed large as its expan-
sionist neighbour but also as a model to be
emulated, but the overall state of our
knowledge of these contacts remains rudi-
mentary as well. 
In modern times, Iran's relations with the
West have all but overshadowed its interac-
tion with countries around it. Since the
focus in this relationship has been the
process of modernization, the tendency has
been to see the West as the agent and Iran
as the recipient or reactive force. The large
shadow the Iranian Revolution has cast over
the country's history has only exacerbated
the lack of a balanced assessment of Iran's
place in the world. Ever since the formation
of the Islamic Republic, most of the Western
public has associated Iran with reactionary
Islam, state-sponsored terrorism and op-
pressed women. 
To be sure, counter trends to both ten-
dencies do exist. In the 1990s, discriminat-
ing movie fans in the West discovered Iran's
rich modern cinema. Kiarostami, Makhmal-
baf, Panahi, and an entire generation of
younger talented filmmakers, some of them
women, have become household names on
the roster of quality films, their reputation
bolstered by the many international prizes
they received. Iranian cinema is hailed in the
West as an outstanding example of human-
istic art – a most striking counterpoint to the
grim appearance of the Islamic Republic –
and the subtle and inventive ways in which
directors manage to show women's lives,
problems, and even expressions of affection
between the sexes have drawn wide praise.
The most important of these trends is of
course Iran's experimentation with open-
ness and accountability since the election of
President Khatami in 1997. The glacial
progress of this process and the fierce resis-
tance it has encountered from the hardlin-
ers in the government have demoralized
Iranians and outside observers alike to the
point where one is tempted to conclude
that the experiment has run its course and
failed. Nor has the so-called Dialogue of Civ-
ilizations, launched by Khatami, found
much resonance outside the halls of the
United Nations (which proclaimed 2001 the
year of the Dialogue of Civilizations). 
Yet it would be a mistake to write Iran off.
The new openness of the Islamic Republic
arguably has little inspiration for the West-
erners, who may see discussions about civil
society held in the face of continuing (or
worsening) political oppression as futile,
and most of whom know nothing of positive
changes in the lives of many young people
and women. In the region immediately sur-
rounding Iran, however, developments are
followed with great attentiveness, and Iran
is seen as a dynamic country and even a
model in its continuing endeavour to create
a society that combines modernity with a
lasting adherence to Islam and tradition.
Present-day Afghanistan is a good example.
To Afghans coming out of Taliban rule, the
Iranian way of integrating Islam into politi-
cal and social life must look positively en-
lightened. The many cultural ties with espe-
cially the Tajik parts of the country make
Iran's educational system, the role it accords
women in public life, and, last but not least,
the ways in which the Iranian state manages
to keep the country's myriad ethnic and lin-
guistic groups unified under the umbrella of
a common identity. 
Egypt is another example of a country
where the new Iran exerts some influence,
albeit of a different nature. Ever since the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, even
those Egyptians who had initially welcomed
Khomeini's Revolution as divine interven-
tion, were forced to choose between Islamic
and Arab solidarity in their assessment of
the Islamic Republic. First vilified by Egypt's
regime, then ignored, Iran gradually faded
in the public consciousness – until the ad-
vent of the Tehran spring following Khata-
mi's election. Overlooking the many nega-
tive stereotypes about Iran that exist in their
country, many Egyptians have come to see
in Iran an inspiration as a vibrant society en-
gaged in Islamic reformation built on no-
tions of pluralism and free elections – a stark
contrast, in short, to the perceived military
staleness of much of the Arab world.
The women's movement
Even Iranian women are proving to their
Muslim sisters that Islamic strictures can co-
exist with experimentation and develop-
ment. In Iran, many more women work and
operate in public life than in many other
Muslim countries. Iranian women, who now
form the majority of university students,
have been at the forefront of resisting inter-
pretations of Islamic law that are inimical to
females. More specifically, the country's
women's movement has been actively en-
gaged in finding ways to encourage eman-
cipation without giving up Iran's indigenous
culture, including Islam. Due in part to its
heavy emphasis on the chador, the regime's
efforts to propagate its message on women
have made little headway in countries with
a recent history of secularism, such as the
former Soviet republics. More recently, Iran-
ian NGO groups speaking on behalf of
women have followed a more pragmatic ap-
proach in their attempt to forge contacts
and connections with women's groups in
other Islamic countries. Such attempts and
the partial successes of Iran's post-Islamist
women's movement do not receive much
coverage in the press, but they do add yet
another dimension to the picture of modern
Iran as a centre of culture and cultural poli-
tics that has influenced and been influenced
by both nearby and distant countries and
cultures. Iran's cultural relations with the
world as a subject can contribute much to
current interest in global and world history.
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A W A D E D D I E  H A L A B I
During the period of Ottoman rule, the Nabi
Musa festival emerged as the largest Islamic
festival in the region, consisting of a one-
week celebration and pilgrimage to Moses'
tomb located seven kilometres southwest
of Jericho, culminating in a gathering at the
shrine on the Friday preceding the Greek
Orthodox Easter weekend. 
The festival evolved into an active and
productive element in the formation of Arab
élite and British colonial versions of Pales-
tinian nationalism. This was due to the syn-
chronic relationship which members of
Palestine's Arab élite families forged with
the British rulers. The high-ranking posts
these Arab élites acquired in the colonial ad-
ministration, or the status the British grant-
ed them as officially recognized political
leaders, ensured that this close familial rela-
tionship would strengthen colonial rule.
British participation in the festival evolved
beyond the formal, official role as state ob-
servers of a civilian, religious ceremony and
acquired an obliquely religious character, as
rightful participants in the ceremonies.
At the 1918 festival, the first to be cele-
brated under British rule, on the first Friday
of the festival, known as the Friday of the
Banners (j u mcat al-acl a m), the British gover-
nor of Jerusalem greeted the shaykhs of the
villages surrounding Jerusalem at the Gov-
ernment House (the main British adminis-
trative building). The shaykhs presented
him with the banners of the Prophet, two
banners of Nabi Da'ud (Prophet David), and
two of Al-Haram al-Sharif. In this segment of
the Moses ceremonies, the new, British gov-
ernor of the city, by officially receiving the
banners, assumed the duties of his former
Ottoman counterpart. Even though this cer-
emony involved a religious component, in
the form of the shaykh leading this delega-
tion reciting a prayer over the banners, the
British governor was nevertheless eager to
participate, by saluting the banners after
the prayers.1
The festival took on greater political im-
portance after Muslim pilgrims rioted during
the celebrations in April 1920. Four Muslims
and five Jews were killed; 251 Arabs and
Jews were wounded. These riots confirmed
the British notion of 'Islamic extremism', in
which Islamic rhetoric, themes, and rituals
could be used to mobilize an anti-colonial
resistance, a fear prevalent throughout
Britain's colonial rule over Muslim popula-
tions. The British authorities stressed that
Arab political leaders had to prevent any fur-
ther violence from erupting at the festival.
That is most likely why in 1921 the British ap-
pointed Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni as mufti of
Jerusalem, bestowing upon him the new
and esteemed title of mufti al-akbar ( G r a n d
Mufti). In 1922 they secured his election as
the president of the Supreme Muslim Coun-
cil (al-Majlis al-Islami al-Acl a), the most im-
portant Islamic body in Palestine. So eager
were the British to appoint a member of a
leading Arab family to the post of mufti, the
first British High Commissioner to Palestine,
Herbert Samuel (1921–1925), even par-
doned Al-Hajj Amin for his involvement in
the riots. Al-Hajj Amin promised to cooper-
ate faithfully with British officials, explicitly
assuring them that the violence of the 1920
Nabi Musa festivities would not be repeat-
e d .2 As the leading religious figure in Pales-
tine, Al-Hajj Amin was responsible for orga-
nizing the festival and leading the cere-
monies, becoming an important player in at-
tempting to erase conflict between the Arab
Muslim community and the British colonial
rulers. A report on the political situation in
Palestine for April 1922 expounds on the im-
portance of his role: 
[The] advice given prior to the Nebi Musa
celebration by the president [Al-Hajj
Amin] of the [Supreme Muslim] council
contributed not a little to preventing
disturbances; and the obviously sincere
spirit in which the president lent his
cooperation is in itself a sign that the
establishment of the council has been
a means of improving the relationship
between the government and
representative Moslem opinion.3
Promoting British rule
A further example of how the Arab élite
employed the festival to promote British
policy manifested in an invitation which the
mayor of Jerusalem, Raghib Bek al-Nasha-
shibi, extended to the British governor of
Jerusalem, to other Arab notables, and to
leaders of all religious denominations, call-
ing for their attendance at a pavilion erected
just outside the Old City, which pilgrims cus-
tomarily passed as they marched to the
shrine. The newspaper F i l a s t i n reported that
these invitations were printed in all three of-
ficial languages: Arabic, English, and He-
b r e w .4 Even though the Arabs of Palestine
were troubled by the British adopting He-
brew as an official language, regarding it as
an encroachment on their identity, a promi-
nent and politically influential member of a
notable Arab family was able to use the Nabi
Musa festival to defuse this language issue in
particular, and the question of British sup-
port for Zionism in general, by recognizing
the official status of Hebrew at this popular
Islamic celebration.
But the inclusion of a British military band
(with pipes and brass instruments) became
one of the most visible examples of British
participation in the festival. An argument
for the necessity of a British band at Nabi
Musa festivities was earnestly put forward
by Herbert Samuel in May 1921, arguing
that a British-sponsored band in the festival
could raise Britain's prestige:
The according of a Band for the occasion
constitutes no precedent for there is no
other religious festival in Palestine
comparable with it. […] The Moslem
population expects that the British
government whose respect for the
Religious Customs and Ceremonies of
their Moslem subjects in other parts of the
British Empire is so well known, shall
adopt a not less favourable attitude
towards the Moslems of Palestine than
the latter enjoyed under the late Turkish
r e g i m e .
He concluded by pleading that '[t]he mat-
ter is of greater importance than may at first
sight appear.'5 From Samuel's words, the
Nabi Musa festival allowed the British rulers
to present themselves as guardians of Islam-
ic identity in Palestine, by invoking the for-
mer Ottoman Muslim rulers as models to be
replicated. The British employed this image
to undermine criticism of their contentious
support for Zionism.
Palestine's Arab political and religious
leadership was willing to collude with the
British aspirations to be involved with the
Nabi Musa ceremonies. One British official
alluded to the importance of this alliance at
the festival as follows:
[I]t is usual at this season, when feasts
important to all three communities take
place [i.e., Passover, Easter, Nabi Musa]
that there should be in the minds of many
a feeling of nervousness. Rumours of
impending trouble are discussed, and,
among the general public of Jerusalem,
there is a good deal of anxiety. Among
the Arab notables, however, there is both
a hope that no outbreak may occur and
a desire to prevent it.6
An important element in how the Arab
élite incorporated British participation in
the festival was by evoking the festival's Is-
lamic nature, which, in effect, artfully sancti-
fied Britain's role in Palestine's Islamic, reli-
gious culture. This approach appears in an
appeal by Musa Kazim al-Husayni, a relative
of Al-Hajj Amin and president of the Pales-
tine Arab Congress, issued a year after the
1920 riots and printed on the front pages of
many Arabic newspapers. In this message,
entitled 'A Message to the People of Noble
Palestine', Al-Husayni wished Palestinians a
joyous celebration in the upcoming holi-
days (i.e. Nabi Musa and Easter), but urged
that these be conducted peacefully, claim-
ing that, 'the government of Great Britain
[…] will not fail the trust of the people be-
cause what the people want is what God
w a n t s . '7 Incorporating the British into Islam-
ic religious discourse became a powerful
method to deflect widespread, public re-
sentment against British rule.
Popular responses
Nevertheless, less-powerful groups, such
as the Muslim pilgrims, at times rejected
and at other times reinterpreted these mes-
sages, transforming the festival into an
arena of alternate discourses on the ques-
tion of Palestinian nationalism and British
colonialism. Folk songs sung at the festival
became the most vocal and unequivocal ex-
pressions of this group's own ideas and so-
cial agendas. During the 1920 riots, authori-
ties noted that pilgrims modified the music
of a British-regiment band accompanying
the procession by inserting their own lyrics
of 'Long Live King Faysal' and 'Down with
Every Nation which Helps the Jews'.8 S i m i-
larly, the worshippers from Nablus replaced
their traditional, religious songs celebrating
the Prophet Moses and their pilgrimage to
his shrine with boasts of their steadfastness
against British colonialism: 'We are the chil-
dren of Jabal al-Nar (Nablus)/ We are a thorn
in the throat of the occupation.'9 These mes-
sages contradicted the conciliatory tone of
the discourses presented by Arab élites and
British authorities at the festival. 
Palestinian national identity arose during the period
of British rule (1917–1948). The Nabi Musa (Prophet
Moses) festival – mawsim al-Nabi Musa – provides us
with an example of how a religious ritual celebrated
within a colonial context shaped nationalist ideas. Rit-
uals, such as festivals and pilgrimages serve as arenas
for the interaction of various social groups, each of
which possesses its own agendas and discourses on
questions of order in society. In British-ruled Pales-
tine, powerful social groups such as the Palestinian
political leaders and the British colonial authorities
used the Nabi Musa festival to promote a conservative
version of Palestinian nationalism, one which re-
mained anti-Zionist but which avoided expressing
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S T A C Y  H O L D E N
In 1937, Haj Alla al-Qadmiri intoned 'Bismallah' (In
the name of God) up to one hundred times in the
course of a night's work.1 Qadmiri was an imam of the
municipal slaughterhouse of Fez. Placing each ani-
mal on its side, he slit its throat from ear to ear while
uttering this blessing. After the ritual sacrifice,
butchers, also Moroccan Muslims, prepared the ani-
mal for sale by removing its skin and dressing its
meat. Qadmiri's job seemed an age-old tradition, but
it was an innovation dating to 1912, when the French
established the Protectorate of Morocco. 
Meat and Society 
in Colonial Fez
Colonial officials collected taxes on each an-
imal slaughtered at the municipal slaugh-
terhouse. Qadmiri's sacrifice ensured that
meat offered for public sale was licit for con-
sumption by the city's 121,000 Muslim resi-
dents. In this way, the French profited from
concessions made to the religious practices
of the residents. When Qadmiri acted as
imam, the taxes paid by butchers accounted
for 10% of the city's income.2
French policies had repercussions far be-
yond their administrative and fiscal inten-
tions. Administering public facilities and
collecting taxes were seemingly trivial ac-
coutrements of bureaucratic modernity.
Nonetheless, the colonial regulation of the
meat industry transformed the way that the
social classes of Fez conducted daily life.
Meat consumption in 
pre-colonial Fez
Before the French Protectorate, meat
played a different role in the lives of the res-
idents of Fez. The élite privately sacrificed
animals. The Sultan, his entourage and
wealthy notables paid butchers to visit
them at home, where they dressed the meat
and prepared it as a meal. Working house-
holds rarely ate meat, while the poor de-
pended on charitable acts by the wealthy. 
When executed for a l -ci d a l - k a b i r ( G r e a t
Sacrifice) the butcher's workaday practices
represented faith, power and prosperity. For
the holiday, residents purchased livestock
and dissected it, as did a butcher. They also
mastered the rites of sacrifice, which served
symbolic purposes. In rendering meat h a l a l,
or permitted for Muslim consumption, a pa-
triarch stressed his religious authority. In Fez,
the pre-colonial capital, sacrifice also became
linked to the exercise of temporal power, for
residents sacrificed only after the Sultan's
public sacrifice. A household then distrib-
uted as much as two-thirds of the meat to the
poor, creating relations of dependence while
publicizing its benevolent prosperity.
Such traditions influenced the butcher's
trade because the élite displayed their privi-
leged status by sacrificing at home through-
out the year. A private sacrifice demonstrat-
ed respect for a guest while calling atten-
tion to a household's wealth. Thus, when
dining in private homes, foreign diplomats
invariably ate m e c h o u i, ram roasted on a
spit. Residents also sacrificed bulls or camels
at home to make k h e l i a, dried meat stored
in fat and spices. Descendants of families
long established in Fez draw attention to
this delicacy's social meaning. The sight of
meat drying on a terrace, insists Abdelali al-
Ouazzani, 'gave authority to the house'.3
Wealthy households paid butchers like Gi-
lalli Rabani for his services in readying the
m e c h o u i or k h e l i a, not for the sale of meat.4
Most residents could not purchase live-
stock, but a butcher did not profit from the
sale of meat. A local proverb identifies meat
as a consumable luxury: 'If you pass the night
without meat, you wake up without debt.'5
Certainly, the possession of meat aroused
popular envy. In 1878, protesting tanners pil-
laged a tax collector's house, taking his stock
of khelia.6 An average family ate meat twice a
week, unless a crisis raised the cost of living.
Thus, in 1880, after three years of drought, tax
receipts collected from commercial butchers
decreased by a third.7 In a like manner, butch-
er shops closed in 1906 when regional con-
flict doubled the price of livestock.8 The
butcher Moulay al-Haj Alaoui endured the un-
certainty of his trade. Eleven years before the
Protectorate, he moved from Fez because he
did not earn enough to feed his children.9
Colonial modernization
In developing meat as a commodity, the
French transformed the butcher's trade.
They respected Islam by naming people like
Qadmiri to the post of imam at the municipal
slaughterhouse. Colonial policies, however,
altered the role of meat in Moroccan society. 
Colonial administrators increased the num-
ber of sacrifices offered by the poor for al-cid
al-kabir. This policy advertised French respect
for Islam and the Sultan, a descendant of the
prophet. Three weeks before the holiday, the
French temporarily lifted prohibitions on the
slaughter of young animals to 'permit poor
families to buy sheep intended for sacrifice'.10
Colonial authorities also exempted holders of
an official declaration of poverty from paying
the taxes collected at the purchase of a sacri-
ficial ram.11 By facilitating the active participa-
tion of poor Moroccans in religious celebra-
tions, colonial officials jeopardized patron-
client relationships while undoubtedly raising
popular expectations in regard to meat con-
sumption on a daily basis.
If French officials honoured the Great Sac-
rifice, they demonstrated equal enthusiasm
in preventing the élite from sacrificing at
home for ordinary meals. In 1912, adminis-
trators fined butchers working outside the
slaughterhouse. Two years later, the Com-
mandant of the Region prosecuted a mer-
chant who privately sacrificed three cows.
Administrators then decided to imprison
butchers who assisted private slaughter.
Notables might apply for permission to
slaughter at home, but they paid a tax
aimed at the 'well off part of the population
[…] who sacrifice choice animals for making
dried meat'.1 2 Municipal administrators as-
sociated k h e l i a with 'clandestine slaughter',
thereby denying a request by the Indige-
nous Chamber of Commerce to eliminate
taxes on livestock from private farms. In
1922, administrators even pursued Driss
Zemrani, the Sultan's Assistant Chief of Pro-
tocol, who sacrificed two bulls at home.1 3
The establishment of the municipal
slaughterhouse demonstrates the care taken
by colonial authorities to make commercial-
ly butchered meat acceptable to those who
had previously sacrificed at home. Construc-
tion of the municipal slaughterhouse began
in 1914 at Bein el Mdoun, the centre of the
walled Moroccan quarters. The municipality
included European Christians and Moroccan
Jews, but the French designated this facility
exclusively for 'Muslim use'.1 4 Wooden lintels
with arabesque in the slaughtering cham-
ber, where the imam performed his sacrifice,
as well as beamed ceilings duplicated fea-
tures of the élite's courtyard houses. As con-
struction began, administrators built a
butcher shop with tiled walls and a marble
butcher's block to act as a model to others in
Rsif, a nearby market with an exclusively Mo-
roccan clientele.
Ultimately, the French desire to increase
colonial revenue underpinned the develop-
ment of meat as a commodity. In France,
taxes on meat served only to maintain a
city's slaughterhouse.1 5 In Fez, the French
used this tax to generate income for wider
purposes. Colonial administrators raised ex-
isting taxes on meat only five months after
the Protectorate's establishment. In 1917,
after the municipal slaughterhouse had op-
erated for a year, the Chief of Municipal Ser-
vices identified taxes collected at the facility
as 'one of the most important budgetary
f u n d s ' .1 6 That same year, taxes contributed
to assisting Moroccan workers, such as six
craftsmen producing traditional embroi-
dery in a municipal workshop, which, in
turn, permitted them to buy meat.1 7
After 25 years of colonial rule, the French
intended to authorize only 21 men to sacri-
fice according to Islamic law.1 8 Colonial offi-
cials respected the Muslim identity of the
urban majority in Fez, but their regulation of
the butcher's trade transformed meat's so-
cial significance. As the French fostered de-
mand for commercially butchered meat
amongst the rich and the poor, they did
more than better the butcher's lot. Prohibit-
ing routine slaughter at home, colonial offi-
cials suppressed a time-honoured preroga-
tive of the élite. At the same time, but for
the sacrifice of ci d, they facilitated the inde-
pendent access to an influential luxury
amongst the poor. In addition, the financing
of employment programmes with revenue
generated from the municipal slaughter-
house permitted wage earners to consume
more meat. Thus, the colonial development
of the meat industry in Fez decreased the
prestige of notables, while increasing that
of the destitute and working households. 
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Dissemination of Islam
The ninth annual international work-
shop of the Department of Middle Eastern
Studies of Ben-Gurion University, Beer-
Sheva, will be held from March–June 2003
on 'The Dissemination of Islam beyond
and within Muslim Communities – Theo-
retical, Historical, Anthropological and
Comparative Perspectives'. 
Please send proposals (1–2 pages, until
1 December 2002) on such topics as: theo-
retical discussions of dacwa, dacwa in con-
junction with jihad, case studies of the dis-
semination of Islam, methods of persua-
sion and propaganda, sociological and an-
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Muslim brotherhoods (t u r u q), most notably the Mouri-
des, have been considered a dominant factor of po-
litical influence at the local and national levels in
Senegal. The recent election campaigns, however,
seem to indicate a changing influence of religious au-
thorities on a local level. Most of the opposition par-
ties formed a coalition which intended to break up
the dominance of the Socialist Party, an intention
which was successfully realized. International politi-
cal – not necessarily homogeneous religious – net-
works and new means of communication were deci-
sive for the victory of the new president, Abdoulaye
Wade, in 2001. 
T r a n s n a t i o n a l
Senegalese Politics 
in France
From the colonization period up to the
1990s, a large number of national and local
religious authorities considerably support-
ed the ruling government in Senegal by
guaranteeing the French governor's control
over rural areas or by expressing clear re-
commendations to the voters after the Inde-
pendence. Nevertheless, the mutual loyalty
of the secular and the religious powers has
not always functioned without resistance. In
the middle of the 19t h century, the French
governor Faidherbe, who counted on the
purchased loyalty of local marabouts in
order to control rural areas, was fought by El
Haj Oumar. Senegal's first president after
the Independence, Léopold Sédar Senghor
(who was Catholic), continued to cooperate
with the authorities of the leading Sufi
brotherhood. The exchange of material and
immaterial goods could be proceeded with
by the purchase of votes against land rights
or tax advantages for the marabouts. Seng-
hor's successor, Abdou Diouf, whose family
belongs to the tariqa Tijaniyya, dealt also
with the Mouride and the Tijaniyy mara-
bouts, particularly with the general caliph of
the Tijaniyya, Abdoul Aziz Sy (1905–1997).
These links were visible on a symbolic level,
when representatives of the Senegalese
government assisted at national or regional
pilgrimages (the Tijaniyy Gamou in Tiva-
vouane or the Mouride Magal in Touba), or
when the drainage system was renewed
and maintained by important public fund-
ing because of the event.1 The ruling
Mouride general caliph Serigne Saliou
Mbacké presented himself until the end of
the 1990s as a discrete religious authority
not wanting to get involved in political af-
fairs. Hence at that time, the leading candi-
date of the opposition party, Abdoulaye
Wade, visiting the Mouride capital Touba
very frequently, openly showed his need for
the protection and counsel of his personal
Mouride marabout. 
Re-privatization of religion
During the presidential election cam-
paign in 2000, the behaviour of most of the
local and national religious authorities
changed significantly. Marabouts tended to
avoid expressing themselves in favour of ei-
ther the ruling socialist party or for the op-
position parties. There was only the general
caliph of the Tijaniyya, Mansour Sy, who ap-
pealed to believers to vote for Diouf. How-
ever, Diouf was defeated even in Sy's own
electoral circumscription in the holy city of
the Tijaniyya, Tivavouane. The large coali-
tion of the opposition parties, named 'Alter-
nance 2000', won the presidential elections,
resulting in the victory of the Mouride Ab-
doulaye Wade as the first non-socialist pres-
ident after 40 years. Although Wade be-
longs to the liberal PDS (Parti Démocratique
Sénégalais), former Marxist parties like And
J ë f / P A D S and socialist dissidents like Ibrahi-
ma Niasse joined the coalition in order to
break the 20-year domination of Abdou
Diouf. 
The first act of the new president just after
his victory was a personal pilgrimage to his
marabout in Touba, in order to thank him
for support and prayer. Serigne Saliou
Mbacké had refused to openly express him-
self for Wade, but the fact that Wade pre-
sented himself always as a Mouride t a l i b é n o
doubt had a positive effect on his election.
But the links between religious and political
authorities at the micro and the macro lev-
els are far more complex, and we need to
enlarge the general context of these elec-
tions in order to understand Wade's success.
Transnational networks
Studies on Senegalese migration have
heavily focused on Mouride trade net-
w o r k s .2 The increasing migration of Sene-
galese peasants to the urban areas and the
international migration to Europe (France,
Italy, Spain and Germany) and, currently, to
the United States (especially New York),
have reinforced the creation of transnation-
al social spaces. The latter are not necessari-
ly exclusively based on religious practices or
on membership in a d a h i r a. Communities
have cross-cutting ties and individuals be-
long to several networks and (interest)
groups at once. It is sure that the Mouride
economic networks are some of the best or-
ganized groups with an undoubtable finan-
cial influence. Nevertheless, we have ob-
served that individual and collective mi-
grants' activities in migration, particularly in
and around Paris, considerably focus on the
will for political change. The large political
coalition that aimed at breaking the domi-
nation of President Abdou Diouf was united
above religious or ideological orientations.
During the electoral meetings in Paris, for
example, financial affairs were controlled by
three women: one Mouride and one
Catholic woman who belong to the main
opposition party PDS, and one Tijaniyy
woman who is a member of the former
Marxist party And J ë f/PADS. This example
reflects the attitude of most of the activists
as well of most of the voters. Religious is-
sues were not openly discussed during the
meetings in and around Paris – on the con-
trary, the laic character of the constitution
was underlined several times by speakers.
Nevertheless, most of the practising
Mourides were conscious of the fact that in
the person of Abdoulaye Wade, a Mouride
t a l i b é was leading the main opposition
party. In the past, several marabouts got
into trouble for having supported the gov-
ernment – a government which has been in-
creasingly contested. The dissatisfaction
with the ruling government and the difficult
economic situation of the population since
the devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994
have increased the will for political change,
particularly among the youth, whose partic-
ipation rate in elections was very low until
2000. Hence, it became a growing risk for
marabouts to openly support the ruling
government by the expression of n d i g a ls
(which means a general order, in this case a
clear recommendation for a vote). A mem-
ber of the Senate, the second chamber in
Senegal, proudly said during a meeting (in
France) of the opposition: 'I have convinced
my marabout not to give any n d i g a l, al-
though he usually supported the Socialist
Party.' This statement was met with ap-
plause, reflecting a belief in the real chance
of political change. We can assume that his-
torical structures of religious authority were
largely contested on an individual level.
People's will to take autonomous political
decisions, independently from the advice of
marabouts, was obvious. This evolution was
the fruitful ground for Abdoulaye Wade's
strategy to count on transnational net-
works. Wade himself organized his political
campaign from his residence in Versailles
near Paris. Political claims of the migrants
constituted the central part of his political
programme: a favourite customs policy,
governmental aid for investments in Sene-
gal, bilateral social insurance agreements,
human living conditions for migrants in
France, etc. Wade systematically addressed
the migrants during electoral meetings that
were organized in the collective workers'
homes in and around Paris. He presented
himself as the only candidate who is close to
the migrants and who best knows their
problems. 
Migrants as vote
m u l t i p l i c a t o r s
The central reason for this election cam-
paign outside of Senegal was the impor-
tance of the migrants as new intermediaries
between the political leaders and the voters
in Senegal, especially in rural areas, where
religious authorities have played the role of
counsellors in electoral affairs for a long
time. In Paris, at the end of the official cam-
paign on Friday night before the elections,
several speakers urged the activists present
to influence their relatives and friends in
Senegal: 'The campaign is officially closed,
but it is not forbidden to phone home.' This
strategy worked also in Senegal, where peo-
ple from Dakar came to visit their family be-
fore the day of elections in order to con-
vince them to choose Wade. Abdou Diouf,
who was conscious of the importance of the
opposition parties in urban areas, sched-
uled the elections during the A ï d feast, hop-
ing that people from Dakar or other cities
would celebrate the A ï d in their home vil-
lages instead of voting in the city. This plan
failed, as residents of the big cities orga-
nized themselves very well in order to be
back in town in time. Ultimately their pres-
ence in rural areas was favourable for the
opposition. Wade's strategy of multiplying
votes from migrants back to Senegal and
from the cities back to the village was very
successful. Another important aspect was
the growing speed of communication
thanks to new media and to mobile phones.
The private press company Sudonline pub-
lished the main opposition journal Sud Quo-
t i d i e n online, so that Senegalese abroad
were very well informed about the political
and economic situation at home – particu-
larly about the corruption scandals in which
members of the socialist government were
implicated. In Paris, the printed version of
the online journal circulated amongst mi-
grants who, in majority, have no access to
Internet. Another important factor for
Wade's victory in 2000 was the efficient sur-
vey of the elections by journalists who as-
sisted at the counting of the votes, and
communicated the results via mobile
phones to the private radio station of the
'Sud' group. The mirror effect continued via
satellite radios which spread the results in
Paris. Senegalese migrants celebrated
Wade's victory in the suburbs of the French
capital as well as in Dakar even before the









a n n o u n c e m e n t
o f the party.
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Mid dl e Ea st
J OH AN N A  P I N K
When on 10 May 1925, the appellate s h a r ica court of
Biba annulled the marriages of three Upper Egyptian
Baha'is to their Muslim wives, declaring that the Ba-
ha'i faith was not part of Islam and therefore Muslims
embracing it were to be considered apostates, this
verdict was, paradoxically, hailed by the internation-
al Baha'i community as 'the first Charter of the eman-
cipation of the Cause of Baha'u'llah from the fetters
of Islamic orthodoxy'.1 The National Spiritual Assem-
bly (NSA) of the Baha'is of Egypt and the Sudan, one
of the first NSAs to be founded worldwide, felt in-
spired by the verdict that finally made the Egyptian
public aware of the existence of an active Baha'i com-
munity in their country. It was clear to everyone now
that the Baha'i faith could no longer be regarded as
an Islamic reform movement, as had been the case
before World War I, when Abd'ul'baha's visits to
Alexandria had caused a first wave of interest in the
new religion.
Deriding Revealed
R e l i g i o n s ?
Baha'is in Egypt
The Baha'i community of Egypt began to
flourish in the 1920s. Their publishing
house, M a t b aca t a s - S aca d a, distributed Ba-
ha'i religious writings throughout the Arab
world. In the 1930s, Egyptian Baha'is pre-
sented their faith in various independent
liberal secular newspapers and managed to
have their NSA registered at the mixed
c o u r t2 of Cairo, though their attempts to ob-
tain any form of official recognition by na-
tional political or juridical institutions were
in vain. In 1939, two Baha'i cemeteries were
opened in Cairo and Ismailiyya. In the 1940s,
the NSA inaugurated their own building, fi-
nanced by donations, in Abbassiyya, a quar-
ter of Cairo. More and more new members
joined the faith, sometimes after having
gotten hold of one of the Baha'i publica-
tions which were disseminated in great
numbers through bookshops and libraries,
sometimes after having read about the new
religion in the liberal press, sometimes after
having attended a public lecture on the
faith. The converts came from all the major
religions present in Egypt. Their educational
background was generally rather elevated,
many of them being academics. All these
developments made Shoghi Effendi, great-
grandson of Baha'u'llah, express, in 1944, his
firm belief that 'the establishment of […]
[the Baha'i] faith on a basis of absolute
equality with its sister religions' in Egypt
was only a question of time.3 Between the
1950s and the present day, however, Shoghi
Effendi's optimistic forecast has not been
fulfilled. 
Arrestation for vice and
d e b a u c h e r y
In January 2001, Egyptian newspapers re-
ported the arrest of 16 Baha'is from the area
of Suhag in Upper Egypt. The accused had
allegedly indulged in promiscuous sexual
activities, which were, the press claimed, in
accordance with Baha'i religious rites. Cari-
catures depicted the Baha'is as obsessed
with women and sexuality. In June 2001,
eight of the accused were still in prison
without having been officially charged. The
accusations do not seem to have been lifted
since then. 
The high expectations the Egyptian Ba-
ha'is had held for the future of their faith in
their home country have indeed been
crushed. After years of failed attempts to
achieve legal recognition, they had initiat-
ed, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, several
lawsuits through which they hoped to
reach, at least partially, their goal. Their
main concern was the validity of Baha'i mar-
riages. The problem was twofold: not only
were marriage contracts that followed Ba-
ha'i personal status law not accepted by the
Egyptian state, but Baha'is with a Muslim
background also ran the risk of having their
marriages annulled on grounds of apostasy.
In 1952, the State Council, the highest ad-
ministrative court, issued a judgment
against a Baha'i government employee
whose employer had refused to pay him the
marriage and family allowances to which he
was entitled. The court held that the plain-
tiff was an apostate and that therefore his
marriage was null and void. It considered
the question of freedom of belief, which
was guaranteed in the Egyptian Constitu-
tion, but came to the conclusion that the
legislator had not meant the principle of
freedom of belief to protect apostates or
members of any faith other than the re-
vealed religions accepted by Islam. The
court furthermore declared the supremacy
of the s h a r ica over secular laws. 
Things definitely took a turn for the worse
for the Egyptian Baha'is shortly afterwards.
The first reason for this was the foundation
of the state of Israel in 1947 and the fact that
the international centre of the Baha'i com-
munity was situated in Haifa. From the be-
ginning of the 1950s onward, accusations
were raised by journalists as well as Muslim
theologians that the Baha'i faith was in real-
ity not a religion, but a disguised instrument
of Zionism in order to corrupt and weaken
the Arab and Muslim world by perverting
God's revelation and by promoting pacifism
and internationalism. This conspiracy theo-
ry spread rapidly and by the 1960s reached
general acceptance in Egyptian public opin-
ion, with extremely few exceptions. 
N a s s e r i s m
The second reason for the increasingly
problematic situation of the Baha'i commu-
nity in Egypt was Nasser's repressive policy
in the religious sector. His aim in dealing
with religious communities of all kinds was
to either submit them to government con-
trol or eliminate them. The second option
was usually chosen for groups that were
suspected of having ties to Israel; not only
the Baha'is, but also Jehovah's Witnesses
suffered from this. In 1960, a presidential
decree (Law No. 263/1960) was issued by
which the Baha'i centres were dissolved and
their properties – including their building in
Abbassiyya and a valuable piece of land in
Maadi, south of Cairo – were confiscated.
The law also made any attempt to continue
the Baha'i centres' activities liable to punish-
ment. 
In several cases, Egyptian Baha'is were
charged with violating this law. In 1972, the
Baha'i community of the delta city of Tanta
was at the centre of the attacks. This case
gained a certain amount of publicity. The
judgment, however, was delayed, one of the
reasons lying in the fact that a number of
Baha'is had shortly before turned to the
newly founded Supreme Court, contesting
the constitutionality of Law No. 263/1960,
which was the basis of the charges against
the Baha'is of Tanta. The court decided to
postpone its verdict until the Supreme
Court had issued its judgment. Interesting-
ly, all the defendants who publicly declared
to be Muslims or renounced the Baha'i faith
were immediately released, which shows
that the charges were not really based on
any concrete action that violated the law in
question, but rather on the defendants' ad-
herence to the Baha'i faith. In the case of
Tanta, many of the accused finally chose to
profess Islam; most of them still being
pupils or students, they feared that repeat-
ed postponements of the final verdict
would make them miss important exams.
The Supreme Court passed its decision in
1975. It declared Law No. 263/1960 consti-
tutional. The court held that the law in ques-
tion did not trespass on the right of freedom
of belief as it did not prevent anyone from
being a Baha'i, i.e. internally believing in the
principles of the Baha'i faith. As for the right
to confess and practise one's religion, the
court maintained that the legislator had
granted this right only to the three revealed
religions recognized by Islam. The court also
declared that Law No. 263/1960 was not a
case of religious discrimination, as the state
was only obliged to treat equally those citi-
zens having a comparable status, e.g. Chris-
tians should be treated equal to other Chris-
tians, etc. This is an extremely restrictive in-
terpretation of the Constitution which basi-
cally strips the relevant articles of any mean-
ing. 
Increasing publicity
The Supreme Court's verdict opened the
way for more arrests. The next one followed
in 1985. About 50 Baha'is were arrested and
charged with violating Law No. 263/1960.
The case received extreme amounts of pub-
licity, virtually every Egyptian newspaper
and magazine covering the topic, often sev-
eral times as the proceedings continued.
The only voice that spoke in favour of the
Baha'is was that of Mustafa Amin, eminent
writer and journalist, who reminded the
readers of his daily column in A l - A k h b a r t h a t
freedom of religion was a basic human
right. Most of the press chose to ignore this
comment. However, newspapers with an Is-
lamist tendency, like A n - N u r or A s h - S h acb,
violently attacked Amin for his opinion.
The defendants were released on bail
shortly after their arrest. In 1987, a court of
first instance sentenced each of them, with
the exception of two who had chosen to re-
nounce their faith, to a three-year prison
term, which was the highest possible sen-
tence. As the judgment contained blatant
legal errors, the most prominent one being
the fact that the court had made no effort to
prove the individual guilt of the accused,
the ruling was, without much public atten-
tion, reversed by the appellate court in
1 9 8 8 .
After that, the Egyptian Baha'is tried to re-
main as inconspicuous as possible. As their
faith dictates them to follow the laws of the
land, they have always accepted the ban on
their organization; the charges raised
against them could never prove any activi-
ties exceeding occasional private meetings.
Still, as mentioned above, last year the Ba-
ha'is of Suhag were arrested. The accusa-
tions in this case do not seem to be based
on Law No. 263/1960, but on Art. 98 of
t h e penal code which rather vaguely bans
'the distribution or support of extremist
ideas with the intention of invoking strife,
deriding or mocking one of the revealed
religions […] or harming national unity or
social peace'. Art. 98 allows prison sen-
tences of up to five years, which exceeds the
limits set by Law No. 263/1960.
Since Farag Fuda was shot in 1992, no-
body in Egypt – including the local human
rights organizations – has taken to publicly
defending the Egyptian Baha'is' right to
freely practise their religion. With Law No.
263/1960 still in force, added to a penal
code allowing arbitrary arrests of persons
adhering to a heterodox faith, it is not likely
that the Egyptian Baha'is will, in the coming
years, experience a change for the better. 
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The Nether l a nds
N A T H A L  M .  DE S S I N G
A few weeks ago, I attended a religious wedding in
the Netherlands. A Moroccan imam concluded a mar-
riage between a Muslim man and a non-Muslim
Dutch woman – a widow with two grown-up sons.
Ten people attended the ceremony: the intending
couple, the imam and two members of a local
mosque, the woman's two sons, and three female
friends. The event epitomized in many ways what it
means to live in a migrational situation where many
religious facilities that can be taken for granted in
Muslim majority countries must be reconstructed.
An Islamic Wedding 
in a Dutch Living Room 
According to Islamic law, marriage consists
of the exchange of consent by the intending
husband and wife or their guardians in the
presence of two witnesses. The exchange of
consent, that is, offer and acceptance, must
take place during a single meeting of the
two parties arranged specifically to this end
(ijab wa qabul fi majlis wahid). The meeting
opens when an offer is made and comes to
an end when the parties separate. 
If the groom is of adult age and sound
mind, his personal and warranted consent is
an essential condition for the validity of the
marriage under Islamic law. According to
the Shaficites, Malikites, and Hanbalites,
however, the bride's consent, whether in
person or by warrant, has no legal validity,
even if she has reached adulthood or has
been married several times before. In order
for the contract to be valid, she must be rep-
resented by a guardian (w a l i) for the giving
of consent. The Hanafites hold that it is re-
commended for a bride of adult age to make
use of a guardian, but she is not obliged to
do so.  
Further requirements in Islamic law are
the stipulation of a bridal gift that the hus-
band must pay to his future wife and the
presence of two qualified witnesses. Islamic
law requires neither the presence of a regis-
trar or a religious authority, nor the drawing
up of a written document on this occasion.
Nevertheless, these institutions and forms
of registration have gained significance in
the present-day marriage legislations of
Muslim countries. In Morocco, for example,
the Minister of Justice appoints qualified,
professional witnesses. These officials put in
writing what they have seen and heard, and
register marriages concluded before them
in the marriage register of the competent
court. 
Most Moroccan couples in the Nether-
lands undergo a consulate marriage. Con-
sulate marriages are concluded according to
the Mudawwana, the Moroccan codification
of Islamic family law and law of inheritance,
and consequently to a large extent also in
accordance with Malikite prescriptions.
There is no distinction, therefore, between a
religious and a civil wedding, as there is for
example in the Netherlands and Turkey.*
The ceremony
Our couple's motivation in concluding an
Islamic marriage was a wish, particularly on
the part of the groom, to legitimize their co-
habitation before God. In their case, a con-
sulate marriage was not an option. They
therefore approached a Moroccan imam to
conduct a wedding ceremony. 
The couple had an initial meeting with the
imam at the mosque. They discussed the
woman's knowledge of and attitude to-
wards Islam and the marriage proceedings.
The imam asked if the two wished to marry
and if the father of the bride consented to
the marriage. He also asked about the in-
tended bridal gift. The bride said that she
would be happy with a bouquet of flowers.
This provoked laughter, as a Moroccan bride
normally receives a substantial sum in cash
as a bridal gift. The imam asked her to sug-
gest an alternative gift. The couple decided
that the groom would give the bride a ring
belonging to his family. At this meeting, the
imam also said that the couple, who had
been living together for some time, should
abstain from sexual relations until the mar-
riage ceremony.
The wedding ceremony took place at the
bride's home two weeks later. The imam in-
vited the bride, her sons, and the female
guests to take seats in the room where he
was sitting with the groom and the two
mosque members. The company sat in a cir-
cle. The ceremony started with the conven-
tional light conversation. The imam spoke
Arabic, and the mosque members trans-
lated his and our words.
The imam checked if all requirements for a
legally valid marriage were met. He ex-
plained that the two members of the
mosque acted as witnesses to the marriage.
He then asked the intending bride if her fa-
ther, who was not present, consented to the
marriage. In order to establish his consent,
the woman was asked to telephone him.
She had not expected this, and she there-
fore inquired if the imam really wanted her
to do so. She then rang her father. She ex-
plained the situation to him, and asked him
to talk with one of the mosque members. He
asked the father if he consented to his
daughter's marriage, which he did.
The imam then asked about the bridal
gift. The bride confirmed that this would
consist of the ring, which was currently
being repaired by a jeweller and which the
groom would present to her in due course.
The ceremony ended with the recitation of
the opening chapter of the Qur'an. The offi-
cial part had lasted approximately thirty
minutes. From then on, the gathering took
on an informal character, with conversation
and people eating cake and drinking lemon-
ade. The meeting ended when the imam,
the mosque members, and the groom left
by taxi. The bride and the other women
then took off their scarves and talked about
the ceremony.
Ritual knowledge and
c o m p e t e n c e
How should we interpret this course of
events? Our example shows that the trans-
plantation of a ritual from one context to
another that does not support it to the same
degree results in a loss of knowledge and
competence of the ritual actors, and conse-
quently in a considerable degree of impro-
visation. An imam normally plays no role ei-
ther in a wedding ceremony in Morocco or
at a consulate marriage in the Netherlands.
The fact that an imam conducted this wed-
ding ceremony was therefore itself a depar-
ture from Moroccan marriage practice. No
one, however, expressed surprise at the
imam's role on this occasion. On the con-
trary, the couple felt that his presence was
essential to render the ceremony valid.  
The imam's understanding of Islamic mar-
riage practice determined the course of
events. He said that he had conducted a
number of marriages before. From one point
of view, however, the formalities of Islamic
marriage were not followed strictly. As far as I
could see, the groom was not explicitly asked
whether he consented to the marriage. The
meeting therefore did not include an ex-
change of offer and acceptance between the
groom and the guardian of the bride – a
basic feature of an Islamic wedding. When I
checked my recollection with the couple
later, they denied this. They said that the
groom was indeed asked to give his consent,
but that I must have missed this exchange.  
Furthermore, the imam was unclear about
the role of the father of the bride in the cer-
emony. Was he considered her guardian,
and if so, did his consent over the telephone
comply with the Islamic prescriptions, or
should he have been present at the ceremo-
ny? And what would have occurred if the
father had been unreachable or unwilling to
give his consent to the marriage?
Creativity and improvisation 
Through lack of knowledge on the part of
the ritual actors, there was much uncertain-
ty about the proceedings. Creativity and im-
provisation were important features in this
situation. When the imam, the witnesses,
and the groom arrived, the sons of the bride
and the female guests did not know
whether they were permitted to sit in the
room with them. They decided to sit in the
adjoining room, viewing the ceremony
through the open doorway. However, the
imam invited them to sit in the room where
the ceremony would be held. He thus clari-
fied the situation for the ritual actors.
There were several other examples of im-
provisation and perhaps also of arbitrari-
ness. In the days before the ceremony, the
husband-to-be had said that the bride
should wear a headscarf during the ceremo-
ny, completely covering her hair. The bride
asked the female guests to put on a scarf
too. I had brought a headscarf for this even-
tuality, but the other two women had to
pick from the bride's collection. What was
the reason for the bride and her guests to
wear a headscarf in the imam's presence?
Was it to show respect to the imam, because
Islamic law requires it, or for some other rea-
son? 
The course of events raises questions
about the stability and reproducibility of
such ceremonies. If an individual imam con-
ducts marriage ceremonies infrequently
and these ceremonies are attended by only
a few members of the Muslim community, it
is likely that no standard form of marriage
ceremony will become entrenched in prac-
tice. Each marriage ceremony will remain a
one-off event, never to be repeated in the
same form. On the one hand, this suggests
that some ritual elements of the Muslim
marriage ceremony will be lost. On the
other hand, the lack of consistency will en-
able new ritual elements to be developed
and adopted, perhaps leading to inventive
adaptation of the Muslim marriage ceremo-
ny to the social and environmental circum-
stances of the migrational context.
In circumstances where ritual knowledge
and competence are difficult to preserve
and transmit, ritual actors attempt to give
structure and significance to a ritual as best
they can, combining partly understood and
remembered elements with ad hoc innova-
tions. The outcome is a less stable and
sometimes subjectively dissatisfying ritual
practice in which attrition is mixed with the
opportunity for creative evolution. Our cou-
ple, however, expressed complete satisfac-
tion with the wedding ceremony that they
had undergone. 
Islam in the Era
o f G l o b a l i z a t i o n
Islam in the Era of Globalization. Muslim Atti-
tudes towards Modernity and Identity pre-
sents an in-depth discussion of some of the
most important questions at present faced
by Muslim society. The book is arranged
around three core themes, namely global-
ization, modernity, and identity. The collec-
tion combines more general and theoreti-
cal elaborations with relevant case studies.
Among the topics treated are the global
and local dimensions of religious and intel -
lectual discourse and dress codes, the com-
plicated – but not necessarily problematic –
relationship between Islam and modernity,
the role of religious education in the con-
struction of identity, the interaction of state
and 'civil society' in religious education and
justice, and the relationship between reli-
gious and other factors in processes of so-
cial transformation. The case studies cover
an area stretching from China and South-
east Asia to the Caribbean.
This publication is of particular interest as it
represents a step towards a new synthesis
in Islamic studies, namely the cooperation
of scholars representing diverse discipli-
nary traditions and various geographical
origins and specializations, including Mus-
lims and non-Muslims. The book will draw
the attention of specialists and students of
Islamic studies, social sciences, and the hu-
manities as well as the general educated
public interested in subjects as diverse as
development, modernization, globaliza-
tion, intercultural contacts, intellectual dis-
course, gender, religious education, and re-
ligious authority.
Johan Hendrik Meuleman (ed.), Islam in the Era
o f Globalization. Muslim Attitudes towards
Modernity and Identity ( R o u t l e d g e C u r z o n :
London and New York, 2002).
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Islamic organizations, claiming to represent the in-
terests of the 8 to 9 million-strong Muslim immigrant
communities in Western Europe, have been asserting
a human rights claim to communal autonomy to
apply Islamic law, the s h a r ica, to their family or per-
sonal matters. Always included among the latter are
marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
Communal Autonomy
and the Application
o f Islamic Law 
In 1975, Sheikh Syed Darsh, the head cleric
of the Regent's Park Mosque in London, said: 
When a Muslim is prevented from
obeying this law he feels that he is failing
to fulfil a religious duty. He will not feel at
peace with the conscience or the
environment in which he lives and this
will lead to disenchantment. […] They
[that is Muslims] believe that the British
society, with its rich experience of
different cultures and ways of life,
especially the Islamic way of life which
they used to see in India, Malaysia,
Nigeria and so many other nations of
Islamic orientation, together with their
respect for personal and communal
freedom, will enable the Muslim migrants
to realize their entity within the freedom
of British society. When we request the
host society to recognize our point of
view we are appealing to a tradition of
justice and equity well established in this
country. The scope of the family law is not
wide and does not contradict, in essence,
the law here in this country. Both aim at
the fulfilment of justice and happiness of
the members of the family. Still, there are
certain Islamic points which, with
understanding and the spirit of
accommodation, would not go so far as
to create difficulties in the judiciary
system. After all, we are asking for their
application among themselves, the
Muslim community, as our Christian
brothers in Islamic countries are
following in the family traditions and the
Christian point of view. The Qur'an itself
has given them this right. (Quoted in
Nielsen 1993: 1–2)
Contrary to the assertion of the learned
cleric, it will be argued below that such au-
tonomy would create serious legal, philo-
sophical-theoretical and political problems
related to current Western notions of justice
and equity. 
Family matters
The recognized schools of Islamic ju-
risprudence (f i q h) regard marriage as a cen-
tral institution of Muslim society. In legal
terms marriage is not a sacred bond but a
civil contract between two free individuals.
However, the consent of the guardian to a
marriage is considered necessary by some
jurists, while others do not consider it oblig-
atory for an adult female. A girl may not be
coerced into marrying someone of whom
she does not approve, but since traditional
law does not prescribe an age limit, even
very young individuals can be married. In
such a case, it devolves upon the guardian
(normally the parents) to decide the terms
of the contract.
A Muslim male may have simultaneously
up to four wives. Such a right is not subject
to any limitations. A man can dissolve mar-
riage by pronouncing his intention to do so
three times. There are different ways of
doing it, but in principle a man can secure
divorce at will even when he is advised to
seek reconciliation (Amin 1989: 77). Women
can apply for divorce under exceptional cir-
cumstances. Allegations of cruelty, insanity
and impotence are strong cases for de-
manding divorce. However, it does not
mean that a woman can secure divorce at
will. Normally she has to be ready to pay an
agreed sum of money to the husband who
must agree to her proposal (Doi 1984:
192–7). The s h a r ica does not allow Muslims
to marry polytheists or atheists. However, a
Muslim male may marry a woman from
among the people of the book, that is, Jews,
Christians and a now extinct sect, the Sabi-
ans. Twelver S h ici s m allows marriage to a
Zoroastrian female. On the other hand, a
Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim.
As regards inheritance, both male and fe-
male dependents and close relatives are
given a share in the property of the de-
ceased. Besides the shares of different
wives, the distribution among the children
of a deceased father follows the principle
that the female children inherit one-half of
the share of male children. Further, while
Muslim wives are entitled to a share, non-
Muslim wives are not. However, through a
will or testament the husband can gift some
property to his non-Muslim wife. Property of
a Muslim may not be inherited by non-Mus-
lim children or parents. The property of an
apostate cannot be inherited nor can the
property of a Muslim be passed on to an
apostate (Ibid.: 289–91). As regards children
born out of wedlock, according to the
Hanafi School (the biggest and considered
the most liberal) the illicit child cannot in-
herit from the father but may inherit from
the mother's side. Moreover, children of a
deceased son are excluded from inheriting
the property from the grandfather. Instead
the share is distributed among the siblings
of the deceased son. Finally, although Mus-
lims are encouraged to take care of orphans,
there is no right to adopt a child. Thus an
adopted child cannot inherit property of the
adoptive parents (Amin 1989: 81–82). On
the other hand, a part of the property can be
left to such a child through a testament.
It is quite clear that the s h a r ica laws per-
taining to family matters differ radically
from the European systems. For example,
only the monogamous form of marriage is
legally recognized in Europe. Any restric-
tions on marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim cannot be condoned by a Euro-
pean legal system because the Western
states have ratified the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1979) which
envisages equality between the sexes on all
matters. Article 16 unequivocally places
women on a par with men in matters of mar-
riage and allows them freely to chose a
spouse. Similarly divorce, the rights of the
child (born within or outside of wedlock), in-
heritance and adoption are matters on
which traditional discriminatory practices
have been eliminated.
Moreover, serious procedural questions
arise with regard to the practical application
of the s h a r ica. Who would be competent to
interpret and enforce Muslim family law?
Can non-Muslim judges be competent
enough to consider cases involving Islamic
law or should the state set up separate
courts with Muslim judges to try cases in-
volving disputes over family matters? Even
more intractable would be problems stem-
ming from mixed marriages. Additionally,
there is a distinct possibility that some Mus-
lims may prefer to seek redress from the
mainstream legal system or, worse still, the
conflicting parties may appeal to the two
different legal systems. Who should decide
which court is appropriate for a Muslim?
Communal authority
In a theoretical and philosophical sense,
the demand for communal autonomy poses
serious challenges to current understand-
ings of multiculturalism and pluralism. S h a r-
ica rulings on family matters are under-
pinned by ontological and epistemological
values which identify community and reve-
lation as superior to the individual and rea-
son. In sharp contrast, Western European
legal systems have been reformed in the
light of the Enlightenment values of ratio-
nality and secular humanism. The human
rights of individuals are a centrepiece of
such reformed law. How these diametrically
opposite approaches can be reconciled into
a coherent system of law is a matter on
which more serious work needs to be done.
In political terms, it is quite clear that any
concession to Muslim separatism under the
garb of communal autonomy will provoke a
reaction deriving from xenophobia, in gen-
eral, and Islamophobia, in particular.
It is worth noting that even among Mus-
lim states there is no agreement on how to
apply the s h a r ica, including its rulings on
family matters. Saudi Arabia and Iran apply
the s h a r ica in a complete sense. Mauritania,
Libya and Egypt in principle but not consis-
tently in practice base their legal praxis on
the s h a r ica. The United Arab Emirates, Oman
and Pakistan recognize the s h a r ica as the
supreme law of the land, but deviate from it
in practice. Twenty countries retain s h a r ica
courts for personal law, while fourteen
make reference to it in personal law codifi-
cations. Nine countries have abolished all
reference to the s h a r ica. These include
Eritrea, Senegal, Turkey, and the former So-
viet republics having a Muslim majority, in-
cluding Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. 
It must be remembered that current
human rights were won by deprived and dis-
enfranchised people through long-drawn
mass struggles. The French Revolution con-
verted obligation-bound subjects of the
monarchy into rights-bearing citizens of a
republic. Initially it was propertied men
from the majority communities who could
enjoy the rights of citizenship. Poor men, re-
ligious and ethnic minorities and women
were extended such rights much later: uni-
versal citizenship is a post-World War II phe-
nomenon. It would be ironic and tragic if in
the name of communal autonomy claimed
by conservative Islamic organizations, Mus-
lim men and women were deprived rights
that other citizens or permanent residents
of Western societies enjoy. The Western Eu-
ropean states have shown understanding of
and sympathy towards demands for permis-
sion to build mosques and maintain special
graveyards. Such matters are truly of a per-
sonal nature. However, marriage, divorce
and inheritance are matters which require
justice and equity for everyone on a univer-
sal basis. Islam established impressive stan-
dards of justice and rights in the 7t h c e n t u r y
but Muslims need to catch up with develop-
ments on the world stage. It is high time to
debunk dubious claims to cultural authen-
ticity as a legitimate basis for human rights,
and instead engage Muslims in a dialogue
for partnership in a world order based on
equal and universal rights. 
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* I worked for more than a year with Shaykh Khamisi
Hamza, the k a d h i of the primary court at the
village of Mkokotoni. Shaykh Khamisi was trained
in Zanzibar and in Tanga, a coastal city on the
Tanzanian mainland. 
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Ea st Af r i ca
E R I N  S T I L E S
In Zanzibar, all family law matters are handled in Islam-
ic courts. Most of these concern marital disputes. Field
research on disputes and court cases shows that it is
difficult to understand judicial decision-making with-
out considering the cultural context of the cases; court
documents often do not tell the whole story. One area
of particular interest is under what circumstances a
judge, called a kadhi in Kiswahili, will uphold social
norms or cultural practices that he actually considers
religiously unlawful. A recent example from a rural
court shows how a kadhi uses the principle of fairness
and the attribution of fault to allow such a practice.  
Buying a Divorce
i n Z a n z i b a r
Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous island-state
of Tanzania with its own president, parlia-
ment and legal system. K a d h is have been
arbitrating disputes for at least two cen-
turies, and the Islamic courts were most re-
cently established at the primary and ap-
pellate levels by the Kadhi Act of 1985. The
courts have jurisdiction over all family and
personal status matters for Zanzibar's Mus-
lims, who make up over 95% of the approx-
imately one million inhabitants. Decisions
of the primary courts may be appealed to
the Chief Kadhi, whose office is in the High
Court in Zanzibar town. Family law is not
codified, and most Zanzibaris, k a d h is in-
cluded, are S h a f ici.
There are nine primary Islamic courts on
the islands – three on the northernmost is-
land of Pemba and six on the southern is-
land of Unguja. Primary k a d h is are selected
by the Chief Kadhi based on their reputa-
tion as religious scholars. As there is no
mandatory training or educational pre-
requisites for acquiring the post, the k a d h is
have a variety of educational backgrounds.
The jurisdiction of the Islamic courts is
limited to family and personal status mat-
ters and the vast majority of cases opened
concern marital disputes. Of these, mainte-
nance disputes, divorce suits, and hus-
bands' pleas for the return of absent wives
are common. Men in Zanzibar have the un-
attenuated right to divorce their wives uni-
laterally through repudiation, and women
may file for divorce in the courts. The latter
are granted a divorce on a variety of
grounds, the most common being deser-
tion and lack of maintenance. About 65% of
all cases in the courts are opened by
w o m e n .
Opening a case follows a fairly regular
procedure. One interesting precondition is
a mandatory reference letter from a local
community leader, or s h e h a. S h e h as preside
over groups of villages in the rural areas
and over urban neighbourhoods in towns,
and their role is an interesting one in the re-
cent history of Zanzibar. In the past they
were selected from within their communi-
ties by elders, but today are appointed by
the government and are thus most often
acknowledged supporters of the ruling po-
litical party. Although they have no formal
training in either religious or secular law,
s h e h as are in principle responsible for all
types of community dispute resolution;
people with marital disputes bring their is-
sues to the s h e h a before opening a case in
the k a d h i court. 
Although only the k a d h i may decide
cases and issue judgments, or h u k u m u,
clerks have an important role in court pro-
cedure. Once a claimant has a referral letter
from his or her s h e h a, the dispute is pre-
sented to the clerk, who determines
whether or not the issue is suitable for the
k a d h i court. If a case is opened, the clerks
aid in the preparation of the plaintiff's offi-
cial claim, the m a d a i, and the defendant's
counterclaim, the majibu ya madai. They
also schedule court dates, manage case
files, write summons, and explain proce-
dure to litigants, their families, and witness-
es. Clerks are not required to have any spe-
cial religious or legal training, but most
have finished secondary school. 
Case study
Shaykh Khamisi* comes to court by boat
every Monday through Thursday. He arrives
early in the morning and hears cases until
the early afternoon. On average, he hears
about three cases each week. It is not unusu-
al for a case to remain open for many
months, and disputants often come to court
several times.
One interesting case was opened in Octo-
ber 1999 by a woman in her fifties named
Mosa. She explained that her husband, Juma,
did not provide adequate maintenance for
her and her children, some of whom were
from a previous marriage. When describing
her problems, she emphasized that Juma re-
fused to support the children from her first
marriage. She said that she had not asked him
for a divorce, but that Juma had previously
asked her for money to divorce her; although
this is a fairly common practice in Zanzibar, it
is considered unlawful by religious experts. 
While preparing her madai, the court clerk
asked if she and her husband got along, and
gave examples of the kind of strife they might
have – foul language, arguing, or rudeness.
Although Mosa agreed that they did not get
along well, she stressed that her main prob-
lem was lack of a house, inadequate food, and
the fact that Juma did not support all of her
children. In the madai, however, the clerk
highlighted their inability to get along and
Juma's bad language. The document referred
to maintenance problems only in a general
way. 
When Juma was summoned, he argued
that he had done nothing wrong and that
their marital problems stemmed from Mosa
leaving him for no reason. His counterclaim
stated that he had not verbally abused Mosa,
and that she blamed him for negligence to
hide the fact that she had left him. It also stat-
ed that he wanted her back. 
They came to court together a week later,
and Mosa argued that she did not receive any
clothing and the food that Juma provided
was not sufficient to feed all of her children.
Juma countered that he was blameless and
that they began having problems when Mosa
left him. He also claimed that he had prob-
lems with her children, because they were
disrespectful and foul mouthed. When the
kadhi asked him about his demand for money
for a divorce, Juma replied that he had indeed
asked because she was away for such a long
time, but that now he no longer wanted a di-
vorce. 
Shaykh Khamisi heard witnesses and decid-
ed the case the following week. He told Mosa
that both she and Juma had made mistakes,
and ruled that they must try living together
again. His written judgment was in the form
of masharti, or terms that each person must
follow. This is typical in cases where the kadhi
thinks the couple capable of reconciliation.
Although it was not written that Mosa return
to Juma, Shaykh Khamisi explained that she
would be expected to do so. Although Juma
was ordered to improve his behaviour and
support her, he was not ordered to support
the children who were not his own because
he had no legal responsibility for them. 
Three months later, Juma came to court
claiming that Mosa was not fulfilling her
terms. He brought a letter from the sheha
stating that Mosa was not upholding her end
of the terms of the judgment. Mosa showed
up two days later, claiming that Juma still did
not maintain her properly. The kadhi listened,
but strongly reminded her that she must first
go to the sheha if she has marital problems, as
it was set out in the ruling. 
When they came to court together the fol-
lowing week, Shaykh Khamisi told them that
they had 'two laws' to fulfil: maintaining the
terms set by the court and going to the sheha
if they have problems – failure to do so was a
violation of court orders. He decided that they
must try to live together one more time and
that if Mosa could not bring herself to live
with Juma, she must buy her divorce in a
court-ordered khul – when a wife compen-
sates her husband for a divorce, usually by re-
turning the marriage gift, or mahari. 
The k a d h i's final words
Mosa did not return to Juma, and two
weeks later Shaykh Khamisi ordered her to
buy her divorce. She agreed, but much de-
bate ensued about how much she would
pay. Juma asked for 70,000 shillings, but the
k a d h i told him he was breaking the law by
asking for more than he paid as m a h a r i.
However, he did permit them to negotiate
the amount, and eventually the sum was set
at 25,000 shillings – still greater than the
original m a h a r i. 
Shaykh Khamisi explained that he allowed
the negotiation because they had b o t h
caused problems in the marriage. Since
Mosa no longer wanted to be married to
Juma, but he wanted her, she must buy the
divorce with a k h u l. Since she was not with-
out blame in their marital strife and had bro-
ken court orders, fairness dictated that she
pay more than her m a h a r i. 
This case shows Shaykh Khamisi's justifi-
cation of a local norm that he considers reli-
giously unlawful. He allowed Juma to re-
ceive more financial compensation than his
original m a h a r i payment because he
deemed Mosa to have broken procedural
regularities and to be at fault in the mar-
riage by leaving him and allowing her chil-
dren to misbehave. He allowed this type of
negotiation in a number of other cases as
well, and justified it in the same way – as a
wife at significant fault in a failing marriage.
It is interesting to note that other k a d h is and
scholars have different ways of handling
this type of situation. Some insist that they
would not allow such negotiation at all
while others justified it religiously. Shaykh
Khamisi, however, had often mentioned
that a Zanzibari k a d h i was not able to apply
sheria za dini (Islamic law) in full, and that al-
though many scholars rejected the position
when it was offered to them because of this,
he himself had accepted the position mind-
ful of that aspect of the job. 
Courthouse at
M k o k o t o n i
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Although Russia is widely associated with Orthodox
Christianity, it accommodates almost 15 million Mus-
lims in its federally organized state. The major Islam-
ic enclaves of the Russian Federation are situated in
the Volga-Urals and the North Caucasus. Following
the fall of Communism Russia's Islamic regions have
experienced a revival of Islam, enhanced by ideolog-
ical voids, centrifugal political processes and the
shifting sands of civil society. The autonomous re-
publics of Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals and Dagestan
in the North Caucasus exemplify two distinctive
models of a relationship between Islam and power in
the post-Communist u m m a. The following draws on
the findings of a three-year research project funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK)
entitled 'Islam, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-So-
viet Tatarstan and Dagestan'.
Islam and Power 
in Post-Communist
Islamic Russia
In spite of the official separation between
the state and religion, as declared by the
1992 Constitution, the Shaimiev govern-
ment supported de facto an increasing role
for Islam in Tatar politics. It perceived the
DUMRT as an indispensable attribute of
Tatarstan's sovereignty and national distinc-
t i v e n e s s . In February 1998 Tatarstan officials
orchestrated the unifying congress of
Tatarstan Muslims and promoted Gusman
Iskhakov as the mufti of Tatarstan. Since
then the government has discreetly sup-
ported Mufti Iskhakov's policy aimed at
making Kazan the Islamic capital of Eurasia
and centralizing Tatarstan's Islamic commu-
nities under the DUMRT's auspices in oppo-
sition to the Ufa Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov.
In July 1999 the authorities adopted a new
law on 'The Freedom of Consciousness and
Religious Formations', recognizing the
DUMRT as the only legitimate Islamic ad-
ministration in the republic. The formal dis-
play of loyalty has allowed Mufti Iskhakov to
enhance his personal power and to place his
relatives and associates in the major local Is-
lamic administrations of Tatarstan. He also
introduced new registration rules for Islamic
communities which rendered the status of
Mufti Talgat Tadjuddinov's followers illegal. 
In addition to forging special relations
with the m u f t i y a t, Tatarstan authorities have
promoted Islamic themes in official sym-
bols, architecture, monuments and design.
The strengthening of the symbolic function
of Islam has been accompanied by some at-
tempts to revive its ideological function. To
this end the leading Tatar official ideologist,
R. Khakimov, has advocated the restoration
of Tatar reformist Islam or Jadidism as a vi-
able basis for the Tatar national ideas. He in-
troduced the concept of EuroIslam, de-
scribed as a neo-Jadidism, which would ar-
guably permit the resolution of the appar-
ently inevitable conflict between formally
Muslim Tatarstan and allegedly Islamopho-
bic Europe. 
On the whole, however, the impact of
Islam on Tatarstan's official politics has been
more symbolic than genuine. Islam has been
regarded as a vital component of Tatarness
while Tatarstan society has remained over-
whelmingly secular. As for the religious Is-
lamic revival, it has been weak and has had
only a marginal impact on political and pub-
lic life. 
D a g e s t a n
In Dagestan the influence of Islam in the
policy-making process has been much more
prominent than in Tatarstan, due in part to
the substantially higher level of religiosity of
the population. Another reason is the much
deeper economic crisis, aggravated by Da-
gestan's close proximity to war-stricken and
intensively Islamicized Chechnya. Dagestani
society has relatively strong communal,
ethno-clan and religious ties which super-
sede individual rights and values. Most
Dagestanis are Sunnis of the Shafii rite, al-
though the Nogays of northern Dagestan
adhere to the Hanafi rite. It is also significant
that the majority of Dagestani Muslims pro-
fess mystical Islam – Sufism of Naqshbandi,
Shadhili, Dzhazuli, Kadiri, and Yasawi orders.
Local Sufism absorbed various pre-Islamic
beliefs and practices and became deeply in-
tegrated into the traditional community
system. As a result, there emerged a particu-
lar regional form of Sufism, known as
T a r i q a t i s m .
Compared to Tatarstan, in Dagestan Islam
has remained a pivotal social and cultural
regulator. Its survival, although mainly in its
popular Sufi form, is due to Dagestan's sig-
nificantly lower scale of industrialization, ur-
banization and resulting secularization, and
the overwhelming numerical superiority of
Muslims over non-Muslims. During the Sovi-
et period the traditional community and
clan-based Dagestani society absorbed So-
viet collectivism and Party centralism and
approximated the Islamic Communist model
advocated by Sultan-Galiev and other Islam-
ic Communists of the 1920s. Consequently,
the bulk of Dagestanis were devastated by
the break-up of the USSR and subsequent
de-Sovietization of Dagestan. Nonetheless,
the Soviet political system persisted in
Dagestan until 1995 and the Communists
maintained their popularity until the late
1990s, much longer than anywhere else in
Russia. 
The breakdown of the Soviet economic
and industrial complex and the drop in fed-
eral subsidies brought about extreme hard-
ships to Dagestanis, aggravated by the war
in neighbouring Chechnya. Among its worst
consequences have been the mass impov-
erishment and desolation, the spread of mil-
itary and terrorist activity on Dagestani ter-
ritory and the proliferation of a culture of vi-
olence and lawlessness. These factors have
created a fertile breeding ground for ex-
tremism, both religious and political. Like
Chechnya, Dagestan has been overwhelmed
by a wave of terrorism, including political
assassinations and kidnappings in return for
ransoms. 
The failure of ethno-nationalists to gener-
ate a viable opposition to the corrupt and
ineffective Dagestani government encour-
aged popular Islamic protest. This was chan-
nelled largely into the Islamic fundamental-
ist movement, known as Salafism, or Wah-
habism. By 1999 about 7 to 9% of Dagestani
Muslims had succumbed to the increasingly
popular Wahhabism. On several occasions
during the 1990s Wahhabi leaders demon-
strated their ability to mobilize their follow-
ers for the struggle against the injustice and
lawlessness associated with the ruling
regime. In response, the Dagestani authori-
ties opted for ruthless political and adminis-
trative suppression of Wahhabism altogeth-
er. 
The common anti-Wahhabi stance had
brought together the Dagestani government
and the Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Dagestana (DUMD, Spiritual Board of Mus-
lims of Dagestan), controlled by the Avar
ethnic party, and in particular, by the
Naqshbandi w i r d (t a r i q a branch) of Shaykh
Sayid-Efendi Aytseev (Chirkeevskii). In 1997,
as a result of pressure from the latter, the
authorities institutionalized Tariqatism as
the only legitimate and traditional form of
Islam in Dagestan, banning Wahhabism.
Many Wahhabi leaders were arrested, their
offices demolished and periodicals closed.
The Dagestan pro-government mass media
has launched an anti-Wahhabi propaganda
campaign, presenting Wahhabis exclusively
as foreign, mainly Saudi and British merce-
naries, despite the fact that many are in-
digenous Dagestanis. Furthermore, the term
Wahhabi has been applied to any represen-
tative of the opposition, irrespective of his
or her religious orientation.
This resolute anti-Wahhabi position of t h e
official authorities of Dagestan has also
been enhanced by the Chechen and Moscow
factors. The Dagestani authorities feared
that the proliferation of Wahhabism in
Dagestan would facilitate the Chechen radi-
cals' plan to unite Chechnya and Dagestan
into a single Islamic state, ruled by Wahhabi
Chechens. On the other hand, under the
conditions of protracted military conflict be-
tween Moscow and Chechnya, Dagestan's
official denunciation of Wahhabism has pro-
vided important leverage for the continuing
inflow of federal subsidies to Makhachkala.
For example, as a reward for their unam-
biguous support for Moscow during the
abortive Chechen-Wahhabi invasion of
Dagestan in August and September 1999,
federal financial support for the republic has
increased by 270%. Since then the leaders of
Dagestan have carefully attuned their
rhetoric and actions to the policies of Presi-
dent Putin, who tends to equate Wah-
habism with Islamic extremism and interna-
tional terrorism. 
The ongoing official physical and ideolog-
ical warfare against Wahhabism has secured
for Sufism the position of official traditional
Islam. However, given the deep interweav-
ing of Sufism with primordial social net-
works based on clan solidarity, it is unlikely
that it could provide a plausible ideological
framework for the future modernization
and democratization of Dagestani society.
Moreover, the prolongation of the current
economic and social disorder, on the one
hand, and the association of Sufism with a
semi-criminal and inefficient regime, on the
other, might continue to generate increas-
ing receptiveness to Salafi Islam, which
could come to be regarded as the last resort
for socially and economically alienated
members of the ex-Soviet Dagestani u m m a .
Galina Yemelianova is a research fellow at the Centre
for Russian and East European Studies and the
Theology Department at the University of
Birmingham, UK. 
E-mail: g.yemelianova@bham.ac.uk 
In post-Soviet Tatarstan Islam has become
an organic part of the Tatar national revival.
Historically the ancestors of the modern
Tatars were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi r i t e .
The Tatars' four-and-a-half centuries of exis-
tence within the Russian Orthodox political
and cultural environment has rendered
'Tatar' and 'Islam' practically synonymous.
The Islamic renaissance among Tatars has
been hampered by high levels of urbaniza-
tion and secularization, and the bi-national
nature of Tatarstan's society. These circum-
stances are responsible for the idea, among
dissident Tatar nationalists, of re-integrating
Islam into the fabric of Tatar society, repre-
sented by the Vsetatarskii Obshestvenni
Tsentr (VTOTS, All-Tatar Public Centre), the
party of Ittifaq (Union), Milli Mejlis (National
Assembly) and Azatlyk (Freedom). After the
abortive anti-Gorbachev coup d'état in Au-
gust 1991, the Tatar nationalists received
carte blanche from Tatarstan President
Shaimiev, who manipulated them in order
to avoid inevitable repercussions from
Moscow due to his backing of the anti-
Yeltsin camp. 
During the period of amicable relations
between the official Tatar establishment
and the Tatar nationalists, lasting from
1989 till 1994, the government in Kazan
(capital of Tatarstan) responded favourably
to the nationalists' main Islam-related aspi-
rations. In particular, it encouraged the
emergence of a separate Islamic adminis-
tration – Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Respubliki Tatarstan (DUMRT, Islamic Spiri-
tual Board of the Republic of Tatarstan),
which declared its independence from the
all-Russian federal Islamic administration,
the Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man
Evropeiskoi Rossii i Sibiri (DUMES, Islamic
Spiritual Board of the European Part of Rus-
sia and Siberia), based in Ufa. 
The 1994 power-sharing treaty between
Moscow and Kazan, which secured wider au-
tonomy for the Tatarstan leadership, put an
end to the alliance between the establish-
ment and the Tatar nationalists. Shaimiev's
team opted for the formation of a democrat-
ically camouflaged, moderate ethnocratic
regime which necessitated the neutralization
of the Tatar national opposition. This includ-
ed the co-optation of the nationalists' most
intelligent representatives, the formation of
the official duplicate national organizations
and the incorporation of some nationalist
ideas into the official ideology. For example,
in opposition to the Milli Mejlis the Shaimiev
government sponsored the formation of a
tame Vsetatarskii Mezhdunarodnii Congress
(All-Tatar World Congress) under the leader-
ship of Indus Tagirov. It also appropriated na-
tionalist policies in areas such as language,
education, and especially religion (e.g.
restoration and building of mosques, open-
ing an Islamic University, Islamic colleges and
madrasas). 
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N o t e s
1 . The full text of this declaration is found on the
website of the Islamic Circle of North America,
w w w . i c n a . o r g .
2 . Kathleen Moore, Al-Mughtaribun: American Law
and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United
States (Albany: State University of Albany Press,
1995), 139.
3 . The presentation of the aims of this project is
taken from the Newsletter of the Middle East
Institute of Columbia University (June 2001); see
h t t p : / / s i p a . c o l u m b i a . e d u / R E G I O N A L / m e i /
4 . See e.g., Abdelhamid Lotfi, 'Creating Muslim Space
in the USA: Masajid and Islamic Centers', Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations 12/2 (2001): 236–54;
and Jerrilynn D. Dodds & Edward Grazda, New York
Masjid: The Mosques of New York City (New York:
Powerhouse Books, 2002).
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No r th Amer i ca
N E G U I N  Y A V AR I  M u s l i m
Communities in
New York City
From the mundane to the existential, and al-
most nine months after 11 September, Mus-
lims in New York are grappling with funda-
mental dilemmas. Muslim communities
turned inward, and what followed was a re-
surfacing of the same isolationist trend that
was visible in the wake of the 1993 World
Trade Center bombings. In response to the
concomitant hostile rhetoric and the in-
creased hostility, what are Muslim commu-
nities doing to alleviate the immediate
threats in the short run, and to promote tol-
eration and respect for their traditions in the
f u t u r e ?
Several Muslim associations in and around
New York produced a statement1 c o n d e m n-
ing the attacks, and expressed solidarity
with the families of victims, their 'fellow
Americans' as they called them. Apart from
university campuses, the most visible and
successful support for Muslim communities
in this city is generated by religious organi-
zations, justified along religious lines, and
expressed in religious discourse. Healing is
promoted in church gatherings, and anti-vi-
olence messages are conveyed from pulpits
in churches, synagogues, and mosques. The
essential political message is universalized
along religious lines: all religions are sus-
ceptible to hijacking by fanatical fringe
groups; all religions are prone to misrepre-
sentation; the majority of the adherents of
all major religions shun violence and ex-
tremism; and Islam, as opposed to the es-
sentially un-Islamic dogma of Usama bin
Laden and his supporters, is no exception.
This inherently religious response to the
events of 11 September is indicative of sev-
eral trends. First among them is the steady
chiselling at the separation of church and
state, evidenced throughout the American
political landscape since the 1980s. From
the pro-life movement to the appointment
of staunchly religious officials to various
governmental positions, the religious right
in the Untied States is on the ascendancy. In
the meantime Muslim communities in
America have capitalized on existing pat-
terns of religious participation in civic life to
foster the development of religious net-
works and organizations to channel the ar-
ticulation of Muslim identity. In her study on
the transformation of Muslim life in the
United States in its multivalent encounter
with the American legal system, Kathleen
Moore has focused on the evolution of Mus-
lim identity in the US as communities settle
into a visible and self-conscious religious
minority, depending on the American state
for protection. 'By virtue of the legislation of
federal hate crimes statutes, the interests
and rights of Muslims, including the security
of religious property, have become a pro-
tected category. Presumably, the state is
empowered to safeguard mosques and
Muslim practices from the inherent risks
raised by their increased visibility, in be-
coming targets of animus directed toward
the Islamic world, and Muslims who report
the incidence of such crimes acquiesce in
the recognition of the capability of the state
to do so. Similarly, increased contact with
neighborhood groups and municipal poli-
tics has been part of the Muslim experience
in establishing mosques, and has brought
out the human factor in the social processes
of determining important spatial relation-
ships. Such legal practices, deciding how
things get done, serve as a mediating and
transformative link.'2
Filling gaps in research
Scholarly interest in American Muslim
communities intensified in the 1990s, and
the consensus of the field tilted in the direc-
tion of increased integration and participa-
tion in civic life. But this surge of interest,
with its prescriptive implications, found it-
self at once lacking in essential demograph-
ic data and in-depth field studies based on
close contact with the concentrations of
Muslim communities in various states. 
The 'Muslims in New York City Project'3 – a
collaborative research project conducted by
the Middle East Institute and the Center for
Urban Research and Policy at Columbia Uni-
versity – to which the rest of this article is
dedicated, was a major response to this
need. It set out to identify and map Muslim
communities in New York City and collect
data on the attitudes of Muslim New Yorkers
toward the social, civic and political life of
the city, and their participation in New York
public space. Between 1998 and 1999, a re-
search team of graduate students can-
vassed nearly every neighbourhood in the
city's five boroughs to record the location of
mosques, Muslim-owned stores, profession-
al offices, and service and cultural centres.
With this information, researchers forged
networks to recruit community members
for interviews. They observed the patterns
by which immigrant Muslims have joined a
small but well-established and active com-
munity of African American Muslims whose
presence in the city dates back at least 70
years. Twenty years ago there were fewer
than 20 mosques in New York. Today, there
are at least 80 mosques in Brooklyn and
Queens alone, a world-renowned Islamic
centre in Manhattan, and a major philan-
thropic organization headquartered in Ja-
maica, Queens.4
In the summer of 2000, the project con-
vened 27 focus groups with over 200 Mus-
lim New Yorkers to ascertain their attitudes
toward community and civic engagement,
and to probe the processes by which minor-
ity identities are formed. Muslim New York-
ers are grappling with problems of assimila-
tion to the mainstream secular American
culture while attempting to ensure continu-
ity of tradition through the creation of phil-
anthropic and educational institutions to
transmit culture and tradition to younger
generations. At the same time, they are
learning to 'manage' in New York through
interfaith dialogue, political coalition-build-
ing and cooperation with their neighbours
of all faiths and backgrounds in order to im-
prove the quality of life in the city. The initial
findings of the focus groups were presented
in a panel at the annual meeting of the Mid-
dle East Studies Association of North Ameri-
ca in San Francisco in November 2001. In
March 2002, the Muslim Communities of
New York Project co-sponsored a confer-
ence organized by The Muslim Women's In-
stitute for Research Development on 'Con-
textualizing Islam in the United States: A
Charge for Muslim Women Scholar-Ac-
tivists', identifying their target audience as
'Muslim women willing to engage in the dis-
cipline of Islamic scholarship that motivates
to action'.
The challenges confronting the project or-
ganizers since its inception were a micro-
cosm of the dilemmas facing the Muslim
communities of New York. As mentioned at
the outset, in conceptualizing the project,
the conveners decided to map Muslim com-
munities, and not simply ethnic minorities
whose worldviews are informed, in radically
diverging ways, within the cultural confines
of multiple permutations of Islam. In so
doing, however, the project has had to
grapple with the underlying tensions be-
tween spiritually religious Muslims and cul-
turally religious ones, assuming that the lat-
ter also wish to be represented within the
rubric of Islam. Participants in this project
are acutely aware of the misleading lopsid-
edness such an appellation might produce.
Another important consideration is that of
segregated focus groups, which brings us to
the question of American, or perhaps demo-
cratic political discourse. An overwhelming
majority of the participants in these focus
groups did not choose to articulate political
demands in local terms. Loyal to the lan-
guage of politics in their homelands, their
concern if at all political, was with overarch-
ing, macro-level issues, foreign policy, prej-
udice, and bigotry. 
Silent women: further
research questions
On taxes, social security benefits, pension
plans, mortgage and interest rates, fiscal
policy, educational initiatives, budgetary
concerns, on all those wide ranges of issues
that define local politics and safeguard
democracy in America, our Muslim women
fall silent. Are they silent women, are they
silent Muslims, are they Muslims and there-
fore silent, or are they highly politicized
Muslim citizens who reveal in their respons-
es more the organizational shortcomings of
the focus group than an organic Muslim
self? Are women who are willing to identify
themselves as harbouring Muslim proclivi-
ties, by definition therefore etching their au-
tobiographical horizons along norms and
metaphors that in their own minds echo
those of their Islam? In narrating their
selves, pasts, and ambitions, are they emu-
lating an imagined Muslim ideal?
These and related questions form the crux
of my area of research in this project, still in
its preliminary stages. I am focusing on the
religious and spiritual organization and ac-
tivities of Iranian Muslim women in New
York City. The majority of Iranian women in
this city who were born outside the United
States left Iran in the aftermath of the 1979
Islamic Revolution, and most of them did
not choose to cooperate with the focus
groups organized by this project. Their per-
sonal and professional lives disrupted by a
religious revolution, these women nonethe-
less express affinity with myriad religious
and spiritual organizations in the city; this in
spite of their reluctance to regard Islam as a
defining component of their identity. How
do these women participate in such activi-
ties, and how do they articulate their reli-
gious affiliation? Even at this preliminary
stage I have found conflicting voices and
contradictory descriptions of how women
define their identity and how they relate
their everyday conduct to the principles es-
poused by organizations and communities
to which they belong or towards which they
feel a sense of affinity and loyalty. By focus-
ing on a small community in some detail,
bearing in mind the artificial and at times ad
hoc taxonomies and dividing lines imposed
from the outside, I hope my report will re-
flect the changing attitudes and outlook of
these women, many of whom lived through
almost two years of revolutionary turmoil in
their country of origin and, just over two
decades later, a calamitous day in their
adopted city. 
The lives of Muslims in America changed on 11
September 2001. The initial reactions of panic, guilt,
defiance, and confusion, were accompanied in sub-
sequent days with physical threats and hostile acts
against Muslims. An opinion piece in the New York
T i m e s arguing that Muslims hate us not for what we
do but for what we are was widely quoted in the
media. Veiled women did not appear in public, sever-
al students on our campus left theirs at home. A great
number of scholars of the Middle East and the Islam-
ic world shouted themselves hoarse insisting that
there existed a direct correlation between US foreign
policy and the events of 11 September, and others
reiterated their anti-liberal stance by pointing an ac-
cusing finger at what they regarded as their fellow
academics' failure to warn the public about inevitable
threats from the outside. Vigilance became the pre-
scriptive word aimed at both New York landlords and
college professors. 
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South As i a
MU H A MM A D  K H A L I D  MA S U D
In 1947, when Pakistan came into being, there were
only two university departments of social sciences:
one in history and one in economics. More depart-
ments were established in the 1960s when research
in sociology and social work expanded. Although the
growth of social sciences was still slow – until 1983
there were only 34 social science departments in all
the Pakistani universities – the range of social sci-
ences expanded to include (apart from economics
and history) departments of political science, psy-
chology, international relations, social work, and an-
thropology. The state began employing social scien-
tists in its activities of planning and finance. The gov-
ernment also established research institutions in the
fields of economics, foreign affairs, administration,
and development economics. 
The State
of Social Sciences 
in Pakistan
In 1983, there were approximately 16,000
graduates in the social sciences in the coun-
try, mostly (97%) employed in the public
s e c t o r .1 Very few foreign social scientists
were working in Pakistan, and the indige-
nization of the social sciences was not yet
an issue for most Pakistani social scientists
in this period. 
Development of social sciences depart-
ments accelerated between 1983 and 2001.
The number of departments in this period
rose from 34 to 110 and the number of
teachers from 191 to 851. In this growth,
economics still figured prominently. 
U n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t
Most Pakistani social scientists are dissat-
isfied with the development of social sci-
ences in the country. In their view, the un-
derdevelopment of this field has to do with
the historical setting in which the Pakistani
state and society came to be defined in ide-
ological terms. Since the first decade of the
existence of the Pakistani state, finance, de-
fence and the constitution comprised the
list of priorities. Continual migration of the
Muslim population from India to Pakistan,
the constant state of war with India, and for-
midable economic challenges did not allow
education and research the attention they
deserved. Military regimes, which have
dominated the political scene in Pakistan
since 1958, and the civil governments, dur-
ing the intermittent periods, which were
supported by authoritarian bureaucracy, re-
inforced a general sense of insecurity and
the need for an ideological identity for the
state and society as the only basis of nation-
al solidarity. 
As an ideological state, regardless of
whether it was defined in secular or Islamist
terms, Pakistani authorities developed a
general fear that freedom of expression and
inquiry might lead to disunity and anarchy.
They distrusted independent and critical
thinking. The solidarity of the state, thus, re-
quired submission to an official version of
history, society and religion, which came to
be known as Nazriyyai Pakistan (the ideolo-
gy of Pakistan). It was considered the duty
of the state, particularly of the Pakistani mil-
itary and bureaucracy, to defend not only
the geographical but also the ideological
frontiers of the state.
The politically powerful conservative
groups within the state structure of Pakistan
also pose themselves as the sole guardians
of the Pakistani tradition and its values.
They dogmatize culture and religion in their
conservative traditional values. Conse-
quently, they support and influence state
institutions to discourage scientific outlook,
critical thinking, reasoning, questioning of
the status quo, challenging traditions and
authority. These groups determine the di-
rection of scientific activity and allocation of
resources to various disciplines and sub-dis-
ciplines in the social sciences. 
Consequently, throughout Pakistan's more
than 54 years of existence, education and
manpower development never received the
priority they have been given in other newly
independent countries. It is only since the
1990s that literacy, health, nutrition, and so-
cial equality, including gender equality, have
been included in the Human Development
Index. Defence-related sciences, however,
are still on the priority list in the budget allo-
cation. Analysing this state of affairs, Hassan
Nawaz Gardezi, a Pakistani social scientist, re-
marked that '[t]he power structure, which as-
signs extremely low priority to social indica-
tors and high priority to building atomic
bombs and missiles, is seriously flawed.
Should not human development be the pri-
mary value to guide scientific activity in Pak-
i s t a n ? '
The state of social sciences
In 1988, social scientists at the Quaid-i-
Azam University (Islamabad), the Centre for
the Study of Central Asian Civilization (Is-
lamabad), and the University Grants Com-
mission, organized a joint conference in Is-
lamabad to discuss the state of social sci-
ences and the causational factors of their
underdevelopment in Pakistan. The confer-
ence recommended the establishment of
the Pakistan Social Science Research Coun-
cil to promote research in the social sci-
ences. The conference was very critical of
the state of social sciences in Pakistan. The
following lines reflect the general tenor of
this criticism.2
Pakistani social sciences have not made
any significant contribution to the cumula-
tive growth of social scientific knowledge.
Generally, the social sciences in Pakistan
lack theoretical orientation and a theoreti-
cal framework. The latter, when indeed
used, is not subjected to a critical assess-
ment. A superficial, speculative journalistic
style of analysis of political events (political
science, foreign policy, international rela-
tions), chronology divorced from social sci-
ence and history, and the rationalization of
events on the basis of charisma and individ-
ual attributes of political personalities, re-
main standard traits of Pakistan's social sci-
e n t i s t s. While some of the speculative, his-
torical and legal-formal analysis has come to
the Pakistani social sciences from the in-
digenous intellectual tradition, abstracted
empiricism or hyper-factualism has come
from a superficial understanding of Western
sciences, both natural and social, through
training of social scientists in the West. 
The import of abstracted empiricism has
been accompanied by the import of re-
search techniques developed in the social
sciences in the West, which are not often ap-
propriate for gathering facts in an illiterate
s o c i e t y .
Social sciences in Pakistan largely suffer
from the twin ills of xenophilia and ethno-
centrism: the former emerging from Pak-
istani society's quest for modelling educa-
tion on Anglo Saxon intellectual and cultur-
al traditions, and the latter from its indige-
nous intellectual culture and special circum-
stances of its emergence as a separate
country from India. The latter is particularly
manifest in the teaching and research in the
fields of Islamic history and Pakistani stud-
ies. 
Some Pakistani social scientists have called
for an Islamization of the social sciences,
which in some sense could be seen as an at-
tempt to indigenize the social sciences, but
in another sense they also reflect a particular
Pakistani ethnocentrism. Islamic social scien-
tists argue that the modern social sciences
and their fundamental epistemology are
Western innovations and alien to Islamic cul-
ture. Pakistan has adopted modern social sci-
ences as structured and classified in the
West. However, the value context in which
they operate limits their full acceptance and
flourishing in the Pakistani environment.
Nevertheless, among the Islamized social sci-
ences, only Islamic economics has achieved
some advancement, while other fields like Is-
lamic anthropology and Islamic sociology
have not progressed further than a change of
labels. The proposed approaches have raised
serious methodological questions, because
they are developed in normative and pre-
scriptive terms. They do not aim to explain
social realities, ignore the question of appar-
ent incompatibility between scientific and
religious knowledge, and subordinate the so-
cial sciences to religious beliefs. 
Furthermore, it is also difficult to speak of
social sciences in Pakistan in a collective
sense. Each discipline within the social sci-
ences in Pakistan is developing in isolation
both in terms of teaching and research. This
segmented development has made the sci-
entific knowledge of Pakistani society un-
balanced. Development in Pakistan has
generally come to be viewed merely as eco-
nomic development, a narrow and unbal-
anced view of development of a society.
The participants in the conference found
two main causes for the underdevelopment
of social sciences in Pakistan. First, bureau-
cratic, authoritarian, insecure, modernizing
and dependent states like Pakistan produce
technocratic, apolitical, tame, hyper-factual
and empiricist social sciences. Second, the
cultural outlook of the religious authorities,
though an indirect and subtle factor, gener-
ates fears of committing apostasy and
heresy, or being condemned for doing so by
religious authorities. Researchers tend to
avoid public controversy and disapproval.
Consequently, the Pakistani social scientists
have not played a significant role and have
been marginal with respect to the planning
process in Pakistan. 
Among other things, the conference rec-
ommended the establishment of the Pak-
istan Social Science Research Council to pro-
mote research in this field.
The Council of Social Sciences
The Council of Social Sciences (COSS) for-
mally came into existence in June 2000 with
a charter that defines it as a service-oriented
and autonomous organization of social sci-
entists. It aims to contribute to the building
and strengthening of an autonomous com-
munity of social scientists and to the en-
hancement of their knowledge and skills.
The Council promotes a scientific way of
analysing problems among the citizens of
Pakistan. It aims to advance a pluralistic ap-
proach in the social sciences while remain-
ing committed to objectivity, rationality and
creativity. More than one hundred social sci-
entists in Pakistan and abroad have regis-
tered themselves as members of the Coun-
cil. The Council offers the following publica-
t i o n s :
The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan,
edited by S.H. Hashmi (Islamabad:
Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan,
2001). It is in fact a reprint edition of the
proceedings of the above-mentioned
1988 conference on the state of social
sciences. In addition to general essays on
the state of social sciences, the book also
contains assessments of the development
of specific subjects, such as psychology,
history, political science, sociology,
economics, public administration,
international relations, education,
Pakistan studies, American studies, and
African studies, in the Pakistani
universities. The book covers the period
between 1947 and 1983. The COSS
continuously updates this survey in its
Bulletin (see below) and plans to update
the book.
Bulletin of the Council of Social Sciences,
P a k i s t a n , edited by Dr Inayatullah,
D r Zarina Salamat and Zafarullah Khan.
This quarterly bulletin contains reports on
the activities of the COSS and of the social
sciences in Pakistan. More significantly it
reports on the developments in social
sciences in Pakistan, listing research
programmes, published books and
periodical literature. The bulletin is also
available on the COSS website.
N o t e s
1 . Statistical data in this essay is from the Bulletin of
the Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan, no. 2 (2001).
2 . See for instance, Dr Inayatullah, 'Social Sciences in
Pakistan: An Evaluation', in S. H. Hashmi (ed.),
T h e State of Social Sciences in Pakistan ( I s l a m a b a d :
Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan, 2001), 1–68.
For more information contact:




Fax: +92(0)51 227 58 03
www.coss.sdnpk.org 
Prof. Muhammad Khalid Masud is ISIM Academic
Director and ISIM Chair at Leiden University.
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For more information on specific IGWS events,
workshops, conferences, the fellows' and scholars'
programme, visit the IGWS website:
www.aucegypt.edu/igws or write to
i g w s @ a u c e g y p t . e d u .
To join H-GENDER-MIDEAST, please send a message
from the account where you wish to receive mail, to:
listserv@h-net.msu.edu (with no signatures or styled
text, word wrap off for long lines) and this text: sub h -
GENDER-MIDEAST firstname lastname, institution.
Cynthia Nelson, professor of anthropology, is
t h e founder and director of IGWS.
Martina Rieker, assistant professor of modern
history, is a member of the IGWS executive
c o m m i t t e e .
I n s t i t u t i o n
C Y N T H I A  N E L S ON  &  
M A RT I N A R I E K E R
Established in 1999 at the American University in
Cairo, the Institute for Gender and Women's Studies
(IGWS) is a multipurpose and interdisciplinary re-
search centre that serves scholars, activists and poli-
cy-makers interested in gender and women's studies
in the Arabic-speaking world, Turkey, the Caucasus,
Iran, Central Asia, Western Asia and Africa. The pri-
mary function of the institute is to serve as a resource
nexus within and through which research projects,
conferences, workshops, seminars, policy debates
and educational programmes on gender and women's
issues are engaged. 
Gender Studies 
in the Global South
Modernities and concomitant liberal articu-
lations of social space and place – delineated
by political and cultural visions of the post-
colonial world order and its boundaries –
have critically informed women's and gen-
der studies over the past few decades. The
challenges to modernist and post-colonial
geographies and political imaginaries posed
in the historical present are increasingly de-
manding a reconsideration of the frame-
works within which gender scholarship has
taken place. Envisioning gender studies in
the global South demands not only a critical
engagement with the grammar of the mod-
ern (subaltern/gendered) subject but also its
critical repositioning within a new global ge-
ography. Recognizing the Middle East as an
unsatisfactory and problematic category,
the goal of IGWS is to facilitate these de-
mands through a focus on transnational dia-
logue, cross-regional networking and inter-
disciplinarity. Although focused on the
MENA region as its main target, the institute
is committed to fostering scholarly dialogue
pertaining to (a) the flows of bodies, ideas
and goods between discrete Islamic cultural
spaces such as West Asia and the MENA
region, (b) the northern and southern
Mediterranean and (c) the Arabic-speaking
and sub-Saharan parts of Africa. 
To further these objectives IGWS has de-
veloped a number of programmatic compo-
nents to create scholarly networks to ex-
plore the demands of the political present
for gender studies in the global South. 
At present its focus is on planning and or-
ganizing workshops, seminars, and confer-
ences to facilitate continuous and substantial
dialogue between academics and social re-
searchers across these new philosophical and
spatial geographies. Components include:
Conferences: At the first World Congress of
Middle East Studies (Mainz, September
2002) IGWS will sponsor a symposium enti-
tled 'Women or Something Like That: Revis-
iting Gender Studies in the Middle East
Field'. The purpose of such symposia in one
of the yearly area studies conferences is to
bring together a critical mass of scholars to
examine (a) areas in which gender studies
have animated the Middle East field and the
political and academic areas that continue
to isolate such approaches and (b) map out
productive strategies for gender studies in a
region marked by conflict.
N e t w o r k s: IGWS is an active member of a
consortium currently being established be-
tween the American University in Cairo and
other universities in the MENA region and
beyond. The purpose of this consortium is
to develop databases on faculty conducting
research on gender issues; organize work-
shops and conferences on Middle East Gen-
der Studies as a field; and explore interdisci-
plinary and comparative research foci that
would engage graduate students and facul-
ty across the consortium. 
W o r k s h o p s: Together with the Center for
Gender and Sexuality Studies at New York
University, IGWS is developing a series of
three workshops, publications and educa-
tional materials on gender and transnation-
al politics. The first two workshops are being
planned on the following themes: 'Gen-
dered Bodies, Transnational Politics: Crisis
of Liberalism in Middle East Studies' (Cairo,
2003) and 'Sexualized Bodies, Transnational
Politics: Emotionality and Desire in Islamic
Studies' (New York, 2004). 
Research Projects: Together with the Cen-
tre for Studies and Research on Women
(CSAROW) affiliated with the Faculty of Let-
ters, University of Fez, Morocco, IGWS is de-
veloping a comparative research project on
'Gender and Modernist Literacies'.
J o u r n a l: Beginning with its first issue in
the summer of 2002 the institute will pub-
lish a bi-annual academic journal on gender
studies in the region. 
Much of the energies in gender education,
research and practice in the global South
are absorbed by and develop in dialogue
with non-academic actors and agencies.
Thus, in addition to its scholarly and acade-
mic mission, IGWS is committed to substan-
tial dialogue between social researchers,
practitioners, and policy-makers to create
more gender-aware and gender-sensitive
action research and policy formulation. In
this context IGWS is launching a long-term
project entitled 'Reassessing Gender Train-
ing in Egypt' in conjunction with the Social
Research Center (AUC). 
The Institute for Gender and Women's
Studies invites interested scholars to partic-
ipate in developing scholarly dialogues
around gender studies across new philo-
sophical and geographical boundaries. 
In Germany, Islam, as the third largest reli-
gious community in the country with
more than 3 million Muslims, has no acad-
emically recognized higher education pro-
gramme that focuses on Islamic theology.
A conference organized by the Free
Hanseatic City of Hamburg's Commission-
er for Foreigners in cooperation with the
University of Hamburg and the K ö r b e r
Foundation, addressed the question of es-
tablishing a chair for Islamic theology at
German universities. Islamic theologians
and experts of Islamic studies from Great
Britain, the Netherlands, Turkey, South
Africa and Indonesia contributed their po-
sitions and experience to the debate. The
publication, which resulted from this con-
ference, presents examples of the profile
of such a chair for Islamic theology, as well
as scientific analysis and critical views
from the political and religious communi-
ty of the City of Hamburg. It offers impuls-
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In June and July 1999 the National Film Theatre in
London screened over 50 Iranian films, made before
and after the 1978–79 Revolution. The proceedings of
the accompanying SOAS conference have now been
published. Contributors review the development of
Iranian cinema before the Revolution, efforts to cre-
ate an Islamic cinema afterwards, and the growing in-
ternational success of the 'New Iranian Cinema'. Typi-
cal features of this cinema are examined: the blurring
of boundaries between documentary and fiction, the
focus on children, the constrained portrayal of women,
and the way the success of Iranian cinema has provid-
ed both a focus and a forum for Iranians to reconsider
their national and cultural identity.
During the 1990s, films from Iran were in-
creasingly acclaimed at international festi-
vals. The 'New Iranian Cinema' became rec-
ognized not merely as a distinctive 'national
cinema' but as one of the most innovative
and exciting in the world. International
media interest was doubtless aroused by two
paradoxes: films of poetic and simple beauty
coming from a country reputed, since the
1978–79 Revolution, for religious fanaticism;
and a successful national cinema emerging
in conditions of political and cultural repres-
sion. These paradoxes are more apparent
than real. Contemporary Iranian cinema has
firm and deep roots, both before the revolu-
tion, and in richer and more profound Iranian
cultural traditions of drama, poetry and the
visual arts that have survived many centuries
of political and social change.
An Islamic cinema?
Before the Revolution, the ulema either
rejected cinema or ignored it: their only
method was to apply juristic (f e q h) rules in
relation to the depiction of images. General-
ly, the religious classes disapproved. For
some pious families, going to the cinema
was tantamount to committing a sin: it was
h a r a m. When the state became Islamic and
subject to the rulings of the jurists, they
could no longer ignore the issue of cinema.
They had two options: either to do away
with it (as the Taleban decided in Afghan-
istan 15 years later) or to Islamicize it. Realiz-
ing its usefulness and power, they decided
to bring it under proper control, and use it
for proper political purposes.
The Islamic revolutionaries sought to undo
and to rectify 'non-Islamic' elements in Iranian
society and culture; to establish an Islamic po-
litical and economic base and popular legiti-
macy through a new Constitution; and to
reinvent culture, society, intellectual life, edu-
cation and learning, 'Islamized' and cleansed
of the pollution of Western and Pahlavi ele-
ments. The new cultural policy imposed new
regulations: all forms of media and arts were
forced into the ideological straightjacket of
feqh rules of halal and haram. The most pow-
erful media, television and radio, were
brought firmly under state control. The arts
(including cinema), press and publishing,
were made subject to the new Ministry of Cul-
ture and Islamic Guidance.
How much did the Revolution mark a break
from pre-revolutionary cinema? While some
scholars focus on differences, others stress
continuities, pointing to many accomplished
directors who made films both before and
after, to the abiding connection of cinema
with politics, and to the continuation of cen-
sorship in various forms. The main break was
the public's reduced exposure to Hollywood
films. By the mid 1980s, however, the failure
to establish an Islamic ideological cinema
was evident. Iranian cinema, like Iranian soci-
ety, gradually stretched the limits imposed
by the jurists, and further redefined and rein-
(and the third in London that year), screening
some 60 Iranian films, both pre- and post-
revolutionary, over two months. The same
year, Chicago had its tenth annual festival,
and there were seasons devoted to Iranian
films, or particular directors, elsewhere in the
USA, France, Canada and other countries.
Renegotiating Iranian cultural
identity 
The new success of Iranian cinema has
provided both a focus and a forum for Irani-
ans to reconsider their national and cultural
identity. The main elements of Iranian na-
tional identity (i r a n i y a t) and the dialectic be-
tween them have been much discussed re-
cently: Iran as homeland and Persian as
dominant language and culture; modernity,
Western or otherwise; and S h ica Islam. The
question is complicated currently by the ex-
istence of a varied and articulate Iranian di-
aspora, interacting with many different host
cultures and different versions of modernity,
and now into second and third generations,
with hybrid/hyphenated identities, and dif-
fering ancestral linguistic and religious roots
in Iran. Extreme versions of all three original
elements (Iranian nationalism/Persian chau-
vinism; Western top-down modernization;
Islamic fundamentalism) have been tried in
the 20t h century, and failed. There is now a
widely perceived imperative to negotiate an
acceptable balance for the new millennium;
and a strong movement, with mass support
among women and youth in Iran, to reject
the traditional politics of monopolization of
power, control, secrecy and violence, in
favour of democracy, transparency and po-
litical, religious and ethnic pluralism.
Cinema has become a major focus and
arena for these discussions and debates.
The distinctive forms and achievements of
Iranian cinema, owing little to Hollywood or
Western models, have shown that, culturally
at least, a fear of 'Western invasion' is a
chimera. Cultures always borrow from each
other, then appropriate what is borrowed
and transform it into their own style. Iranian
cinema has much to teach the world about
poetry, children, emotion, class. But what do
audiences see – and want to see?
Audiences and critics have predictable (if
contradictory) expectations of 'international
cinema': an appealing aesthetic, profession-
al filming and editing; a focus on universal
human themes such as family relationships,
loss/search, survival; 'documentary' portray-
al of a little-visited country; images that con-
tradict media stereotypes of a given people
(Iranians, for example, as anti-Western, irra-
tional, terrorist); and alternatively, a lively,
country-specific social and political critique,
confirming stereotypes created in Holly-
wood productions such as Not without My
D a u g h t e r (Brian Gilbert 1991).
In terms of style and content, Iranian
movies have drawn international attention
by neo-realism and reflexivity, a focus on
children, and difficulties with portrayal of
women. In the age of ever-escalating Holly-
wood blockbusters, part of their attraction
(like much 'third-world' cinema), comes from
shoe-string budgets and use of amateur ac-
tors. Many successful films have had striking-
ly simple, local, small-scale themes, which
have been variously read as totally apolitical,
or as highly ambiguous and open to inter-
pretation as politically and socially critical.
Given such contradictory expectations
and interpretations, manifested in any num-
ber of film reviews in both popular and in-
tellectual presses, it is not surprising if Irani-
ans abroad themselves show confused reac-
tions and understandings of foreign audi-
ence responses to images of 'their' country
in the films. The mixed – and often heated –
responses of Iranians abroad to the new
Iranian cinema (and other aspects of Iranian
culture and politics as viewed in the West)
reflect not merely their different politics,
but different assumptions about what for-
eign viewers look for, and see, in these films.
Not least of the achievements of Iranian
cinema has been that it provides both a so-
cial critique and a forum for discussion be-
tween Iranians inside and outside the coun-
try. The international success of Iranian cin-
ema has been for many in the diaspora a
source of renewed pride in their culture and
heritage, as well as a channel for reconcilia-
tion between Iranians of different persua-
sions inside Iran and in the diaspora. It has
become an important medium – through
viewing and debate – for renegotiating Iran-
ian cultural identity.
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vented Iranian culture. In the arts, some Mus-
lim militants and radicals who had won the
earlier battle with the secularists now be-
came moderates and liberals themselves.
Among key players in this group who formu-
lated cultural policies in the 1980s, was Mo-
hammad Khatami, Minister of Culture and Is-
lamic Guidance, who, with a team of Muslim
intellectuals, laid the foundation for an inde-
pendent press and a new, national cinema.
Back to the festivals
Pre-revolutionary directors such as Dary-
ush M e h r j u ' i, Bahram B e y z a ' i, M a s ' u dK i m i a ' i
and Abbas Kiarostami were allowed to re-
sume their interrupted careers. Prominent
newcomers included women directors. A
period of recovery and qualitative growth
started, and films like M e h r j u ' i ' s The Tenants
(1986) and Beyza'i's Bashu, the Little Stranger
(1988) attracted international attention
once more. Important foreign critics and
filmmakers were invited to the seventh Fajr
Film Festival in 1989. The next year came a
breakthrough, with the success of Kiarosta-
mi's Where is the Friend's House at Locarno.
Meanwhile inside Iran, after the end of the
Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and Khomeini's death
in 1989, cinema became a focus for ideolog-
ical and political dispute. Official attitudes
and conditions changed. Morality codes
were relaxed. Strict censorship continued,
but a process of cultural negotiation and ac-
commodation resulted in a lively cinema
and cinema culture.
Political skirmishes reached a peak at the
Fajr Festival of 1991 and led to Khatami's res-
ignation and a new period of uncertainty.
Rafsanjani's rightist government banned
many high quality films, and accused inter-
nal opponents of supporting 'Western cul-
tural invasion'. But the change of policy was
too late, and backfired. It politicized the film-
makers and forced them to take positions. In
the 1997 presidential elections, when Khata-
mi was a surprise candidate, the artistic com-
munity, including prominent filmmakers,
took an active role in politics for the first
time. Those producing art and progressive
cinema openly supported Khatami. With the
latter's election, a new phase in Iranian cine-
ma began. Many long-suppressed films were
screened, and new films like Rakhshan Bani-
Etemad's The May Lady (1998) and Tahmineh
Milani's Two Women (1999) addressed issues
that had been taboo.
With the phenomenal success – and Festi-
val exposure – in the late 1990s of new films
by established masters like Kiarostami,
M e h r j u ' i, and Mohsen Makhmalbaf, as well as
newcomers such as Majid Majidi, Abolfazl
Jalili, Samira Makhmalbaf, Jafar Panahi and
Bahman Ghobadi, the international progress
of Iranian cinema seemed unstoppable. No
respectable festival could be without at least
one film from Iran. Seasons of Iranian movies
multiplied. In summer 1999, the National




N e w I r a n i a n s ?
Richard Tapper is professor of anthropology at SOAS,
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Visual ArtsI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 0 / 0 2 39
U K
M A I  G H O U S S O U B  &  
S H AH E E N  M E R AL I
Genuine culture can never claim a unique origin. Its
validity and its richness are drawn from a long inter-
action within human society. The centres of cultures,
historicized as centres of civilization, have been con-
stantly travelling and traversing at the same pace as
human curiosity, and curiosity is as old as being. 
Claiming Multiple
I d e n t i t i e s
In the 'Dressing – Readdressing' project, we
are seeking to position specific symbols
drawn from our own communities and marry
them to our lives as the new Europeans. The
changes witnessed recently by the fashion
world speak of a desire to transcend national
boundaries. The message conveyed by the
clothing and dressing is that of borrowed
and exchanged identities. Aminata Dramane
TraorJ, Mali's minister of culture and tourism,
spoke of the meanings filtered through this
message: 'Affluent, technological standard-
ised societies tend to forget the meaning of
this twofold relationship between ourselves
and our clothing and between the clothed
body and other people. […] Clothing is the
bearer of our, and society's, images of our-
selves, of our desires and impulses. […] The
changes wrought by fashion in recent years
have blurred national boundaries. The cloth-
ing traditions of the various ethnic groups
and cultures are now shifting and interacting
to create a new African aesthetic which in-
cludes a universal element.'1
By dressing some of the facades of conser-
vation buildings with symbols linked in pop-
ular memory to 'the other', we hope to bring
to the fore the question of the role of art, the
inter-relations between the monumental
f a ç a d e and the ambiguities of cultural identi-
ty. Here the visual arrangement acts as a fan-
tasy that can be enjoyed by the eye as well as
stirring the mind with the unexpected.
Similarly, books bought by the artists from
second-hand traders, fragrant with age, are
deviated by pasting onto the covers either a
t a r b o u s c h, f e z, or a traditional veil. This vari-
ance, this state of discord, like some trans-
lated text that imports the local vernacular,
addresses the shifting geographies and the
tension between the global and the local.
Unlike the dressing of the f a ç a d e, which is
like some ritualized event and has an out-
wardly symbolic measure, the books are in-
timate objects and re-a-dressing their cover
illustration invites the 'reader' to a more in-
tricate and personalized reading. 
In remembering these conditions of lost
origins and merged authenticities, of ruined
essentialisms and immigrant progression,
we have tried to work alongside our 'remem-
berings' as two disturbed observers partici-
pating in what can only be described within
a legacy of a century of contested history. As
displaced native informants, looking at Euro-
pean culture while being in European cul-
ture, we claim an off-centred view, a multi-
angular gaze at visual memories. 
According to Steyn, '[t]he ways in which
identity can be thematised is multifold: it is
made and un-made in many sites and cross-
es many paths. Rethinking identity entails a
demand: to split the traditional link be-
tween self and identity.'2
The two collages of dressing the building
and the books in 'Dressing – Readdressing',
make and un-make, temporarily, the mes-
sage of the original architects and publishers.
The intention of the artists was to find out
whether this temporary change would have
an effect on the understanding of the pass-
er-by that goes beyond a temporary visual
experience. The characters created by a sim-
ple costume collage became 'self sufficient
cameos, nourished within and externalized
in self-created visual idioms'.3 In this self-suf-
ficiency, the enquiry by the artists remains
open and questioning: how far can the
imagination of an individual or, in this case, a
pair of individuals effect the realization of
the complexities of a disputed history, of a
conflicted claim for the word 'civilized'?
The first site
The first site is Al-Saqi Bookshop, 26 West-
bourne Grove, West London. The façade of
the building needed to express its (Middle)
Eastern identity to the passer-by – as 26
Westbourne Grove has been the hub of ac-
tivities around issues raised by the presence
of the Near and Middle Eastern communi-
ties. The artists intended their work, 'Dress-
ing – Readdressing', to be a proclamation, a
shortening of distance between its users and
its locality in the same manner a street loves
to put ornaments when it celebrates a happy
event or when men put on a tie and women
wear a suit to attend an official ceremony. 
Specific symbolism
Since both the artists' grandfathers wore
the Turkish f e z, they wanted the theatre per-
sonalities sculpted on 26 Westbourne Grove
to try the f e z on for a few weeks. Near and
Middle Eastern women wore the veil tradi-
tionally. Most of them covered their faces at
the time when the figures sculpted on the
façade of the building were active in the
theatre. The veil was hastily raised as a neg-
ative symbol in the West and by Middle
Eastern modernists in a way that was totally
oblivious to customs and traditions. By re-
dressing 26 Westbourne Grove in 19t h- c e n-
tury Near and Middle Eastern symbols we
hoped – in this case by a simple method of
juxtaposition – to make a shift in peoples'
visual concepts and readdress the myths.
N o t e s
1 . Aminata Dramane TraorJ, in E. van der Plas and
M . Willemsen (eds.), The Art of African Fashion
(Prince Claus Fund and Africa World Press, 1998).
2 . Julia Steyn, Other than Identity ( M a n c h e s t e r
University Press, 1997).
3 . Jaya Appasamy, The Critical Vision (New Delhi:
L a l i t Kala Academy, 1985).
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Muslim lifestyles and subjectivities' in the
global era – the most deleterious of which
are on display nightly on the TV news, the
more positive of which are harder to spot in
the media. Indeed, Muslim thinkers are not
shying from the issue of 'why the hatred of
America', as a recent A l - H a y a t opinion piece
described it. For many, such 'repugnance'
and 'antipathy' towards the US are compa-
rable to the feelings of George Washington
toward the British; or at least an under-
standable response to 30% unemployment,
increasing poverty, and myriad other prob-
lems which most critics of globalization see
as the inevitable outcome of neo-liberal
economic globalization. 
Strong opposition to American power and
'tyranny' is seen as a sentiment in common
with many European citizens, whose increas-
ing opposition to US policies is noted by
many authors. This reaching out to Euro-
peans demonstrates the potential to bring
Muslims and Arabs into the grassroots world-
w i d e conversation on globalization as an
important avenue to address many of the
problems that stifle its growth. Such a move
would expand the focus to include issues of
culture and identity that are the foundation
for shaping any alternative worldwide con-
versation by enlarging the conversation be-
yond its secular, left-wing base to include
both 'religious' and 'Other' perspectives.
Cultures of resistance
In the context of the post-11 September
war on terrorism, the current heightened vi-
olence between Palestinians and Israel has
exacerbated Muslim sentiments against the
United States and opened new space for
communication with European opponents
of American-sponsored globalization. In
fact, Israel has long been singled out, based
on the vision of leaders such as Shimon
Peres, as the 'engine' of globalization, and
thus a threat to Muslims regardless of the
status of the peace process with Palestini-
ans and its Arab neighbours. 
The daily displays of unchallenged US and
Israeli power are strengthening the belief
that in the global era there can be no alter-
native for the Arab world except unity and
loyalty to its original culture. But how to re-
main loyal? A 'cultural revival' that can unify,
rather than divide, humanity is called for,
one built on a 'firmly rooted infrastructure' –
that is, Islam. Indeed, scholars and activists
around the world consider such 'revival' and
'protection' to be the foundation for suc-
cessful 'cultures of resistance' against the
negative effects of globalization. Yet more
broadly, a new 'universalism' is advocated,
one which would 'open up to the world', en-
riching rather than diluting or even erasing
local identities. In this vein, Islamist thinkers
and activists are developing specifically
Muslim models for a multicultural society
which need to be situated vis-à-vis the con-
struction of alternative modernities in other
cultures in the global era.
Thus Tariq Ramadan seeks to decentre
globalization from the West and deploy the
'effervescence of thinking and mobilizations
in the Muslim world' to make possible a
'South-North synergy'1; but to build on such
forward thinking the Muslim world must 're-
alize that there exist cleavages and resis-
tances that traverse national and cultural
frontiers and even the larger symbolic fron-
tiers between civilizations'. But to achieve
this, as Hassan Hanafi observes, a 'recon-
struction of the mass culture' in the Muslim
world is necessary, one that can reduce the
power of the main stream in favour of
heretofore marginalized voices that favour
human initiative and freedom.
To quote Muhammed Arkoun: 'The circu-
lation of various Islamist discourses will
have much to do with how this turns out',2
that is, with the success of the growing at-
tempts by Muslim and Western intellectuals
and culture producers alike to establish a
successful dialogue between their respec-
tive civilizations. Much research remains to
be done before we can assess the prospects
for this important enterprise.
N o t e s
1 . Tariq Ramadan, Muslim in France: The Way towards
C o e x i s t e n c e (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation,
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2 . Mohamed Arkoun, 'Islam et l a ï c i t é: un dialogue-
conflit en é v o l u t i o n?', in Robert Bistolfi and
François Zabbal, Islams D'Europe: I n t é g r a t i o no u
insertion communautaire (Paris: Editions de l'Aube,
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ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM welcomes the following new fellows:
– Dr Vazira Zamindar: 'Idols of the Past:
T h e Construction of World Heritage and Islamic
I n t o l e r a n c e '
– Dr Ali Yaman: 'From Holy Lineages to Cultural
Organizations: Modernity and Changing
Institutional Structures among Alevis in
Modern Turkey'
– Syuan-Yuan Chiou, M.A.: 'Islandization and
Islamization: Conversion, Ethnicity, and
Identity among Chinese-Indonesian Muslims'
– Caco Verhees, M.A.: 'Islam, Gender and
t h e State in Senegalese Women's Groups
i n Paris and Dakar'
The ISIM invites applications and research pro-
posals for various programmes. Applications
from candidates in the social sciences, humani-
ties, and religious studies will be considered.
Applicants should be competent in academic
English. The ISIM fellowships and their respective
application deadlines are as follows:
– Junior fellowships
(1 September 2002 and 1 March 2003)
– Ph.D. fellowships
(1 September 2002 and 1 March 2003)
– Post-doctoral fellowships
(1 September 2002 and 1 March 2003)
– Visiting fellowships
(1 March 2003) 
– Sabbatical fellowships
(1 September 2002 and 1 March 2003)
For more information on the various fellowships,
p l e a s e consult the ISIM website
( w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / f e l l o w s h i p s / ) .
Application forms may be downloaded from the website
o r obtained upon request from the ISIM secretariat
( i n f o @ i s i m . n l ) .
ISIM Events
Workshop: 'Scholarship and Activism
i n Islamic Family Law'
C o n v e n e r s: Lynn Welchman, Anna Wuerth
Jointly organized with the Working Group
Modernity and Islam (AKMI) and the Centre of
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (CIMEL/ SOAS)
D a t e: 5–7 July 2002
V e n u e: Freie U n i v e r s i t ä t Berlin, Germany
Panel at First World Congress for
Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES):
'(Migrant) Domestic Workers to/in/from
the Middle East' 
C o n v e n e rs: Annelies Moors, Blandine
Destremeau 
In cooperation with the University
o f Amsterdam 
D a t e: 8–13 September 2002
V e n u e: Mainz, Germany
Panel at the First World Congress for
Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES):
'Taking Islamist Debates and
Discourses Seriously: New Avenues in
Research and Collection'
C o n v e n e rs: Amr Hamzawy, Roel Meijer,
D i c kD o u w e s
D a t e: 8–13 September 2002
V e n u e: Mainz, Germany
Joint Conference: 'The Role of Converts
in European Islam'
C o n v e n e r: Thijl Sunier
In cooperation with the Netherlands
Association for the Study of the Middle East
and Islam (MOI)
D a t e: 21 September 2002
V e n u e: Utrecht, The Netherlands
Workshop at the 4t h M e d i t e r r a n e a n
Social and Political Research Meeting
(MSPR): 'The Production of Islamic
Knowledge in Western Europe' 
C o n v e n e rs: Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano
A l l i e v i
D a t e: 19–23 March 2003 
V e n u e: European University Institute, Florence,
I t a l y
For more information on these and other ISIM Events
please check the ISIM website or contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31(0)71 527 7905




The ISIM has recently produced its fourth publication in the ISIM Papers series as well as a special ISIM
Publication: 
– 'Traditionalist' Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (ISIM Paper 4) 
by Barbara Metcalf
– New Voices of Islam
by Farish Noor
The following publication is forthcoming:
– Muslims, Minorities and Modernity: The Restructuring of Heterodoxy in the Middle East and Southeast
Asia (ISIM Chair Inaugural Lecture)
by Martin van Bruinessen
Earlier ISIM publications include:
– Islam, Islamists and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East (ISIM Paper 1)
by James Piscatori
– Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt (ISIM Paper 2)
by Talal Asad
– Muslim Jurists' Quest for the Normative Basis of S h a r ica (ISIM Inaugural Lecture) 
by Muhammad Khalid Masud
– S h a r ica, State and Social Norms in France and Indonesia (ISIM Paper 3)
by John Bowen
These publications are available at the ISIM and can be ordered through the ISIM secretariat.
